My Lords, I would like to speak to my Amendment 41. It is a very specific amendment relating to Clause 11 as it currently stands. Before I turn to that, however, I will take up the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Brown in relation to providing a legal structure for our discussion here. The first thing, which has been emphasised by a number of noble Lords, though not all, is that Article 31 is central to the discussion. This is because it is obvious
that the Government, in relation to Clause 11 and the following clauses, are seeking to interpret and apply their view of Article 31.
It has been suggested that we can ignore the convention because we must have regard to what people think today, but I am afraid that we cannot do that. We are a party to this convention: if we do not like it, the Government will have to recuse themselves from it and try to get other countries to change it. At the moment, however, the convention applies.
Article 31 says that no penalty shall be imposed on account of illegal entry or presence on a refugee who satisfies three requirements. These are the three requirements set out in Clause 11. The first is that the refugee comes directly from the territory of persecution. The second is that the refugee presents themselves without delay to the authorities. The third is that the refugee shows good cause for their illegal entry or presence. That is what Clause 11 is about. However, you cannot read Clause 11 on its own because the subsequent clauses all have some impact on it. In particular, Clause 36 is critical because it seeks to give a definition of coming directly from the territory of persecution.
Noble Lords will see from what I have just described that, although Article 31 says what the Government cannot do—that is, they cannot impose a penalty if those three requirements are satisfied—it does not go on to say that, if they are not satisfied, you can have a differentiation such as that in Clause 11. That is a matter of policy, and I can certainly see the force of the argument for saying that this division that has taken place in Clause 11 is sufficiently inconsistent with the definition of a refugee to make it improper.
There is a more fundamental point: Clause 36, referred to by my noble and learned friend, in seeking to define “coming directly from another country,” says that the requirement is not to be taken as satisfied if the refugee stopped in another country outside the UK, unless they can show that they could not have reasonably been expected to have sought protection under the convention in that country. There is no such qualification in Article 31, and it appears that the Government believe they can, through legislation, elaborate on the meaning of Article 31 in whatever way would best suit the current asylum policy of the day. This, I am afraid, is entirely misguided as a matter of law.
As an international treaty, the convention has the same meaning for each and every member state that signed up to it. It cannot bear different meanings for each member state, according to the policy of the Government of the state for the time being. In England and Wales, the court has, pursuant to its constitutional role of interpreting legislation and written law, held that a refugee may still come directly to a member state, within the meaning of Article 31, even if the refugee passes through one or more intermediate countries, if the final destination of the refugee has always been the state in which the asylum is finally claimed and the halts in the intermediate country or countries are no more than short-term stopovers. My noble and learned friend Lord Brown referred to his judgment in the Adimi case, which decided that very point.
On the global picture, to cut matters short—before I turn to the particular amendment—I am against the division, the separation, between group 1 and group 2 in Clause 11 because it depends on a requirement, or the failure to meet a requirement, which is directly contrary to the convention. Therefore, I certainly object to the division between group 1 and group 2 so long as Clause 36 stays in its present form, with its present definition of coming “directly”, on both logical and legal grounds—quite apart from the matter of general principle, which other noble Lords have mentioned, about the demeaning nature of distinguishing between two different categories.
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On another requirement, that of presenting directly to the authorities, I think the right reverend Prelate already referred to the fact that in many of these cases—for example, wives who have fled from abusive marriages in a conservative religious country such as Pakistan—people have to flee in a clandestine way. That was the word used before. The idea that they can present themselves straightaway—for example, to a male representative of authority—and describe their situation seems unrealistic in many of these cases. Yes, it is true that we welcome large numbers of people under resettlement schemes—Afghanistan and Hong Kong are examples of those—but when we are talking about these other refugees, whom I would describe as the genuine refugees seeking one by one to escape from persecution, it seems to me that Clauses 11 and 36 as currently worded are inconsistent with the convention. For that reason, like my noble and learned friend Lord Brown, I would object to them.