I am delighted to speak to this small group of amendments. I shall speak particularly to my Amendment 77A but before I do, I would be interested in probing my noble friend on the relationship between Clause 16, on environmental principles, and Clause 45, on environmental law. I have another amendment asking that we write the Aarhus convention into the Bill, so I am interested in how the principles relate to the law in the context of this ground-breaking Bill.
My second point relates to government Amendments 80, 298 and 299. I hope he will look carefully at Amendment 80A in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Amendment 81 from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as there may be nuances relating to Scotland and Wales that the government amendments should consider.
In speaking to Amendment 77A, I am extremely grateful to the Bar Council for briefing me and bringing to my attention that the phrase “due regard to” is inappropriate here and should, as the amendment says, be replaced by “ensure compliance with”. The background to this is that the concept of “due regard” has come before the courts a number of times, so guidance is available on the exercise of due regard by public authorities. This is in the context of public bodies making decisions—concerning equality legislation, for example—rather than making policy, as proposed in the Bill before us.
I shall give a couple of examples. Lord Dyson’s description of “due regard” in R (Baker) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government in 2008 has been paraphrased as
“regard that is appropriate in all the particular circumstances in which the public authority concerned is carrying out its function as a public authority.”
The courts have otherwise considered those circumstances where a public body is required to have regard alone to the policy or government guidance. On the one hand, strength may be given to the terms as set out by the High Court in the case of Royal Mail Group Plc v The Postal Services Commission 2007, in which it was held in the context of a decision under the Postal Services Act 2000 to impose a penalty on the licence holder that must have regard to a policy statement, that:
“The obligation to have regard to the policy recognises that there may be circumstances when it does not have to be applied to the letter but … there must be very good reasons indeed for not applying it.”
There is another example, in the context of planning law, where a similar conclusion may be drawn—the case of Simpson v Edinburgh Corporation.
I submit to the Minister that the requirement in Clause 18 of the Environment Bill is currently for a Minister to
“have due regard to the policy statement on environmental principles”,
not simply the environmental principles, when making policy, not when making decisions. From that follow a number of qualifications to that requirement, based on the significance of any environmental benefit or the proportion or disproportion of environmental benefit from the policy itself.
I argue that the use of the term “have due regard” in Clause 18 creates a potential tension between the Government’s clear entitlement to promulgate policy and to express their policy “in unqualified terms” subject to the
“basic tests of reason and good faith”,
as was argued in SSCLG v West Berkshire, and the rule as applied in Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, which is that a statutory discretion must be deployed to promote the policy and objects of the Act and the significance of having a set of environmental principles enshrined in statute in the first place. To that end, a clearer duty to “ensure compliance with” or “ensure accordance with”, as opposed to “have regard to”, would help to avoid confusion, leave the promulgation of policy open to debate in the courts and give greater recognition to the importance of the principles.
I know that, in the context of previous Bills, we have had cause to discuss the context of “have due regard to”. I am arguing for the importance of leaving the courts with a power to impose a financial penalty, as in this case, upon an unsuccessful body—including, for example, statutory undertakings such as sewerage and water undertakers—which has been found to be in breach of environmental law. It is extremely important that, in the context of what we are asking the OEP to do in the remit of the Bill, it be given real teeth when holding public bodies to account and mirror the pre-existing power, previously exercised by the European Commission and which it is now intended that the body of the OEP should fulfil post Brexit.
The requirement that the breach be severe to justify a financial penalty is noted. It is assumed that this is to ensure that a financial penalty be the exception rather than the rule, but this would also be in the
context that the OEP’s power to apply for an environmental review is already on the condition that it considers the authority’s failure to comply to be serious. To that end, it might be less open for debate as to whether it is severe or serious if the court’s discretion were wider, and therefore based upon all the circumstances of the case, but to be exercised where those circumstances are exceptional.
In the circumstances before us, “have due regard to” is not appropriate. I would like to replace it in the Bill with the words: “ensure compliance with”. That would give the OEP greater clarity and, should it be subject to judicial review, it would be easier for the courts to clarify in those circumstances. I hope that my noble friend will look sympathetically on probing Amendment 77A.