My Lords, we turn to Part 4 of the Bill, and specifically the clause concerning procedural defects highly likely to have made no substantial difference to the outcome of a judicial review. I pay tribute to this House, and the expertise shown in many corners, which has been brought to bear on these clauses. We have heard from my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who brought his unrivalled experience to the debate. He referred to comments of a former Secretary of State, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, who wrote in his book, Education, Education, Education:
“However, if Parliament was navigated quickly and unobtrusively, the same was not true of the courts. As soon as academy projects became public, opponents seized on judicial reviews as a means to stop them. Ultimately they failed, but only after years of lengthy, expensive and immensely distracting court actions”.
My noble friends Lord Horam and Lord Tebbit told us that judicial review does not exist in isolation and has an impact on projects in the real world that deliver employment to people and can significantly affect actual problems. There have, of course, been many contributions far less supportive of the Government’s proposals. For example, the House has heard from a number of distinguished judges with enormous experience of judicial review, including the noble and learned Lords, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Woolf. We heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, of the important role that judicial review can have when used properly.
Throughout, the Government have listened carefully—more carefully than some of our more trenchant critics suggest. The amendments that we propose in later groups bear, I hope, testimony to that. In the case of financial information we have proposed an amendment, despite having won a substantial victory in the other place. However, I must say to the House that on the matter of this clause the Government have not been persuaded that any amendment is required.
When used appropriately judicial review is an essential part of the rule of law, by allowing for the lawfulness of public bodies’ actions to be tested in court. But it is an area that has been misused, with claims brought with no real prospect of success, and with a view to delaying and adding expense to perfectly lawful acts that are simply disliked. Such challenges place significant burdens on the public purse and strike at the economic development that the country badly needs.
The Government want to restrict judicial review, not abolish it—I must emphasise that. Rather, we want to restrict it to cases that have real merit. Judicial review should not be used as a campaigning tool. It should be concerned with unlawful activity that has or is likely to have a real effect on outcome.
Clause 64 is intended to filter out claims brought on technicalities highly unlikely to have made a substantial difference to the claimant’s position earlier and at a lower cost. Your Lordships’ amendments would, in the Government’s view, undermine the clause. The elected Chamber rejected the House of Lords amendment, voting by 319 to 203 last Monday.
As this House amended it, Clause 64 would permit the court to refuse permission or a remedy where it was considered highly likely that a complained-of flaw would have made no difference to the outcome for the applicant. The Government’s formulation would require the judge to consider an argument that it was highly likely that a complained-of flaw would have made no substantial difference to the outcome for the applicant, and to refuse a remedy or permission where he or she was satisfied that the argument was made out.
Although the clause introduced duties on the court, it retained significant judicial discretion—primarily, of course, in deciding when the “highly likely” threshold is met in a particular case, and where the court is of the view that there is any significant doubt that it is, it can act as it thinks fit. Indeed, we have deliberately avoided defining “highly likely” in the statute, meaning that the judiciary will determine how it will apply in practice.
In the House of Commons, in speeches pitched against the Government’s original position and in favour of the amendment made by your Lordships’ House, it was said that we would be putting the judge in the position of the decision-maker. I simply fail to understand this point. The judge is not being asked to second-guess the decision of the administrative body; he or she is being asked simply to consider whether it is likely that there would have been a substantially different outcome if the impugned decision or the conduct had not occurred. This is very much judicial territory. Judges perform such assessments in all sorts of different circumstances.
The second point made in the House of Commons was that the judge would not be able to come to a decision without a mini-trial or dress rehearsal. I do not accept that point either. At the moment he or she will have to decide in appropriate circumstances whether it is inevitable that the outcome would have been unchanged. Now the bar is slightly higher but the process by which the judge arrives at the conclusion will be very similar, if not the same.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to public interest. Of course, public interest plays a part in a number of different legislative provisions in different contexts. But we believe that the threshold established in this clause does best serve the public interest. It will ensure that judicial review cases that progress beyond permission stage are not purely academic and are not based on minor technicalities highly unlikely to make any difference. We therefore think that this strikes the right balance. Indeed, the House’s amendments to the clause could serve to undermine the intended effect, and underestimate the significant safeguards built into the clause as agreed by the other place.
There is a balance between imposing appropriate duties to ensure that these reforms have the intended effect and preserving the important role of judicial decision-making. I strongly believe that this clause gets the balance right between allowing judges to decide matters of judicial review and nevertheless providing appropriate safeguards to ensure that inappropriate and meritless judicial reviews do not proceed further. I beg to move.