My Lords, in moving Amendment 15A, I shall speak also to Amendment 15C in my name and that of other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, two of whom apologised that they had to leave. Amendments 15A and 15C together would require the Secretary of State to have due regard to the principle of academic freedom, as already recognised by Parliament in Section 202(2) of the Education Reform Act 1988, when issuing guidance or directions under this section. It was quoted earlier, but I remind noble Lords that it includes a duty,
“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.
I believe that it was inserted by your Lordships' House and it would be appropriate if we were to do the same now.
I would argue that Amendments 15A and 15C are perfectly compatible with the Government’s own Amendment 15D. They would simply add to it by making explicit reference to the important duty to uphold academic freedom in the 1988 Act, which is currently missing. This is a duty that is very important to academics, as it puts flesh and bones in the context of higher education on to the more abstract duty of freedom of speech contained in the 1986 Act and referred to in the Government’s own amendment.
I think that we have all been guilty at times of conflating the two principles of freedom of speech and academic freedom. If I may say so, the Minister does so in his letter of 3 February to me and other noble Lords—and here I thank him for finding a few minutes yesterday to discuss the amendments with me. The letter refers to the impact that the Prevent duty might have on academic freedom of speech. Although the two principles overlap, there is also a clear distinction, which it is important to understand because it is at the heart of why the amendments matter. Here, I have to part company with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, when he suggested that one necessarily implies the other.
While I have always counselled my students against relying on Wikipedia, on the principle of “do as I say” rather than “do as I do”, I turn to it now because it provides a helpful working definition of academic freedom. It says that it is,
“the belief that the freedom of inquiry by faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy as well as the principles of academia, and that scholars should have freedom to teach or communicate ideas or facts (including those that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities)”.
It spells out:
“Academic freedom and free speech rights are not coextensive … Academic freedom involves more than speech rights; for example, it includes the right to determine what is taught in the classroom”.
In Committee, I illustrated my worries by citing a discussion of the Charlie Hebdo attack that colleagues instigated, open to all staff and students in my school at Loughborough University. What was at issue here was not so much the freedom of speech of staff and students as the academic freedom to feel safe to instigate such a discussion that might be interpreted as potentially drawing some students towards ideas that conceivably might lead them towards violent terrorism. If the duty to uphold academic freedom as well as freedom of speech was written into the Bill itself, it would, I hope, give some assurance to both lecturers and students that it is still safe to have such controversial discussions. If it is not written in, I fear a chilling effect on both—lecturers playing safe and not instigating debate on such controversial topics related to terrorism, or something like it, because of feeling pressure from university management not to take risks of this kind, and/or students feeling afraid to engage honestly and openly. This would then have the counterproductive effect, which was discussed quite a lot in Committee, of pushing extremist views underground rather than allowing staff and students to discuss them critically. Indeed, a Hansard Society student on placement with me put it very well. He said, “You prevent the peers of the extremists from engaging with them and you cripple their ability to persuade them to abandon extremist views”. Earlier, that point was made very eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, and the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, who are not in their places.
I will also illustrate the point with reference to the draft guidance. Paragraph 57, for example, makes it clear that the Home Office expects universities to carry out a risk assessment of where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into not just violent extremism but non-violent extremism, which, as Universities UK has consistently pointed out, is not generally unlawful. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, earlier referred to this bit of the guidance as hopeless. It is easy to see how in a university with risk-averse management—which is probably true of much of university management these days—this could translate into pressure on individual academics not to offer certain courses or lectures or to pursue certain research grant applications, or to discourage certain topics of inquiry by doctoral students.
The Government’s free speech amendment is helpful in relation to the draft guidance in so far as it refers to visiting speakers and events but it does not address the academic freedom issues that are the stuff of everyday academic life as lived and breathed by academics and students. Robert Moretto’s legal advice, to which I referred in our earlier debate, suggests that, as currently drafted, the guidance “seeks to avoid” the kinds of issues raised by the tension between the Prevent duty and existing freedom of speech and academic freedom duties of such concern to noble Lords. It therefore gives the individual academic little clarity. The Government’s amendment goes some way towards
providing that clarity but I suggest that if the Minister could go away and come back at Third Reading with something that incorporated these amendments too, it would do the job even better.
Because of the tight timescale with fast-tracking, it has not been possible to have the kind of more in-depth informal discussion that would have been normal between the stages of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon has already referred to the problems that this has created. I think that the problems have been as much for the Minister and his team as for anyone else. It would be such a shame if, for this practical reason, we lost the opportunity to strengthen the Bill in a way that I believe is totally compatible with the Government’s aims.
If the Minister felt able to go a bit further—again, I appreciate how far he has already moved on this part of the Bill—it would give some reassurance to the academic community who are so anxious about this Bill and who I fear will have been very disappointed at the outcome of the debate on the second group of amendments. I beseech the Minister to be as flexible as possible, but if it really is impossible will he at least commit to ensuring that the guidance states that due regard must be had to the principle of academic freedom as recognised in the Education Reform Act 1988, although this does not address the question of directives, as these amendments do. I beg to move.