My Lords, Clause 7 increases the maximum sentences for a number of terrorism offences to ensure that the available punishment properly reflects the seriousness of the crime. That is the point that I urge noble Lords to focus on in this debate. A key aspect of the review of our terrorism laws announced by the Prime Minister following last year’s attacks, of which the Bill is the product, was looking again at the courts’ sentencing powers to ensure that they are sufficient to respond to the threat and keep the public safe. The clear conclusion was that sentencing needs to be updated and strengthened, and the Bill contains a package of measures to deliver that, including Clause 7. However, I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have queried whether these changes need to be made and have suggested that such changes are unnecessary and disproportionate. However, I sincerely hope that in responding to such concerns I can explain why the Government believe that Clause 7 as drafted is a necessary, proportionate and timely response to the contemporary terrorist threat.
Since the offences in question were first introduced, in some cases 12 years ago and in others 18 years ago, the terrorist threat has evolved significantly. Its source has shifted and diversified, its methods have developed and it has been quick to exploit modern online technology. Both its extent and its severity have maintained an upwards trajectory, and the intelligence services consider that in recent years there has been an enduring shift in the nature of the threat, rather than just a spike. We can be under no illusion: the scale of the threat we face today is unprecedented and, sadly, more attacks are likely.
In particular, we have seen increases in the scale of radicalisation and changes in its methodology and patterns. The growth of the internet has brought new and powerful ways for people to connect with each other, and to share ideas and information, which have brought great benefits to the vast majority of the public. But they have also brought new opportunities to those who would do us harm, increasing the ability of terrorists both to access and to disseminate unlawful terrorist information and training material, propaganda, and incitement to hatred and violence—and to do so, potentially, to a wide audience. Indeed, those who seek to recruit and to inspire or direct individuals to carry out attacks have never found it easier to identify and connect with would-be terrorists, often across international borders, and those who are embarking on the path of radicalisation have never found it easier to access material, to communicate with terrorist individuals and organisations, and to receive encouragement or direction which will move them further and more quickly along that path.
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The police and MI5 report that, as a result, people are moving increasingly quickly from the initial stages of radicalisation to planning or actually carrying out attacks—a point well made by the noble Baroness,
Lady Manningham-Buller, at Second Reading. Further- more, these attacks are often less sophisticated than previous ones the UK has experienced, involving simple planning and preparation, and sometimes limited or no contact with other terrorists on the specifics of the plot. This was highlighted in a number of the attacks in 2017, in which knives and vehicles were the weapons of choice and complex planning or the acquisition of particular materials was simply not needed to have a devastating effect. All of this conspires to limit the opportunities for intelligence coverage and investigation to identify when a person is becoming radicalised to the point of planning or carrying out an attack, and therefore for the police and MI5 to intervene to protect the public.
The review concluded that, in this context, it was necessary to focus on strengthening the ability of the police, the intelligence agencies and the criminal justice system to intervene effectively with robust disruptions at an earlier stage in the process of radicalisation to violence, and that the type of criminal conduct covered by the offences addressed by Clause 7, which is preparatory to the incitement, planning or commission of a terrorist attack, should be treated as more serious and harmful than was the case in 2000 and 2006, when these offences were first enacted.
Clause 7, therefore, increases to 15 years the maximum sentences available to judges for four offences, to better reflect that seriousness and high level of harm. These offences are: the collection, making records of, or possession of, information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, contained in Section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000, where the current maximum penalty is 10 years; eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of the Armed Forces, intelligence services or police, which is likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, contained in Section 58A of the Terrorism Act 2000, where the current maximum penalty is 10 years; encouragement of terrorism, contained in Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, where the current maximum penalty is seven years; and dissemination of terrorist publications, covered by Section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006, where the current maximum penalty is seven years. In addition, the clause increases to 10 years’ imprisonment the maximum penalty for the offence of failing to disclose information about acts of terrorism, contained in Section 38B of the Terrorism Act 2000, where the current maximum penalty is five years.
