My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his introduction to this important amendment. I have to say that I was somewhat shocked when I first read the Bill. In Clause 33(6), it says:
“Where the advocate provides support to victims under the age of 18, the advocate may do so only by providing support to such persons as the advocate considers represent those victims”.
As a teacher, the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, who submitted this amendment, understands the vital issue of whether a child or young person—as a victim of a
major incident—can have capacity to consent to the provision of direct support. To expect an advocate to make a decision, by passing it on to someone else to represent them, even if it is a parent—it may not always a parent, for reasons I will come to—without checking the child’s capacity or their interests and understanding is just plain wrong.
The example I want to highlight—I have chosen another non-criminal one, deliberately—is the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Many children and young people were separated by the tsunami from their families, with no knowledge of who lived, died or who had been injured, and that included a number of British children. We know, from accounts at the time, that older siblings had to take on the care of and responsibility for the younger ones and for making contact and communicating with the British consul.
I cite this example because the issue of capacity and consent in those early days was vital, but in the longer term it would have been really helpful for those children and young people in their recovery to have been party to sensitive discussions about what had happened. There was mention in an earlier grouping about how one registers the death, and in this example there might have been important differential cultural practices in handling deaths and children might be the ones who can talk about what they want and what their family practice is without, for example, a British consul having to make that decision. I think one of the worst things an advocate or a Government could do would be just to impose someone to represent their interests without gaging their capacity first.
However, this does not just happen in criminal courts, and I am really grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for citing the family court approach at the moment. We know that family courts often have to consider Gillick competency when hearing from children and young people about their own future. It is also commonplace in children’s social care and education and, above all, in health and about treatment. The CQC has a very helpful guide on the internet called Brief Guide: Capacity and Competence to Consent in Under 18s that sets out exactly what professionals need to consider. I am not suggesting that the CQC briefing or the rules that it uses should be adopted in whole, because issues about treatment are very different where somebody is acting as an advocate or having some parental responsibility. But large sectors of our public system—whether it is health, education or the courts—already use, and are trained to use, competency and consent. They understand when it needs to move to the area that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned, where a voice is heard but a decision is not necessarily made on the child’s view. Clause 33(6) cuts that out completely, which seems to be totally extraordinary.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister on why it was there and whether there would be some possibility of negotiating something that reflects the actual practice in our courts and education and health systems for children at the moment.