I concur that there may be instances in which parliamentarians’ communications are not targeted but where a parliamentary communication is disclosed incidentally to investigations of third parties. However, one cannot plan for that or provide for a warrant for that in advance. It is a consequence, sometimes, of actions against third parties.
May I move on to Schedule 8 and the subject of combined warrants, which I touched on before? I confirm what I said at the outset: that this issue is still under consideration. I hope that, taking that into account, the noble Lord will consider it appropriate not to press his amendments.
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I now turn to the government amendments in this group. Schedule 8 provides for combined warrants, and Amendment 85 provides that the privacy duties in Clause 2 apply when interception or equipment interference warrants are issued as part of a combined warrant. The privacy duties in Clause 2 require public authorities to have regard to whether what is sought to be achieved could be achieved by other less intrusive means; the public interest in the integrity and security of telecommunications systems; and other aspects of the public interest in the protection of privacy. It is surely right that this vital safeguard apply when warrants are issued as part of a combined warrant, as well as in respect of other warrants.
Amendments 100, 101, 168, 169, 195, 196, 205, 206, 211, 212, 224 and 225—with which your Lordships will be familiar—fulfil a commitment that the Government made in the other place to make clear the considerations that must be applied by the judicial commissioners when they are deciding whether to approve a person’s decision to issue a warrant under the Bill. I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, wanted to be reassured that those commitments would be adhered to, and that is the purpose of the amendments.
These amendments will bring the targeted and bulk equipment interference, bulk acquisition and bulk personal dataset regimes into line with the updated provisions currently set out in Part 2 of the Bill. This will mean that before approving a decision to issue an equipment interference warrant, a judicial commissioner will consider the issuing authorities’ conclusions with a sufficient degree of care to ensure that they comply with the duties imposed by the new privacy clause, Clause 2. These amendments will strengthen the double-lock authorisation process introduced by the Bill, contributing to a truly world-leading authorisation and oversight regime.
Amendments 50 to 52, 170 to 172, 199, 200, 209, 210, 215 to 217 and 229 to 231 reflect equivalent amendments that we have already discussed in relation to Part 2. They respond to concerns voiced by the Intelligence and Security Committee that the Bill should prohibit a targeted interception warrant being renewed very early in its period of validity. The amendments make it clear that a warrant cannot be renewed more than 30 days before it is due to expire. While we do not foresee any circumstance where a very early renewal application such as that feared by the ISC would be approved by the Secretary of State or judicial commissioner, there is no harm in ensuring on the face of the Bill that such an eventuality cannot take place. I beg to move.