My Lords, I have added my name in support of the stand part notices of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, to Clauses 147, 148 and 149. These clauses would abolish the office of the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner, along with the surveillance camera code of practice. I am going to speak mainly to the surveillance camera aspect, although I was taken by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who made some strong points.
The UK has become one of the most surveilled countries in the democratic world. There are estimated to be over 7 million CCTV cameras in operation. I give one example: the automated number plate recognition, ANPR, system records between 70 million and 80 million readings every day. Every car is recorded on average about three times a day. The data is held for two years. The previous Surveillance Camera Commissioner, Tony Porter, said about ANPR that it,
“must surely be one of the largest data gatherers of its citizens in the world. Mining of meta-data—overlaying against other databases can be far more intrusive than communication intercept”.
Professor Sampson, the previous commissioner, said about ANPR:
“There is no ANPR legislation or act, if you like. And similarly, there is no governance body to whom you can go to ask proper questions about the extent and its proliferation, about whether it should ever be expanded to include capture of other information such as telephone data being emitted by a vehicle or how it's going to deal with the arrival of automated autonomous vehicles”.
And when it came to independent oversight and accountability, he said:
“I’m the closest thing it’s got—and that’s nothing like enough”.
I am not against the use of surveillance cameras per se—it is unarguable that they are a valuable tool in the prevention and detection of crime—but there is clearly a balance to be found. If we chose to watch everything every person does all of the time, we could eliminate crime completely, but nobody is going to argue that to be desirable. We can clearly see how surveillance and biometrics can be misused by states that wish to control their populations—just look at China. So there is a balance to find between the protection of the public and intrusion into privacy.
Technology is moving incredibly rapidly, particularly with the ever-increasing capabilities of Al. As technology changes, so that balance between protection and privacy may also need to change. Yet Clause 148 will abolish the only real safeguards we have, and the only governance body that keeps an eye on that balance. This debate is not about where that balance ought to be; it is about making sure that there is some process to ensure that the balance is kept under independent review at a time when surveillance technologies and usage are developing incredibly rapidly.
I am sure that the Minister is going to argue that, as he said at Second Reading:
“Abolishing the Surveillance Camera Commissioner will not reduce data protection
”.—[Official Report, 19/12/23; col. 2216.]
He is no doubt going to tell us that the roles of the commissioner will be adequately covered by the ICO. To be honest that completely misses the point. Surveillance is not just a question of data protection; it is a much wider question of privacy. Yes, the ICO may be able to manage the pure data protection matters, but it cannot possibly be the right body to keep the whole question of surveillance and privacy intrusion, and the related technologies, under independent review.
It is also not true that all the roles of the commissioner are being transferred to other bodies. The report by the Centre for Research into Surveillance and Privacy, or CRISP, commissioned by the outgoing commissioner, is very clear that a number of important areas will be lost, particularly reviewing the police handling of DNA samples, DNA profiles and fingerprints; maintaining an up-to-date surveillance camera code of practice with standards and guidance for practitioners and encouraging compliance with that code; setting out technical and governance matters for most public body surveillance systems, including how to approach evolving technology, such as Al-driven systems including facial recognition technology; and providing guidance on technical and procurement matters to ensure that future surveillance systems are of the right standard and purchased from reliable suppliers. It is worth noting that it was the Surveillance Camera Commissioner who raised the issues around the use of Hikvision cameras, for example—not something that the ICO is likely to be able to do. Finally, we will also lose the commissioner providing reports to the Home Secretary and Parliament about public surveillance and biometrics matters.
Professor Sampson said, before he ended his time in office as commissioner:
“The lack of attention being paid to these important matters at such a crucial time is shocking, and the destruction of the surveillance camera code that we’ve all been using successfully for over a decade is tantamount to vandalism”.
He went on to say:
“It is the only legal instrument we have in this country that specifically governs public space surveillance. It is widely respected by the police, local authorities and the surveillance industry in general … It seems absolutely senseless to destroy it now”.
The security industry does not want to see these changes either, as it sees the benefits of having a clear code. The Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board, said:
“Without the Surveillance Camera Commissioner you will go back to the old days when it was like the ‘wild west’, which means you can do anything with surveillance cameras so long as you don’t annoy the Information Commissioner … so, there will not be anyone looking at new emerging technologies, looking at their technical requirements or impacts, no one thinking about ethical implications for emerging technologies like face-recognition, it will be a free-for-all”.
The British Security Industry Association said:
“We are both disappointed and concerned about the proposed abolition of the B&SCC. Given the prolific emergence of biometric technologies associated with video surveillance, now is a crucial time for government, industry, and the independent commissioner(s) to work close together to ensure video surveillance is used appropriately, proportionately, and most important, ethically”.
I do not think I can put it better than that.
While there may be better ways to achieve the appropriate safeguards than the current commissioner arrangement, this Bill simply abolishes everything that
we have now and replaces the safeguards only partially, and only from a data protection perspective. I am open to discussion about how we might fill the gaps, but the abolition currently proposed by the Bill is a massively retrograde and even dangerous step, removing the only safeguards we have against the uncontrolled creep towards ever more intrusive surveillance of innocent people. As technology increases the scope for surveillance, this must be the time for greater safeguards and more independent oversight, not less. The abolition of the commissioner and code should not happen unless there are clear, better, safeguards established to replace it, and this Bill simply does not do that.
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