If the police and intelligence services are going to keep the public safe, they need sufficient powers to effectively disrupt terrorists involved in this type of activity, to do so at an earlier stage, before the risk of them planning attacks has progressed, to better manage them, and to protect the public from them after they have been convicted. The Bill contains a comprehensive package of measures to deliver this objective, of which the increases to maximum sentences are an important component. Other amendments to some of these offences are taken forward in earlier clauses. They will close gaps and update them for the modern digital age, and complement the increased sentencing powers—in other words, we should not see these powers in isolation.
In its report on the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has argued that the increase in the maximum penalty for the Section 58 offence is disproportionate. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has tabled an amendment to remove this proposed increase from the Bill, but I hope that I have been able to explain how this change is necessary to address the challenge posed by contemporary patterns of radicalisation, and the ways in which individuals can rapidly gather information useful to a terrorist over the internet.
I will try to reassure the noble Baroness that this measure is not disproportionate. The proposed increase in the maximum penalty for this and other offences is the product of a careful and detailed review, including extensive engagement with the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the intelligence services. The changes are intended to better reflect our current analysis of the heightened threat facing the UK. Because of that threat, we need to make an emphatic public statement, in the form of increased penalties, about the seriousness of these offences. These higher maximum penalties will send a clear message and, we believe, act as a strong deterrent to those engaging in activity preparatory to acts of terrorism, or radicalising others to commit acts of terrorism. Moreover, they will provide a powerful and effective means of intervention to protect the public in cases where individuals do none the less engage in this serious and harmful activity.
These are very serious offences and it is right that judges should have the ability to send people who commit them to prison for a commensurately long period of time. This is a principle reflected in the sentencing guidelines for terrorism offences that were published earlier this year by the independent Sentencing Council, which also concluded that the seriousness of this type of offending, and the resulting harm, has increased, and that sentencing practice should increase as a result.
The noble Baroness referred to the average length of sentences passed for these offences. What we are considering today are the statutory upper limits. Sentences awarded in individual cases will continue to be a matter for the judge, taking into account all the circumstances of the case including any aggravating and mitigating factors, in line with the applicable sentencing guidelines. Sentences towards the upper limits of these ranges will continue to be reserved for the most serious cases. It will continue to be open to any person convicted to seek to appeal their sentence if they consider that the judge has got it wrong.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed to the disparity between sentencing practice in England and Wales compared to Northern Ireland. Clause 8 is designed to address that issue directly, by extending to Northern Ireland courts the power to treat a terrorism connection as an aggravating factor when sentencing for an offence in the general criminal law, such as firearms and other violent offences—which may be particularly relevant in the Northern Ireland terrorism context.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, made powerful points about prison overcrowding and radicalisation. I take those points completely, which is exactly why the
Government’s prison estate transformation programme is attempting to get the basics right by building decent prisons, to improve rehabilitation and to create safe and secure environments for staff and offenders alike. The department is committed to delivering up to 10,000 decent prison places, providing the physical conditions for governors to achieve better educational, training and rehabilitative outcomes. As well as constructing new prisons, we are reconfiguring the existing estate so that prisoners will be held in the right place at the right time in their custodial journey, and their rehabilitation can be managed more effectively. The combination of building new prisons and the reconfiguration of the existing estate will certainly address some basic issues, such as safety and decency, reduce crowding and drive improvements in rehabilitation.
The noble Lord makes a good point on radicalisation in prison. We make every effort to ensure that individuals imprisoned under the Terrorism Act are given the best possible chance to rehabilitate while in prison and on probation. All offenders of extremist or terrorist concern are managed actively as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism case management system. As he mentioned, we have opened two separation centres, at HMP Frankland and HMP Full Sutton, to hold the most subversive extremist prisoners and protect the vulnerable from their ideology. The first separation centre opened in July last year and an early assessment of it concluded that it was operating well. This is work in progress.
As is the case for many of the measures in the Bill, the offences that Clause 7 amends are subject to oversight by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. The Government give careful consideration to all conclusions and recommendations made by the independent reviewer. Given the specific explanation on the Section 58 offence, and the reassurances that I have tried to give on the sentencing provisions as a whole, I hope that I am not too forward in asking the noble Baroness to consider withdrawing her objection to this clause standing part of the Bill.