Indeed, not a donkey, nor a camel, though he certainly does more than the work of both, which I guess is the point which is being made to all of us here—that is a serious point about how we support a highly effective individual in a highly effective office to do his duties more effectively. I will seek to address
some of the specific points on my way through, but I give notice that part of my instructions, should I race past it on page 11 of my speaking notes, is that we will be returning to this on Report. I hope that that will provide some comfort to noble Lords as they consider what to do with their amendments at this stage.
Clause 36 is a very important clause, as it should be. It is right that as the legislative landscape changes, we pause to consider the safeguards and oversight arrangements we have in place for counterterrorism laws, to ensure that we are getting the balance right between responding to these threats and the protection of civil liberties.
Few would question the exemplary job David Anderson QC is currently doing as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, or the contribution of his predecessor. I totally take on board his injunction to make haste slowly and the fact that we should ensure that there is a robust independent scrutiny of some of our most far-reaching counterterrorism powers. We should be proud of the long-standing, very effective and transparent system of independent oversight that we have in the UK, but we should not rest on our laurels.
Clause 36 provides for the creation of a board which will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. As our legislative armoury necessarily increases, there is also an increasing demand for the review of particular aspects of counterterrorism legislation, and that this is a substantial task for one individual to undertake. David Anderson has himself made clear that he is operating at the very limit of his capacity and that there is a need to reform the independent reviewer’s role. It is intended that the board will provide support in the discharge of the independent reviewer’s statutory responsibilities, but also that the board will produce reports and advice to the independent reviewer, expanding the capacity and breadth of experience available to our oversight arrangements, and enabling a greater range of matters to be subject to review.
It may be helpful at this point to deal with Amendments 118F to 118J which go to the heart of a very important issue, in the same way as other amendments, in seeking to set out particular matters on which the board will report.
Clause 36 provides for regulations to be made which will be subject to the affirmative procedure and which would set out the precise detail of the board. Among other matters, these regulations will make provision about the appointment, membership and particular functions of the board. I fully expect that a number of the issues covered within these amendments may be appropriately dealt with in those regulations.
We are approaching the end of the public consultation period on 30 January, as the noble Lord, Lord Butler, pointed out. The Government will consider carefully the outcome of that consultation prior to bringing forward the regulations setting out the details on how the board will operate. Of course, it is important that the comments of your Lordships in this debate and at other stages of consideration are also considered as part of that consultation.
However, I am mindful that a number of views which have been expressed in this House—