My Lords, I rise to speak to two amendments that have a relationship I shall endeavour to explain as rapidly as possible, bearing in mind the hour. Amendment 73A relates to Schedule 3 and deals with the very extraordinary powers in this Bill, giving the High Court the power to overrule primary legislation of the devolved legislatures. This is a very real problem. I shall speak largely from the point of view of the judiciary and what we are intending to do.
Before I turn to that, I would say that, if we look at agriculture or anything else where there is an attempt by the four Governments of the UK to agree something that deals with the support of subsidies, it is extraordinary that anything that is legislated for in England is exempt, but what is legislated for elsewhere is not. There is a constitutional reason for that, and I know what the Minister will say, but it is not a matter of practical reality or public perception. It is important that we consider this.
The first extraordinary part of this is that power is given not to the Competition Appeal Tribunal but to the High Court or the Court of Session in Scotland. To my mind, it is worrying that you give to a first-instance court the power to overrule a decision and an Act of a democratically elected primary legislature. Normally, these matters would go to the Supreme Court. Secondly, and much more importantly, is it right that we should put our judges in a position to make decisions about what are effectively the principles in the Bill? People may remember something called the Human Rights Act and the very broad powers it is said to give judges to make decisions. That has had a degree of criticism.
Why do we want to do this in a piece of legislation where the phrases are so ill defined? I shall come to that in the second amendment I intend to speak to. We should exercise the greatest degree of care in giving judges the right to overrule the legislature. I am not certain about the extent to which there has been widespread consultation with the judiciary about this, or with others, but this is the first and very significant step.
There is an extraordinary constitutional provision that has to deal with whose rationale is looked at. I do not want to go into the details of that, because that is more a subsidiary point, and I bear in mind the time—but there is an extraordinary constitutional innovation in the clauses in this part of the schedule.
Of course, it might be said of these principles—and I think this is possibly the Minister’s line—that all of this is very vague and there are not going to be many challenges, so do not worry. However, I am afraid people have left provisions in legislation on that basis and it has come back to bite them. What would worry me about this is if something enshrined in the decisions of the Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish Parliaments or Assemblies, is challenged by someone. What about it happening in the field of agriculture? Someone who is importing goods would have the right to initiate this sort of action, with its very serious constitutional consequences, whereby a judge would have to make a decision, quite often, I imagine, in relation to the principles that are so ill defined.
That takes me neatly to my second series of amendments, which deal with the definitions and status of guidance. I will leave the noble Lord, Lord German, to deal with the question of whether the guidance is binding. It seems unarguable to me that it is not binding.
What I am much more interested in—this highlights the difficulties caused by Schedule 3 and the construction of the Bill as a whole—is the Minister’s power to give guidance as to the meaning. Ordinarily, it is Parliament that decides what something means and, if it does not, it leaves it to the judges. Sometimes, it is put in secondary legislation. However—this is extraordinary—here we are putting the meaning of the wording into guidance.
There are two fundamental problems with that. First, we have visited the word “equity” on a number of occasions—I might call it a word for all seasons—but, even at this late hour, I feel that I ought to refer to John Selden’s famous note about equity. He said:
“Equity is a roguish thing: for law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. ‘Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call a foot, a Chancellor’s foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot: ‘tis the same thing in a Chancellor’s conscience.”
I refer to that because it is the essence of the problem with the word “equity”. With the utmost respect, I believe that this Committee ought not to shirk its responsibilities in defining what is meant by this and how it applies in certain circumstances. It might be said, “Well, we are constrained by the fact that these are taken directly from the TCA”, but is that in fact a constraint—or do we hanker for the way in which
these vague principles were left to the judges in Luxembourg? Do we want to give our judges that pleasure as well? I doubt it, but I am not sure that it has been fully thought through.
It therefore seems to me that we ought to look at this very carefully. There is the constitutional principle in relation to the Minister being able to give guidance on meaning; it plainly is not binding but he should not be giving such guidance because that is a matter for the courts or Parliament. Parliament should not shirk its responsibility to define what some of these things mean. We should not leave it to judges—unless, of course, there is a hankering for, as they do in Europe, leaving things to the judiciary in Luxembourg. This time, however, it would be the judiciary in Westminster, Edinburgh or possibly Belfast—but not possibly in Cardiff.