My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 80 and 84. These amendments would extend the provision of Jade’s law in the Bill, which relates to murder and manslaughter cases, and would deprive a convicted offender of parental responsibility. The amendments would extend the provisions to sexual offences against children in the family. A powerful case has been made for this extension. It was recently approved, as has been said, in another Bill before the Commons. The examples provided in the briefing material fully justify this amendment.
If I may be pedantic for a moment, I will point out that in the explanatory statement attached to Amendment 80 there is an incorrect reference to removal of “the presumption of custody”. There is no such presumption, and the concept of custody has not existed since the Children Act 1989, although it persists in soap operas, to the irritation of family lawyers.
This amendment would prohibit the exercise of parental responsibility by convicted offenders in cases of child sexual abuse. Allowing sexual offenders to
continue to exercise parental responsibility would be wholly inappropriate. Amendments 80 and 84 are well suited to the structure of the Bill, which provides for an order to be made by the Crown Court and then automatically reviewed by the family court when there is perhaps a fuller picture of the family circumstances and a fuller picture of wider implications.
In many ways, cases of sexual offending are more difficult because, sadly, in cases of murder and manslaughter, both parents are not alive. When both parents are still alive, and when there is the possibility that the offender is not in custody—or not for very long —serious thought needs to be given, after the automatic order in the Crown Court, by the family court. That is why I suggest that these amendments are well suited to the structure of the Bill.
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I have some reservations about Amendment 83, which I expressed in Committee. I find it more difficult. I understand the point of the amendment but question its scope. It would apply to cases of murder as well as manslaughter, and it would do so irrespective of the nature, extent and seriousness or otherwise of the abuse suffered. It would also apply irrespective of its lack of relevance to the offence for which the parent has been convicted. Abuse in these situations may be rather remote and unrelated to the offence, and, in cases of murder, it will not have affected the decision to convict. As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, accepted, there is a discretion under new Section 10A(5), to be inserted by the Bill into the Children Act, in manslaughter cases at least, to allow some relief from the provisions of Jade’s law. I venture to suggest that that might well be sufficient and would allow for a case- specific decision in each case.
I support Amendment 91, which relates to expert evidence and particularly refers to the problems of psychological experts, highlighted in recent decisions of the Court of Appeal and the family court. I can tell the noble Baroness that it is cowgirls as well as cowboys who operate in this field. If I can be anecdotal for a moment, I particularly recall an advocate recommending fervently the instruction of a psychologist of whom nobody had heard and who turned out to be the advocate’s wife.
When the court decides that expert evidence is needed in difficult cases, the courts and the parties are entitled to expect professionals who are objective, authoritative and have relevant skills and qualifications, not those with their own agenda, unhelpful rigid views or preformed assumptions. We need experts to assist with the analysis of past events, but, more importantly, as the noble Baroness said, even if that is left to the court, the expert is needed to help with recommendations for suitable and available appropriate therapy to deal with the problems of the family revealed by the case. The purpose of experts at that stage can be to see whether there is any possibility of restoring family relationships, particularly in the so-called alienation cases.
It is frustrating, and it still happens, that you come across a recommendation for a form of treatment that is not available, either because it is too costly or because it is not available under the health service.
That is less likely to happen if the expert who has been instructed is a mainstream practitioner grounded in the real world. I repeat what I said in Committee: it would, frankly, be better if this provision applied to all psychological experts used in such cases, not just those instructed to assess the victim but those instructed to assess the perpetrators and the children. Quite often, you get jointly instructed experts required to carry out what are called “global assessments” of all involved. Although I appreciate why this amendment focuses on the assessment of victims, it is to be hoped that, if it is introduced as part of the statutory framework, it will apply to raise standards across the board.
I support Amendment 92. Much of what it seeks to achieve is or ought to be covered by the relevant practice direction in the Family Procedure Rules. As I said in Committee, it is sometimes quite difficult to discover what the state of the investigation has been and what bail conditions apply. It is therefore quite difficult to align bail conditions with orders required by the family court. Nevertheless, I support the amendment because it will, in practice, assist the courts.