My Lords, it is a pleasure to have the opportunity to speak in Committee. I begin by apologising on behalf of my noble friend Lady Lawlor, who is detained on a train. I am somewhat at a disadvantage in reading her notes but, naturally, I support the sentiments contained in what would have been her speech. I also begin by putting on record my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Leong, for being prepared to debate and discuss these issues since Second Reading, his willingness to correspond with noble Lords on key issues, for holding a meeting with his officials, which was much appreciated, and substantially corresponding with my noble friend Lord Frost.
I am going to take the easy part first, which is to speak to my Amendment 33. I think it is apposite to look at the broader context of the Bill, bearing in mind the admonition that we should not repeat Second Reading remarks. All the amendments that I, my noble friend on the Front Bench and other noble Lords are moving today are in the context of the Bill, which is an extremely wide-ranging Bill that gives significant sweeping powers to Ministers. For instance, the UK in a Changing Europe document published just last week, its UK-EU Regulatory Divergence Tracker, makes the very pertinent point that the Bill
“is a very significant legislative change, with the government giving itself a broad power to proactively align with EU regulations … The exact range of regulations in scope is ambiguous, but it is evidently broad, with the bill’s explanatory notes referencing product safety, as well as emerging sectors like online marketplaces”.
With that in mind, and the skeleton nature of the legislation, as deprecated by my noble friend Lord Sharpe, we need to see my amendment in that context.
Clause 2(3)(h) is the most egregious example of the potential issue at the heart of the Bill, which is that even existing provision in primary legislation may be replaced by provision in regulations. Many parts of the Bill, particularly in Clauses 1 and 2, are unfettered by any requirement for consultation, for criteria to be met or for meaningful preconditions to be satisfied. Indeed, the Bill clearly cuts across the guidance for departments that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee provided in its report of 15 October. My noble friend referred earlier to skeleton legislation, as well as the excoriating reports of the DPRRC and the Constitution Committee.
I remind noble Lords that this subsection relates to categories of
“persons on whom product regulations may impose product requirements”—
with all the caveats that we must accept that secondary legislation cannot, by convention, be amended. That leads us to a broader problem with the Bill in many clauses, particularly this one, which is that we have a double whammy. In the use of ministerial fiat, there is in effect no proper scrutiny in our Parliament and no proper oversight, because statutory instruments are very unlikely to be amended. Therefore, given that we have no fora in which to look at the details of the regulatory regime and the statutory instruments that will arise from the Bill—we no longer have a European Scrutiny Committee in the other place and we do not have a similar body in this House; we have a European Affairs Committee, which has a much wider remit—not only will we not be able to exercise that proper scrutiny but, having left the European Union, should we decide to shadow or dynamically align with regulations we will have no input on their effect but will effectively be cutting and pasting them into our domestic legislation.
In effect, we will have no mechanisms for scrutiny should we agree these clauses. We do not know the methodology by which a value judgment is made on the efficacy of any of these regulations on alignment. We have no measurement of criteria and no way to monitor or review the regulations at present, because there is no effective consultation process at the front end. For those reasons, I urge the Minister to look carefully at my amendment. It is not far reaching; it would specifically removes paragraph (h).
With that in mind, and for reasons of time, I am not particularly predisposed to go into detail on my noble friend Lady Lawlor’s amendments, other than to say that her Amendment 8 seems extremely sensible. Given the nature of the Bill and the wide-ranging powers that Ministers are seeking to exercise, potentially across vast swathes of our economy, a de facto sunset clause, after a modest period, would test the effects of a government intervention in terms of its environmental and economic impact, and particularly—regarding what I said earlier—its political and constitutional impact. It is an eminently sensible and straightforward amendment, and I would be surprised if such a measure were arbitrarily repudiated by the Minister and the Government.
4.41 pm