My Lords, the subject of IPPs is so well known to you all, and indeed to many outside this House, that it is unnecessary to speak at any length about it, save for one remark and one set of common grounds.
When the Minister said that this Bill was about victims, he was in every sense right. In some senses, those who received the sentence of IPP are in fact victims, as I will endeavour to explain by reference to what I think are four areas of common ground, which I think ought to guide what I wish to say.
The first area of common ground is that the 2003 Act which implemented these was a mistake and should never have been enacted. There is now no dispute about that. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for the candour, statesmanship and exemplary conduct he has shown—which so few do—in admitting error. He is to be warmly commended for that, and my only regret is that he is not here in person for him to hear what we all feel.
The second point of common ground is that the operation and the effect of the IPP system has been a stain on the administration of justice in England and Wales. Again, I do not think that is disputed.
Thirdly, the outcome of imposing sentences of IPP has been problematic in very many ways, and a particular problem has been the effect on the mental health of those who received this form of sentence, particularly those in the initial period from 2005 to 2008.
The fourth area of common ground is the old phrase, “Something must be done!” The real question is: what should be done? These problems have to be addressed; we cannot leave them unaddressed.
In the groups of amendments to be considered this afternoon, the real issue relates to that fourth point of common ground: what is to be done? One should begin by welcoming the leadership shown by the Lord Chancellor—this Lord Chancellor, I underline—in the Bill. He has accepted that there are problems and that they need to be addressed. We have to recognise that he is in some senses constrained by circumstances and by events which may happen later in the year. However, I very much hope that in the course of this debate we can achieve more under his leadership, which has been outstanding in this respect, and see what we can do to try either to solve the problems now or at least to make certain that the basis is there for their solution in the future.
Having said I would say very little by way of introduction, I may have spoken for too long; I now turn to the amendments in the first group. These are amendments to Clause 48 and there are four sets of them. I am extremely grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Blunkett, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, for their support by co-signing these amendments, which all relate to the provisions for release on licence.
I am not sure how well appreciated it is that the licence period after release from an IPP is one of the most draconian aspects of the sentence. After release, the offender is on licence and subject to licence conditions—and, most importantly, subject to recall if they breach them—for an indefinite period presently,
unless the Parole Board decides to release or reduce the licence period. At present, it cannot do so until 10 years have elapsed. It is that 10-year period which this clause seeks to address. At the moment, all cases are referred to the Parole Board for consideration—but 10 years is a very long time.
One of the things that is clear on the evidence—and it is always important to proceed on the evidence—is that the indeterminate nature of IPP sentences has created many very serious mental health issues and these are exacerbated by the licence period. It is very difficult for someone who has been in custody for such an indeterminate period, not knowing when they are going to released, to maintain his or her mental stability—and then being subject to 10 years on licence is almost impossible.
So we must warmly welcome the basis of this recall in reducing that period from 10 years to three years, because then the Parole Board can look at the licence period and decide whether it should be terminated then and there. If it is not terminated and if the person is successful and remains on licence, out of custody, for two years, there is a sunset or automatic termination. So, before I turn to the amendments, I think it is right to say that this is a huge achievement and, on almost everyone’s behalf, I thank the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for doing this.
My amendments make changes to this new regime which are minor but important. I hope they are of a kind about which there will be little dispute—because, if there are disputes about these, I dread to think where we shall get to when we go down the list. Four areas are covered by these amendments. The first of these sets of amendments are Amendments 149, 150 and 151, which try to set out a more flexible and just way of terminating the licence period if it is not terminated at the three-year point.
I do not want to go into the technicalities of this too much, because this is typically awful sentencing legislation—most sentencing legislation is awful, as is shown by the fact that the Sentencing Code is about this thick—and I do not think a debate on the language is a good way for us to spend our time. But, in essence, this provides that, if the Parole Board does not at the three-year period terminate the licence, we have to address whether it is right that the person has to wait to have their licence terminated by spending two years without the risk of having their licence revoked and returning to prison.
The essence of this amendment is accepting the mental health problems that this form of imprisonment has caused and for which ultimately the state is responsible, as a result of the enactment of this legislation. This amendment seeks to restore a right of annual review. This would give the Parole Board the opportunity each year to look at the position of the individual and see whether, in all the circumstances, we can terminate.
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Amendments 150 and 151, which I will deal with separately as they are slightly different, go to putting right a possible injustice in how the legislation is drafted. As everyone appreciates, the offender can be recalled to prison. Sometimes, there is a mistake in the recall. The Lord Chancellor or the Secretary of State
can set that aside and revoke the recall. He does so if there has been a mistake. However, the problem with how the legislation is drafted—this is a highly technical problem—is that if he recalls the person but decides subsequently that it was a mistake, the two-year period is interrupted. That is unjust. Why should you be prejudiced by a mistake? The very simple Amendment 150 deals with human error, so that the offender is not prejudiced.
Amendment 151 deals with a very analogous problem—what happens if a person is recalled by the Parole Board, in the exercise of its judgment in respect of what is known as the Calder jurisdiction? I need not go into this matter in any detail because the point is a simple one. If the Parole Board decides that it was inappropriate to recall him but that he is fit for release, again, the effect of that in the Bill as currently drafted is that it breaks the two-year period and therefore the person has to start all over again. It is a bit like going round the Monopoly board and being sent back to the start again. This is something that we should not have.
Amendment 152 is very simple. The Bill contains a power to change the period of three years. There are two solutions to this. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, will address the first, which is whether we should remove the power altogether. The second—my preferred solution —is to alter “change” to “reduce”. “Change” enables you to increase, and I am sure that no one in Parliament wants to see an increase in the period. So I think it would be better to have a power but to make sure that it can be exercised in only one way. Having said that, I very much hope that this will not be controversial and that the Government can agree to this or to something very similar. I beg to move.