I thank noble Lords for an interesting debate on these non-government amendments. I do not think that I have a perfect reply to my noble friend Lady Noakes’s three questions. We are due to meet to discuss various aspects of the Bill and I would like to explore her questions further, and then perhaps I can write to the Committee when it is clear to me what the right replies to those questions are.
I will attempt to comment on the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has just talked about, on why government departments do not have the same obligation to have regard to recommendations under Clause 97. It is a simple question, and our response is that it is not necessary to include government departments in Clause 96 and 97, because the appropriate authorities have sufficient influence over contracting authorities to ensure that any recommendations that result from an investigation are duly taken into consideration. To confirm, investigations, findings and progress reports may be published by the relevant authority acting as a further incentive. It is simply unnecessary to provide statutory powers in respect of government departments, whereas due to the different relationship with non-central contracting authorities, statutory powers were required to ensure appropriate engagements for these purposes. As noble Lords will know, we have quite a well-developed procurement operation now, right at the heart of Government, sitting in the Cabinet Office, which I think is an improvement. That is why it is not provided for in the Bill.
Just before I leave voluntary standstills, let me say that I will make sure we come back properly on the exchange we had earlier. We want to maintain voluntary standstills for dynamic markets—they are intended to be quick to use, agile and efficient, as we heard from my noble friend Lord Lansley—and for light-touch contracts, which are often for time-sensitive services such as the provision of health and social care. We do not want to make the light-touch contract rules stricter in this regard than current legislation, as we think that could lead to some problems.
Amendments 349A, 349B and 353A were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, and others. They seek to legislate for the procurement review unit with a new clause. The procurement review unit, which is very important, is not specifically referenced in the Bill as it will be exercising statutory and non-statutory powers on behalf of Ministers. The proposed new clauses would therefore conflict with existing provisions.
Furthermore, considering the importance and potential implications of the decisions the PRU will support the Minister of the day in making—the proper statutory process—we believe it would be inappropriate to delegate that ultimate responsibility to unelected officials below ministerial level.
The PRU will work on behalf of the Minister of the day in two key areas. The first area is debarments. Clauses 56 to 61 set out the process for the establishment of a debarment list of excluded and excludable suppliers; this has already been debated. Under these clauses, it is envisaged that the PRU will investigate whether a supplier is subject to an exclusion ground and whether the issues in question are likely to arise again. The PRU will issue advice to the relevant Minister, usually the Minister for the Cabinet Office, who will take the final decision whether to add the supplier to the debarment list.
The second area is improving compliance with the Bill. Clauses 96 to 98 provide the framework and statutory powers required for carrying out procurement oversight. The PRU will exercise these oversight functions on behalf of the Minister and make proposals regarding any investigations, recommendations and statutory guidance it considers appropriate for the Minister’s ultimate approval.