It is differentiation rather than discrimination. The two are quite different.
Amendments 44, 45, 47, 51 and 52 seek to remove the powers to differentiate entitlements. As we have noted elsewhere, these powers are broad and flexible; they do not require the Secretary of State to act in a particular way. Equally, there is ample discretion available in respect of whether a person is granted group 1 or group 2 refugee status. While the detail will be set out in rules and guidance in due course, suffice it to say that the exercise of the powers in question will be sensitive to vulnerabilities and individual circumstances. That enables us to balance the need to take a tough approach with the need to protect the most vulnerable.
We have been clear that our starting point in respect of the length of leave will be a grant of no less than 30 months. Similarly, settlement will be available by virtue of our long-residence rules. We have gone further in our defence of refugee family reunion, noting that we will continue to uphold our international obligations under Article 8, but in any event, there is no requirement to apply such entitlements in each and every case. I repeat that we fully intend to be sensitive to vulnerabilities and individual circumstances in that respect. That is why we have retained a considerable amount of discretion in the drafting.
Turning to Amendment 55, I do not think it would be appropriate or right for us to step outside of the existing power to make immigration rules under the Immigration Act 1971. This is the same power that we use to implement most other aspects of UK immigration policy, including but not limited to asylum policy. Indeed, areas in which we regularly use Immigration Rules to administer the system include the type of leave to remain,
the length of leave to remain, the routes and conditions of settlement, and family reunion. It would be inappropriate to do otherwise in this case. The rules are the appropriate vehicle: they have a long-standing and clear procedure, with the appropriate level of scrutiny built in. As I have noted, however, I am absolutely committed to this policy being exercised sensitively with a view to protecting the most vulnerable. There will always be discretion in our policies to make the right decisions in each case, and that extends to the Immigration Rules.
I cannot agree to Amendment 39, which would remove the requirement for a person to claim without delay to be a group 1 refugee. That means that anyone claiming asylum, regardless of whether that was done at the last moment to defer removal, could be a group 1 refugee. That would undercut the entire purpose of the policy and embolden those seeking to abuse our rules. There are already safeguards within the legislation enabling discretion to be exercised, such that a claim should be made as soon as reasonably practicable.
Amendments 43 and 50 would amend the list of ways in which we can differentiate from a non-exhaustive list to an exhaustive one. We must keep all options on the table to prevent dangerous journeys from safe countries, and we can do that only by retaining flexible powers to respond to situations as they arise.
Amendment 48 would prevent the ability to differentiate in respect of family members. This is primarily about coherent policy. We should ensure that, where appropriate, family members of refugees are not treated more or less favourably than the lead applicant, but the flexibility that we wish to retain will also enable us to respond sensitively to particular circumstances as appropriate, including in respect of how we treat family members. For example, let us say we discover that a child has been a victim of abuse by their parents and needs to be taken into care. The flexibility in the powers would enable us to respond to such a tragic situation by granting a more generous entitlement to that child compared to their parents, in order to sympathetically reflect the need in those individual circumstances.
Amendment 53 would remove the ability to differentiate in respect of requirements for settlement for family members. We must keep all options on the table to prevent dangerous journeys from safe countries, and we can do this only through retaining flexible powers to respond to situations as they arise. That said, I anticipate that many if not most families will receive the same length of leave to remain to ensure that all qualify for settlement on the same terms at the same time. However, we want to retain the ability to respond flexibly to challenging situations that might require us to do otherwise in respect of length of leave for a refugee and their family.
I turn to Amendment 41, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I hope I can offer some reassurance that his concerns have already been accounted for in the policy, so there need be no further amendments to the Bill in this respect, as I outlined earlier. We envisage that the provision will apply in cases where a refugee meets the first two limbs of Article 31—
that is to say, they came direct and claimed “without delay”—but, at the time of the claim, they had entered or were present in the UK unlawfully, having, for instance, overstayed an economic migrant visa.
To illustrate, let us say a person overstayed their visa and then lodged an asylum claim. Because they had entered the UK directly and ostensibly claimed without delay, they might be eligible for group 1 refugee status but, due to having overstayed, we would also check whether they had
“good cause for their illegal … presence”
at the point of claim. If they had no good reason for having been in the UK illegally, they might be liable for group 2 status. An example of where good cause could be shown might be if a person had overstayed their visa and then lodged an asylum claim—a very similar situation to that described by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham. If their reason for overstaying and lodging an asylum claim while in the UK illegally was on the grounds that they feared presenting to the authorities because they were homosexual, in such a case this may well amount to a good cause.
Suffice it to say that the powers in the Bill are broad and flexible and therefore enable us to exercise discretion where appropriate, including with respect to “good cause”, which will be reflected in guidance to caseworkers.
I turn my attention to Clause 11 as it currently stands. These powers are primarily intended to uphold the “first safe country of asylum” principle. Clause 11 provides a power, as noble Lords have pointed out—they are not very happy about it—for the UK to differentiate according to whether people satisfy certain criteria based on those in Article 31.1 of the refugee convention. The Government have set out their interpretation in Clause 36. I will not distract the Committee from the issue at hand by going through the provisions of Clause 36, because they will be debated in full.
If I may just pick up the points made by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Chakrabarti, on Article 31, the criteria we use as the basis for differentiation are not based expressly on one’s method of arrival. Instead, they are based on the criteria within Article 31 of the convention: whether someone came directly and claimed without delay, and, where applicable, had
“good cause for their illegal entry or presence”.
The clause acts on our commitment to do everything we can to deter individuals, as I have said, from making dangerous and unnecessary journeys through safe third countries, often putting lives at risk. I hope I have fully explained the Government’s rationale and addressed noble Lords’ questions. If I have missed anything out, I am very happy to follow up in writing but I hope that noble Lords will feel happy to withdraw or not press their amendments.