My Lords, Amendment 9 in my name would require an annual report on public operator liabilities. This might sound rather a dry subject with which to lead the last group on Report, but it is an important one, as it has the potential to totally disrupt the Government’s ambitions for Great British Railways. I begin by thanking the Minister for the meeting that we had last week with the noble Baroness, Lady Blake. He listened patiently to my concerns and was able to allay some of them—though not, I am afraid, this one.
This amendment has grown in prominence since last week’s Budget with its clear fiscal rules, and these were needed to give confidence to the markets that the Government could borrow the substantial sums needed to fund their expenditure; we will debate all that on Monday. In a nutshell, my concern is that, if liabilities which are currently off the Government’s books cease to be off balance sheet, we will revert to the position when I was Transport Secretary, with transport bidding for investment against schools, hospitals and defence and always missing out because of political priorities.
I believe the noble Lord has conceded the risk of this happening, because he has said repeatedly that it will be for the Office for National Statistics to decide in the future how GBR liabilities impact the public sector balance sheet and, specifically, public sector net debt. However, it simply cannot be prudent for the Government to embark on a programme of nationalisation without fully understanding the financial consequences of the ONS classifying GBR as “central government” and without taking the necessary precautions.
We can have a shot at what the ONS will do, because it has stated that in circumstances such as GBR it would run what is called the market body test, and we know that GBR, as the Government envisage it being structured, would fail that test. The integration of track and train within a single entity, as set out clearly in Labour’s Getting Britain Moving document, will mean that GBR will fail the ONS market body test, meaning that its liabilities will be consolidated into the department’s accounts. The Minister has argued previously that the position will not be different from where we are now, but it will be. The creation of GBR as a permanent public monopoly will create a completely different system, which will change the way in which the ONS categorises expenditure.
The Labour document is clear that GBR will be a “single employer”. If so, it will simply fail the market test and its accounts will be classified as “central government”, rather than a public corporation, as LNER is currently. The accounts will then be required to be consolidated into DfT’s accounts, like other bodies that fail the market test, and then classified as “central government”. Crucially, these different accounting treatments will make investment, for example, in rolling stock harder, as it will be in competition with other demands for public investment. The Minister has made it clear that GBR will use its purchasing power to commission new rolling stock through the roscos: rolling stock that will then be leased to GBR. He stated:
“GBR will enable a longer-term view of the rolling stock market, and it will reduce the margins it needs to make
”.—[Official Report, 23/10/24; col. 736.]
Those long-term liabilities, totalling potentially some £15 billion, will score immediately on the Government’s balance sheet, increasing national debt, even if the money to manufacture the trains comes from the roscos and is raised on the capital markets.
What I hope the Minister has done—and if he has done it, no one would be happier than me—is get an undertaking from the Treasury that, if the ONS so classifies GBR debt, the Treasury will ensure that the DfT is insulated from that decision. He may have such a letter in his breast pocket. If he has not, we know what is likely to happen because it happened to Network Rail, which was reclassified by the ONS in 2014. The Minister said at our meeting that there was scope for economies at Network Rail when it was reclassified, and I am sure he was right. But those measures were never going to compensate for all the consequences. Network Rail had to divest £1.8 billion by selling property assets; it had to defer renewal works; it had to postpone completion dates; and it had to renegotiate a lot of contracts. Do we honestly want that to happen to GBR?
So, in a nutshell, I am concerned at the gamble the Government are taking with the future of the railways by going back to the pre-privatisation system, where Ministers will have to compete against other spending departments for what the railways need. I beg to move.