My Lords, I speak solely as a lawyer. I did not speak at Second Reading; I would have needed to apologise for and explain that a few years ago. Consistently, we have been permitted to engage at a later stage, and that is no longer so.
I confess that I have been working hard to try to catch up with the legal appreciation of the effect of this Bill. I wish to respond to the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Horam, as a lawyer and in terms of the consistency of the Bill with our international obligations under the refugee convention. Under Article 35, we and our courts are required to have regard to what UNHCR says on the proper interpretation of the Bill in applying it in this country.
Although my views on the Bill overall are still not fully formed, as a lawyer I have come to the clear conclusion that Clause 29 and the clauses that follow Article 31 most directly for present purposes are simply impossible to reconcile with the clear jurisprudence of our courts of the most authoritative nature. For that, reason, I take essentially the same root-and-branch objection to Clause 11 and say to the noble Lord, Lord Horam, that I wonder whether this large proportion of people who, understandably, object to the problems this country has with asylum—and who would wish to exclude, so far as possible, those who are trying to gain refugee status here—would add, “And we don’t care a fig if what we are doing to give effect to that policy flatly contradicts our international law obligations under the refugee convention”.
Intrinsically, the group of clauses to which I refer, including Clauses 31 and 36, bear very closely on Clause 11, which is of course the subject of this group
of amendments. The centre of the Bill’s approach, and that of Clause 11, is to try to create a particularly disadvantaged subcategory of asylum seekers, essentially on the footing that they fall outside the protection of Article 31 of the convention. The fact is that Article 31 is addressed both in Clause 31 and, as it happens, in closely similar terms, in Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. So there it is: we are talking about Article 31 of the convention, Clause 31 of the Bill and Section 31 of the preceding legislation, the 1999 Act.
Clause 36, more particularly, seeks to override well-established case law most directly. All this is explained in the series of authoritative legal opinions that have been addressed, certainly to me and probably to other lawyers in the House, by the Bingham Centre, the UNHCR and Amnesty—and by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is a very authoritative body of both Houses.
The Bill now seeks to overcome the effect of a divisional court case known as Adimi. I confess that, way back in the last century, I gave the leading judgment in that case but, much more importantly, it was approved explicitly on the critical questions—of coming here without delay and so forth—by the Appellate Committee of your Lordships’ House, presided over by the late and much-lamented Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in a case called Asfaw. The reference is 2008 1 AC 1061. It is a compelling leading judgment and indicates that the position, authoritatively decided in accordance with UNHCR advice and all the earlier indicia, is not compatible with what Clause 11, by reference to Clauses 31 and 36, seeks to do: to create this category B, to be regarded as illegal entrants to this country. It is on that basis, and not the narrower although well understandable objections to Clause 11 from other quarters, that I shall particularly resist the inclusion of Clause 11 in the Bill.