My Lords, I remind the House of my interest in that my wife is a consultant at the Education and Training Foundation.
The very fact that we have been debating insolvency measures in the Bill underpins the responsibility of the boards of FE institutions. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, referred to the issue of financial competence and the initiatives being taken on governance, which are welcome. We should certainly pay tribute to the public-spirited citizens who undertake these roles, which have become ever more onerous in the past few years.
The noble Lord, Lord Nash, will know that my main experience is in the National Health Service. Between 2011 and 2014, I chaired the board of an NHS foundation trust. In many ways, the way that FE colleges and NHS foundation trusts have developed is similar. They are very similar institutions: they both provide a public service and are almost entirely dependent on public funding, although the routes by which it reaches the institutions are a little different, but increasingly
they have to stand on their own two feet and, if you like, the buck stops with the board. That is very different from the way that FE used to be, with institutions that were owned by the local authority. It is the same for NHS foundation trusts.
However, there is a difference in governance. In the NHS there is essentially a two-tier structure. As chairman of the board of directors, I was appointed by the governing body, which was elected by the members of the foundation trust—in my case, 100,000 of them—who were essentially patients, members of the community and staff. As chairman of the board of directors, I had regularly to account to the governors in public meetings every other month and meet them individually as well, as did the chief executive—whose appointment had to be ratified by the governing body—the executive directors and the other non-executive directors. I and the non-executive directors had a term of office that was subject to reappointment, but only at the pleasure of the governing body.
We also had a senior independent director, a non-executive director to whom any member of the board could go if they were concerned about anything to do with the running of the board, the performance of the chairman or indeed the performance of the chief executive. When outside regulators came to review the performance of the organisation, they would be able to talk directly to the senior independent director. In addition, we had a highly qualified and experienced company secretary who was charged with ensuring that the trust acted within the law and exercised good governance, and acted as an adviser to the chairman on difficult issues, including the performance of the chief executive and the executive directors. This was not an issue in my case but if, for instance, I as chairman had decided along with my non-executive colleagues that we wished to remove the chief executive, it is to the company secretary that we would have gone, and he would have advised us on the way to do it. He would have done so without informing the chief executive, except where due process would at some point be required.
Looking at governance in further education, I just do not get the sense that there is that robustness. In too many colleges, the members of the governing body tend to be self-perpetuating—it was interesting to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady Buscombe, about financial literacy among those governors—the principals often play too much of a role in deciding who the members of the governing body will be, and the board’s members are of course accountable to no one but themselves and do not meet in public. So there is very little transparency about the performance of the boards of FE institutions, and there has to be some suspicion that, at least at some colleges, they do not exercise challenge and scrutiny as much as they should.
This therefore makes the role of the clerk to the governing body very important. However, there is a problem, to which I referred at Second Reading. The Minister will know that one of the reasons we are having these insolvency provisions is that some institutions have got themselves into trouble financially. We also know that in some cases that is because principals
have decided to undertake ventures that, if they were subject to proper scrutiny, I do not think they would have been allowed to. There is an instance in Birmingham where basically a principal was going on foreign adventures—there was a fashion in FE for colleges to try to open up and do deals abroad—without the kind of expertise and scrutiny that we are talking about, and almost all those adventures ended up in trouble. There is evidence that the college’s board of governors did not exercise due scrutiny and diligence when it came to those issues.
There was a paper by the former Learning and Skills Improvement Service identifying a number of issues with governance. It stated that in FE there can be too much polite consensus to avoid conflict, with insufficient challenge, a business focus at the expense of core educational performance, a taking on of big risks but not managing them, with the clerk being undervalued in being able to stimulate and facilitate good governance. This is where I come to the role of the clerk. These days, I do not think the word “clerk” aptly describes what needs to be done. Unfortunately, some principals seem to have mistaken the role of clerk for that of secretary, and that is a big problem. At national level, I have no argument at all with the Minister’s department, the FE commissioner or Ofsted, all of which have on a number of occasions given their support to professionally qualified clerks at a high level.
On the ground, there is a suspicion that that has not always been reflected. There is some evidence that, when clerks leave, it is not unusual to see the role offered at a lesser salary with lesser hours and for it to be offered internally, to an administrator. Unbelievably, there have been reports of examples of the principal’s secretary being asked to undertake that role. That is completely unacceptable, and I am surprised that the national regulators have not ruled on that. It reflects the fact that governing bodies are poor and simply do not challenge principals when they make decisions that are totally unacceptable, such as that one.
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At the end of the day, clerks have to be able professionally to advise the board on difficult issues, and they have to have the strength to stand their ground when the going gets tough and ensure that boards act within the law. There can be occasions when principals want to do something which clerks know that the board ought not to do—but the clerks have to feel that if they stand their ground the system will come and support them. All too often, the evidence is that clerks who stand their ground in the end lose their job, because essentially the principal is able to restructure them out or get rid of them.
I know that this is very much down to the governance rules that are set, the way in which regulators review governance and the lead that the department can give. There is some legislation already, but it might help the position of clerks if we put something in the Bill that would get home to the governing bodies that they need to have clerks who are qualified, who can give them impartial advice and whose position is protected, if they need to act when they believe that the principal is taking the college down the wrong route.
Of course, this is a way in which to discuss governance. The Minister made sympathetic comments on initiatives that are being taken. It particularly relates back to ensuring that good quality governors are appointed, and I applaud the Government’s efforts in this. But somehow a stronger governance structure has to be built to make sure that these institutions are well governed in what has become a very difficult climate. None of us should underestimate the difficult climate in which FE colleges have to operate. I want to make sure that they have the strongest possible governance. I beg to move.