My Lords, I begin by associating myself with the remarks of my noble friend Lord Hailsham about the late Lord Cormack. I cannot add anything to what my noble friend said, but it is entirely true that Lord Cormack is a great loss and we shall all miss him tremendously.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and my noble friend for their references to my earlier intervention in these debates. I am not sure that the further interpretation that they place on my intervention is entirely justified or that I would entirely go along with it, but that is perhaps a matter for debate at a later stage.
The amendments in this group are all based on respect for the rule of law. A critical part of respect for the rule of law is the separation of powers, something much referred to in our earlier debates, and it is to that subject that I propose to address these remarks. As Anthony Speaight KC reminds us in his recent Politeia pamphlet, there is no such thing as the absolute separation of legislature, executive and judicial powers in our constitutional arrangements. Our Executive are rooted in our legislature and in any event, as Mr Speaight and others have pointed out, there are precedents for this legislation—for the proposition that Parliament can deem certain countries to be safe—including the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004,
passed under the Blair Government. The principle in that legislation was challenged in the case of Nasseri but was upheld by the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. That, of course, is essentially what this Bill does: it deems Rwanda to be a safe country.
However, there is an even broader principle that is relevant here and is at the root of why this legislation is necessary. We have traditionally recognised the separation of powers between the Executive and the judiciary. That principle can be expressed in the proposition that decision-making is the responsibility of the Executive, but that the courts have the responsibility to review the lawfulness of those decisions.
That responsibility of the courts is what we know as judicial review. Its scope has been expanded greatly in recent years in ways which have not found universal approval but its principle is accepted as an important part of our constitutional arrangements. However, judicial review does not involve the courts substituting their own decisions for those of the Executive. It involves, in essence, an assessment of whether it was reasonable for the Executive to make the decision in question.
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That was the approach that the Divisional Court took in the case that gave rise to the Bill. The Divisional Court held that the Government’s decision was lawful and I imagine that, if things had rested there, the Government would not have asked Parliament to consider the Bill; but, as we know, things did not rest there.
The Court of Appeal, by a majority, and the Supreme Court held that the Divisional Court had applied the wrong test. The correct test, said the Supreme Court at paragraph 34 of its judgment, requires the court to decide the issue for itself—to substitute its own decision for that of the Executive—and that is exactly what the Supreme Court did. It took that approach because it was following a decision of the European Court of Human Rights in a case called Soering; but as the Supreme Court itself recognised at paragraph 28 of its judgment, while the Human Rights Act requires it to take into account decisions of the European court, as is now well established, it does not require it to follow them.
I suggest to your Lordships that, in resolving to decide this issue for itself, the Supreme Court was trespassing on the province of the Executive. If there is any breach of the principle of separation of powers in this matter, it is not the Government who are guilty but the Supreme Court. All the Government are doing in the Bill is to reassert their responsibility, as traditionally understood by the principle of the separation of powers, for executive decision-making. There is a reason why it is the Government and not the courts who have that responsibility: because it is the Government and not the courts who are accountable. The courts are accountable to no one—they pride themselves on that—but accountability is at the heart of democracy. That is why the Government are fully entitled to bring forward the Bill and why much of the criticism directed at them for doing so is, for the reasons I have given, fundamentally misconceived. That is why I oppose these amendments.