No. I was saying that there was extensive consultation, including with the police, and that that has resulted in these new arrangements. As to the actual mechanics of the production of an overall report, I am afraid that I do not know but I will find out and advise noble Lords.
His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services also inspects, monitors and reports on the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, including their use of surveillance cameras. All of these bodies have statutory powers to take the necessary action when required. The ICO will continue to regulate all organisations’ use of these technologies, including being able to take action against those not complying with data protection law, and a wide range of other bodies will continue to operate in this space.
On the first point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, where any of the privacy concerns he raises concern information that relates to an identified or identifiable living individual, I can assure him that this information
is covered by the UK’s data protection regime. This also includes another issue raised by the noble Lord—where the ANPR captures a number-plate that can be linked to an identifiable living individual—as this would be the processing of personal data and thus governed by the UK’s data protection regime and regulated by the ICO.
For the reasons I have set out, I maintain that these clauses should stand part of the Bill. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will withdraw his stand part notices on Clauses 147 and 148.
Clause 149 does not affect the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, which the noble Lord seeks to maintain through his amendment. The clause’s purpose is to update the name of the national DNA database board and update its scope to include the national fingerprint database within its remit. It will allow the board to produce codes of practice and introduce a new delegated power to add or remove biometric databases from its remit in future via the affirmative procedure. I therefore maintain that this clause should stand part of the Bill and hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his stand part notice.
Clauses 147 and 148 will improve consistency in the guidance and oversight of biometrics and surveillance cameras by simplifying the framework. This follows public consultation, makes the most of the available expertise, improves organisational resilience, and ends confusing and inefficient duplication. The Government feel that a review, as proposed, so quickly after the Bill is enacted is unnecessary. It is for these reasons that I cannot accept Amendment 292 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.
I turn now to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which seek to remove Clauses 130 to 132. These clauses make changes to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which provides the retention regime for biometric data held on national security grounds. The changes have been made only following a formal request from Counter Terrorism Policing to the Home Office. The exploitation of biometric material, including from international partners, is a valuable tool in maintaining the UK’s national security, particularly for ensuring that there is effective tripwire coverage at the UK border. For example, where a foreign national applies for a visa to enter the UK, or enters the UK via a small boat, their biometrics can be checked against Counter Terrorism Policing’s holdings and appropriate action to mitigate risk can be taken, if needed.
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The existing retention rules in the Counter-Terrorism Act present several operational challenges for Counter Terrorism Policing in relation to international biometric exchange. These clauses make proportionate changes to mitigate these issues, so that the police are not forced to delete critical data. In the case of Clause 132, which makes changes to the way biometrics from Interpol can be retained, this change was recommended by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who highlighted the pressing operational need for these biometrics to be exempt from the national security determination regime and an alternative regime to be put in place.
Overall, these clauses will support the police to retain biometric data from international partners, including Interpol, ensuring that biometrics are retained in a proportionate way, while protecting the public from national security-related risks, such as terrorism. Given the positive impact these changes will have on national security—changes which, in part, have the support of the relevant independent reviewers and which are being pursued only following a formal request from policing—I cannot support the noble Lord’s opposition to Clauses 130, 131 and 132 standing part of the Bill, and I hope that he will not press it.