My Lords, we have just heard some very moving speeches on this matter. I have no doubt that, as the Leader of the House has said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will consider these matters very carefully. I know that it is extremely difficult to analyse the precise effect of income tax or tax credit changes in individual circumstances. Your Lordships will remember that when Mr Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, thought to take out of the tax system the 10% tax band that had previously existed, finding out precisely who was affected and how they were affected turned out to be extremely difficult. I believe that there are difficulties in this connection also. It may well be that the information that arises in the course of the attempt to deliver this will show what in detail is required if changes should be made.
I am intending to deal only with the constitutional question as I see it. These draft regulations are made under the Tax Credits Act, which sets up mechanisms for the payment of tax credits of two types: children’s tax credits and working tax credits. The arrangements were under the control of the Board of Inland Revenue which was entitled under Section 2 to deduct the sums paid for tax credits from the income of the board raised by taxation. So it is perfectly clear that these tax credits are a charge on the taxes raised by the Board of Inland Revenue, as it was then. The details of the credits and the machinery necessary for their administration were set out in the later sections of the Act. Section 66 of the Act provides:
“1) No regulations to which this subsection applies may be made unless a draft of the instrument containing them (whether or not together with other provisions) has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.
(2) Subsection (1) applies to … (a) regulations prescribing monetary amounts that are required to be reviewed under section 41”.
That is the system under which this statutory instrument has been made. Accordingly the statutory instrument before the House requires to be approved by each House of Parliament before it can be made. The instrument, as we know, was approved by the other place and a Motion to reverse it was defeated in the other place. So it has come to us as a matter which has been fully considered so far as the other place is concerned until now.
In considering this, regard must be had to the financial privileges of the other place. It is not a question of the conventions of this House, it has nothing to do with them; it is to do with the financial privileges that belong to the House of Commons. So far as I understand it, there is nothing to prevent a Motion along the lines proposed here being considered by this House, but the question is whether that consideration can properly interfere with the financial primacy of the elected Chamber. Erskine May says that the practice is ruled today by resolutions which were made in the 1670s. The last one of these, the clearest and fullest, states that,
“all aids and supplies and aids to his majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the commons; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the commons: and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants; which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords”.
It is clear that these tax credit payments are made out of the supply raised by taxation and that the other place has decided that the Tax Credits Act 2002 should be amended in terms of the approved draft. I am clearly of the opinion that a failure on the part of this House to approve the draft of this instrument would be a breach of the fundamental privileges of the elected Chamber.
It may be asked why the approval of this House is required. I believe that it is as a courtesy to the House, just as it is asked to agree to the passing of money Bills on their way to becoming Acts of Parliament. The House never seeks to delay them as it is obliged to respect the financial privileges of the elected Chamber and how it deals with those matters; it should deal with this matter in the same way. To decline to approve these draft regulations or to decline to deal with them until certain conditions are met is a refusal to accept that the decision of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege is the final authority for it. It has to be noted that this is a matter of the privilege of the elected Chamber, not of the Government. The Motions other than that in the name of the right reverend Primate—