My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Lansley for posing those very interesting questions. I am sure that the Government
have answers to them, but they illustrate that this legislation is essentially very rushed and that they have not properly considered it.
I promise not to repeat what I said in Committee, but I cannot resist referring back to the final impact assessment, produced by the Department for Transport. It said that the purpose of the Bill is to meet a manifesto commitment, so it has not undertaken the normal practice of looking at alternative methods by which the same objectives might be achieved, because they are all in a terrible rush as the Government want to have a headline, essentially, and want to get ahead of the franchises as they expire. Therefore, I appreciate what my noble friend Lord Lansley has said, and I look forward to the Government’s reply.
Amendments 5 and 6, standing in my name, are linked. If Amendment 5 were to pass, I understand that there has been discussion with the Government Front Bench that Amendment 6 would pass without a Division in order to avoid having two votes on the same topic.
In Committee, I referred to two different models by which the private sector might be involved in the running of railways. One is the franchise system that we are currently discussing, which is the main subject of this Bill, but the other, generally dubbed the concession system, is the one used by Transport for London for the operation of all its services other than the London Underground, which is directly provided by Transport for London. All the other services—the buses, London Overground, the DLR, the tram and so forth—are provided under a concession system; that is, they are run by private companies on a contract.
The key difference between the franchise system and the concession system is that under the franchise system, as envisaged at privatisation, the fares risk rests with the operator. That was the model that was set up back when privatisation was introduced. If the fares went up and the companies generated more fares income, they would keep it; if they lost money on fares, it would be their problem that they did not make money because the fares were not good enough. Companies had the incentive to generate more fares, principally by generating more passengers, through all the clever things that they would do.
I was frank and straightforward in saying at Second Reading that that aspect of privatisation has never worked well because, essentially, private operators are not in control of fares income, which is closely correlated with the economic cycle—which of course they cannot control, manage or in any serious way mitigate. That aspect has never worked well, and Covid put an end to it in any meaningful sense. It has never recovered from that, nor, given this legislation, is it ever going to have the chance to recover.
The concession system is different, in that the fares risk remains with the franchisor. In the case of Transport for London, it is the franchisor of the services I referred to and it retains the fares risk. The obligation of the private sector operator is simply to have the trains and equipment in the right place, pointing in the right direction first thing in the morning, properly staffed, cleaned to a certain standard and so forth. If it fails to do those things, it will suffer financial penalties. The important point is that all those things are within its
control. It receives a fee for that, but, in practice, because of competition, it is a modest fee given that risk is very limited. The risks are all things that are just a matter of it doing its job properly; if it does it properly, it will get that modest fee without penalty.
The purpose of Amendment 5 is to open up an option. It makes no obligation on the Secretary of State. When a franchise is terminated, the Secretary of State would have the option of awarding it not only, as the Bill is currently drafted, to a public sector company that is a subsidiary of the Department for Transport but to a private sector entity on a concession basis. The reason for it is simply that we know that it works. We know from Transport for London that the system can be made to work very effectively. We know that some of the best services on the Transport for London network—some of the best modes—are provided under this system. Why should it be that the Government would want to rule that out? Of course there could be a role for the private sector operating on that concessionary basis.
My noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendment gives the Government more options than mine does. My amendment gives the Government one extra option, but he would give the Government effectively limitless options by deleting the word “only”, whatever options might be available. It would give the Government more flexibility in dealing with circumstances that they may not have foreseen when they drafted this Bill.
Amendment 6 goes with Amendment 5 simply by defining in a separate clause what I mean by concession. Amendment 5 opens up the choice to do something on a concession basis and Amendment 6 says what a concession is. Despite every effort on my part and that of the Public Bill Office, we could not quite combine these into one amendment, so they stand on the Marshalled List as two amendments which, in practice, are closely linked, as one amplifies and clarifies the other.
I would very much like to hear from the Minister why Amendment 5 would not be acceptable, except to a control freak. That appears to be perhaps the Government’s vision for the railways.
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