My Lords, I will speak to the two amendments in my name. It is late, and I will try to keep this as short as possible, first addressing Amendment 67. Amendment 62, in the names of my noble friend Lady Ludford and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, focuses on much of the same ground as Amendment 67, and there has been a lot of wise discussion in that area. I support their points but do not need to echo them. However, I add that Clause 3 has the effect of sunsetting retained EU rights, powers, liabilities, et cetera. Unlike Clause 1, the Bill does not allow the Clause 3 deadline to be extended, which increases the likelihood of accidental deletions. Why is that extension not advanced for Clause 3?
I will focus on the proposal that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill. This is intended to probe the effect of abolishing the general principles of EU law—we briefly heard from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, on that process, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, also alluded to this. I remind your Lordships that we have established that much EU law is, as the Minister described it, a “mishmash” of interwoven UK and EU-derived law. I think that that is what the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, called, rather more alarmingly, the “interpenetration” of law. Until now, the general principles of EU law have been used by lawyers, court and tribunals in the UK to interpret the EU part of that mishmash. These general principles include legal certainty, equal treatment, proportionality, non-retroactivity, effectiveness, equivalence and respect for fundamental rights, among others—like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I was unable to find a definitive list.
A further example of a general principle of EU law is the Marleasing principle. Looking at experienced lawyers opposite, I feel I am probably entering terrible territory by even mentioning this. But my understanding is that the application of this principle means that, if no national law at all has been passed to comply with a directive, it was held that having national legislation passed specifically in the name of the directive was not necessary. In any case, the Bill does away with this, so there may be some lasting effect. So this amendment probes the practical effect of abolishing direct-effect supremacy, and the general principles of EU law, taken together.
As we know, the UK regulations set out the letter of a law, the bare bones. However, in spite of the excellent work done in this Chamber to achieve clarity in those laws, there is often uncertainty—noble Lords will find that hard to believe—as to what the words actually mean.
Where the regulations give effect to a directive, such as the working time directive, the courts use the directive to help them understand the meaning of the regulations. Directives, unlike UK law, set out their purpose and their aims. Those aims help a court or tribunal to interpret the regulation. My understanding is that during the process of assimilation, new assimilated law loses contact
with the EU directive and the EU-derived part of the law in that mishmash. It loses the basis for ongoing interpretation.
I can understand, post Brexit, why on the face of it the Government wish to sweep away all mention of EU law and EU directives—I get that. However, the meaning and understanding of the regulations, as we now have them—the Minister’s mishmash—has taken years and many different appeal cases, and much individual expense, to give the level of understanding of the law and the regulation that we now enjoy.
For example, litigation began in 2001 over whether workers were able to carry over their annual leave when they were too sick to take it. This was finally settled many cases later by Plumb in 2015—14 years later—with a carryover right. This is not unusual. Common law incrementally decides issues before a settled understanding emerges. The default of the Bill is to sweep away all this accrued understanding or at least put it in question and not provide any clear statement of what the law will be going forward.
If the Government do not want to change the settled meaning of UK law as it is interpreted today, my understanding is that they would need to audit all the conforming interpretations that have affected regulations from court decisions and translate those court decisions into the body of the new or replacement regulations. Is that what the Minister intends? If so, that intention should be inserted in the Bill. However, I suspect this is not the plan. In that case, even if all the regulations were preserved in assimilated law, the abolition of direct application, supremacy and general principles will result in the UK waking up on 1 January 2024 to a new year with large swathes of law that no lawyer will be able accurately to predict or advise on, causing great uncertainty—the sort of uncertainty that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, alluded to.
A colleague said to me as I was trying to explain this, “Surely no judge would want to throw out all that case law.” That is where we come to the interrelation of Clause 7. However, we will not know what the judges decide until a case has been brought. Let us not forget that there are thousands of laws here, which could mean thousands of potential tests. We will not know how the test will end until a judge rules on it—probably more than once, as experience shows.
Can the Minister explain why there is no plan to port the interpretation and case of the laws that we have within the mishmash into the assimilated law as we go forward? If there are plans, could he explain what they are?