UK Parliament / Open data

Consumer Rights Bill

Proceeding contribution from Baroness Drake (Labour) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 29 October 2014. It occurred during Debate on bills and Committee proceeding on Consumer Rights Bill.

My Lords, I support Amendments 56FA and 56FB. These amendments are not about extending consumer rights, so that more contract terms can be deemed unfair; they are about enabling more matters to be assessed for fairness. The problem arises because of the interplay of two provisions. The court may assess a contract term for unfairness unless it falls into a certain exempt category; and core terms in a contract are exempt from assessment for fairness by the courts if they are prominent and transparent.

Through this Bill the Government are clearly seeking to address the problem thrown up by the 2009 Supreme Court decision in the case of the OFT v Abbey National that held, as my noble friend has said, that charges for unauthorised overdrafts were exempt for assessment for fairness. This gave rise to uncertainty about whether ancillary charges could be assessed for unfairness. To use the Government’s own words, this created a situation whereby:

“Some protection in law is necessary because consumers often cannot, or do not wish to, investigate the detail of every contract term before they sign up to an agreement”.

This Bill provides for the “prominence” test for core terms in a contract to be exempt from assessment for fairness by the courts, but this raises other concerns. Prominence is very important and welcome, but its efficiency in providing a remedy both for unfairness and for a weak and ineffective market depends on how the consumer’s attention is drawn to a term and their understanding of its significance. As the OFT commented:

“Transparency alone cannot turn a substantially unfair term into a fair one”.

As the BIS Select Committee commented, bringing something to the consumer’s attention is not the same as a consumer appreciating its significance.

Prominence should not be operationalised in a way that gives too great a protection to traders in exempting contract terms for assessment for unfairness and too weak a defence to the behavioural bias that consumers demonstrate, so unfairly restricting their access to the courts for assessing the fairness of the term of a contract.

These amendments are clearly seeking to mitigate that risk by limiting the wide range of price terms that are immune from a fairness assessment. Consumer markets and products are becoming more complex, increasing the risk that consumers do not understand the significance of certain information. We have behavioural bias. We have asymmetries of knowledge and understanding between the trader and consumer that can actually create incentives for the trader to frame information in certain ways—a problem which the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, illustrated has not been remedied in 400 years.

The Bill may narrow the scope of the price exemption following the Supreme Court’s decision, but it does so on the assumption that consumers will take into account

all information that is provided prominently. However, we know that that is so very often not the case. Consumer behavioural bias is very powerful. If the most important goal is buying a house or a holiday, people will focus less on the detail of the associated insurance policies. The closer that the consumer gets to signing something, the less likely they are to walk away or assimilate the detail. As my noble friend Lady Hayter has spelled out, the behavioural biases that consumers exhibit are very significant. At risk of repetition, I shall restate some of them. People are more influenced by presentation than the information. They overvalue a benefit that is received now. They underestimate the impact of any deferred cost. They underestimate future use. They are prone to optimism bias. Volume information means that they reach saturation point. Excessive or complex product information can freeze their decision-making. That is probably one-fifth of the list that one could enunciate if one was going through a study of the literature.

The one thing that behavioural science shows us is that if consumers are not factoring certain prices into their decision, those prices will not be subject to competitive forces, so the markets cannot work effectively. In effect, the Government will not secure the functioning markets they are quite rightly so keen to secure unless there is some limit on the wide range of price terms which are now immune or could be immune to fairness assessment.

By way of illustration, perhaps I may refer to the letter dated 27 October from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, to my noble friend Lady Hayter on mortgage contracts. To me, the contents raise more concerns than they settle. On the issue of “mortgage prisoners”, the letter makes a reference to the FCA’s concerns that some firms do not seem to be applying its transitional arrangements in the spirit in which they were intended. That is very politely and gently stated, but it is quite clearly yet another example of the failure of rule compliance and is hardly an expression of confidence that Clause 64 of the Bill will work effectively. In her letter the noble Baroness also refers to a number of things that the FCA is doing to address the concerns raised by my noble friend, but of course these apply to regulated products. They cannot deal with unregulated products, which include the Bank of England example cited by my noble friend. For these unregulated products we must rely on the unfair contract terms, the problems with which my noble friend and I have, I hope, gone through in some detail.

Other non-financial sectors will exhibit similar problems with unregulated products, especially where switching is difficult because of the length of the contract wrapped around the product. Examples of these would be products bought in the ICT and telecoms sectors or longer term courses in higher education. When one takes into account the extent of the behavioural bias which consumers bring to the market and how that creates incentives for traders to frame information, the fact is that if consumers are not factoring these prices into their decisions, it means that competition and functioning markets cannot be operating. There really is a compelling case for amendments that would constrain terms that are not assessable for unfairness.

4.15 pm

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
756 cc448-450GC 
Session
2014-15
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords Grand Committee
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