My Lords, I have tabled my opposition to Clauses 55 and 56, which noble Lords know will prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or a civil partnership with another person without the written permission of the Secretary of State, with that permission to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. I am very pleased to be joined in my opposition to these clauses by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord German—the latter of whom unfortunately cannot be in his place tonight—both of whom spoke very powerfully on this topic in Committee.
I am also very pleased to be joined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whom I first met when he was a legal adviser at the Home Office from 1989 to 2006. We used to travel together to Strasbourg to defend the United Kingdom against allegations that it had breached the European Convention on Human Rights. Our record in court was mediocre at best, but the lunches were excellent, and I have great admiration for his expertise and judgment. I very much look forward to what he has to say on this subject.
Why have we brought this matter back on Report? It is not because I have any expectation of changing the Government’s mind, and it is not because I intend to divide the House, particularly at this late hour. My motive is simply to ensure that we record why this is an objectionable measure which has no conceivable justification. There are three reasons why I express such a critical view of these clauses. First, the Government’s reason for conferring this power on the Secretary of State and imposing this disability is so weak. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, suggested that these measures will
“drive up public confidence in the justice system
”.—[Official Report, 25/3/24; col. 491.]
I can think of many reasons why confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined: the unacceptable delays in hearing trials in which defendants are accused of serious offences; the fact that so many courtrooms cannot be used because of their poor state of repair; the low rates of pay for prosecutors; and the low rates of legal aid renumeration for criminal barristers and solicitors, which has substantially reduced the number of lawyers available in criminal cases. What I have never heard anyone say is, “My confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined because whole life prisoners are able to marry”. It is preposterous.
My second reason for objecting to these provisions is that they are wrong in principle. We all know, and the Minister emphasised in Committee, that whole life orders are reserved for those who have committed the most serious crimes—awful crimes of serial or child murders involving premeditation or sexual or sadistic violence. However, this does not mean that we deny such prisoners basic rights. However repellent their crimes, whole life prisoners are allowed to eat more than a crust of bread; they are allowed to exercise; they are allowed to read books, to watch television and to send and receive letters. The right to marry another consenting adult is also a basic right. National law may limit the exercise of that right—you cannot marry your brother, a 12 year-old or your dog—but what the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test repeatedly stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Minister in Committee suggested that the Government consider that Article 12 of the European convention allows for a restriction on the right to marry to be in the public interest. However, that does not assist the Government because there is a judgment of the Strasbourg court in a case concerned with prisoners. It is Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court recognised at paragraph 91:
“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and… some civil rights and privileges. This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
The court added, at paragraph 93, that the state cannot prevent a prisoner exercising the right to marry because of the view of the authorities as to what
“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.
That is precisely the basis on which this Government purport to justify Clauses 55 and 56 of the Bill—public opinion, public confidence. I ask the Minister, how can the Government maintain the statement, made by the Secretary of State for Justice on the front of the Bill, that Clauses 55 and 56, like the rest of the Bill, are compatible with Convention rights?
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My third reason for opposing these clauses is that they may do real damage in prisons. If we are to lock people up for the whole of their lives, subject only to release on compassionate grounds, we must surely not remove encouragement for them to maintain relationships with the outside world, however difficult that may be. It is not just for their own self-respect; it is not just because of their mental health; it is because it will help those who manage the prison estate by reducing the risk that the inevitable frustrations of long-term prisoners erupt in violence against prison officers or other prisoners. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on the Opposition Front Bench, made this point powerfully on Second Reading and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, did so again in Committee. The Minister had no answer on either occasion. So for these reasons, Clauses 55 and 56 should be removed from the Bill. They have no coherent justification, they are objectionable in principle and they will impede good management of the prison regime.
I am very sorry indeed that a Secretary of State for Justice, Mr Alex Chalk, who I greatly admire, should think it appropriate to bring forward such proposals. I do not normally quote the Bible, but I will. The Book of Mark, Chapter 10, verse nine:
“Those whom God has joined together let no-one separate”—
not even the Secretary of State.