My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, to which I have added my name. I have done so because of my concerns about the well-being of young people and because I am not convinced that there are sufficient benefits in allowing the enlistment of young people of 16 or 17 rather than 18. Evidence and personal experience tell me that there is not.
I speak because of the experience of a member of my own family, so I know a story inside out, but I have also spoken to a number of parents whose children were recruited under the age of 18—and I have heard some very similar stories those described by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, in her speech. I have no doubt that, for some early leavers recruited below the age of 18, the mental damage can take years to recover from. These recruits have the legal status as children and are entitled in law under safeguarding legislation to be protected from harm as far as possible.
There are a number of other reasons why I question this policy. Younger recruits suffer from very high drop-out rates. Official statistics show that, once enlisted, 30% of the Army’s under-18 recruits leave or are dismissed before they finish their training. They can find themselves out of work and education within months of joining, and these discharged recruits are not tracked, so we cannot speculate on how they fare after they leave the military. That being said, it would not be unreasonable to say that, had the option of joining up not been available, they would have stayed in full-time education, taken an apprenticeship or worked part time while undertaking a qualification. We are talking about not some small, troubled minority who failed to adapt adequately to military service, but nearly a third of all junior recruits. That is affecting some 700 young people a year, according to the Child Rights International Network.
According to data from 2011 to 2014, of those junior recruits who stay on to complete their training and enlist fully, an additional 10% drop out at the age of 22, the minimum length of service. This gives a total retention percentage beyond the age of 22 of around 63% for all those who enlisted below the age of 18. Furthermore, data from 2017 to 2019 shows that only one in five recruits enlisted under the age of 18 are still in the Army 10 years later, compared with one in four adult recruits.
Surely this makes little sense for the Army, which allocates huge amounts of time and resources to recruit so many under-18s only for such a large proportion to either leave prematurely or complete just the minimum required service. The Ministry of Defence’s own data shows that adult recruits aged 18 or above are more likely to finish their training. Hence, it makes economic sense apart from anything else for the Army to focus its efforts on older recruits, especially given that the MoD admits that adult recruits cost half as much to train.
As I have mentioned, there are also concerns surrounding the long-term mental health outcomes of those who join up early. A recent study led by Glasgow University comparing the long-term outcomes of junior entrants with civilians of the same age and background found that junior entrants since 1995 were between two and three times more likely to develop long-term PTSD. This is significant because PTSD has been found, in a range of studies, to co-occur with depression and addictive behaviours, including substance and alcohol misuse and gambling disorders. This point is reinforced further by a study led by King’s College London, which reviewed the mental health of veterans who had originally enlisted as junior entrants. Since
2003, junior entrants were twice as likely to develop alcohol misuse and twice as likely to report episodes of lifetime self-harm compared with veterans who had enlisted at older ages.
Even if these are afflictions that affect junior recruits in adulthood, any reasonable duty of care must consider the long-term consequences of a particular policy. Since around the turn of the millennium, the youngest recruits to the Armed Forces have been substantially more likely than older recruits, and more likely than civilians of the same age and social background, to develop mental health problems in the longer term.
I am sure that some might prefer to focus on the fact that this problem has emerged since the late 1990s. The slur “snowflake” has been used to tar a generation some believe are overly sensitive and unable to overcome adversity. But the reality surely is that, regardless of our approach to young people, the problems young recruits face are real and have serious long-term impacts. In an age of heightened awareness about mental health, old mantras such as “toughen up” fail to alleviate the damaging consequences of junior enlistment.
The evidence I have been trying to outline in favour of these amendments points to a real problem with the policy of recruiting at such a young age. Seeing as most other countries can manage by recruiting adults, surely the UK should have no problem either. For those 16 or 17 year-olds who would have eagerly joined the military, if they are still passionate about doing so at 18, the option is still available to them. They will be entering with greater life experience and a greater chance of success both in the military and in their subsequent civilian life.