My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 8. Amendment 1 is by way of a sunrise clause that would require the Secretary of State to consult the Parole Board about the resources required for additional hearings resulting from the implementation of this clause of the Bill, which deals with the arrangements for the Parole Board, and lay a report before Parliament containing his assessment of the resources required for additional hearings and his plans to ensure that the board has sufficient resources to fulfil the requirements of the proposed section.
The amendment was the subject of debate in Committee. It was prompted by the growing pressures on the Parole Board and the impact that they were having on the timely discharge of its responsibilities. In that debate I expressed concern about the effect on the board’s workload of a number of provisions in the Bill as a result of the number of categories of offender being made subject to the decision of the board in relation to release instead of being eligible for automatic release after serving two-thirds of their term. These cases include prisoners convicted of terrorist and explosives
offences, who would be subject to the enhanced dangerous offenders scheme, all offenders serving extended determinate sentences, and others who would be subject to discretionary, rather than automatic, release after serving half their term. In addition, the Bill prescribes a new release test for recalled prisoners.
All these factors threaten a substantial increase in workload, with a potential requirement, on the Government’s own estimate, eventually, of 1,000 extra prison places. The situation is certain to be made worse by a substantial anticipated rise in oral hearings consequent on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Osborn. Given the department’s track record in forecasting the effect of IPPs on prison numbers, there must be some doubt, to put it mildly, as to the robustness of its estimate. As it is, the board is anticipating holding an additional 4,500 oral hearings a year.
The Minister wrote to me on 29 July in reassuring terms, saying that the experience of the first few months after the judgment showed that the board’s predictions about the caseload were too pessimistic, and that in any case, it was,
“developing significant changes to its operating model and these were being tested”.
The Minister affirmed that the resources question would be kept under review and, of course, I welcome that. It would, however, be interesting to know what the projected caseload in that respect now looks like and what the anticipated cost is and to receive an assurance that any extra work for the board, and its already reduced staff, will not be at the expense of its basic caseload and the times in which it can deal with hearings. Will the Minister provide his assessment of the cost of the additional hearings and how and when this will be met? In particular, will he tell us what consultations have taken place with members of the board and others over the proposal for one-member panels for determinate sentence reviews and two, instead of three, members for indeterminate case reviews?
The Minister hinted somewhat coyly that the Government were,
“considering a number of options”
to address the situation. Three months after the relevant debate in Committee, and all of six days before the first day on Report, the Government unveiled their proposal to create an entirely new service, recall adjudication, which is the subject of the Government’s amendments in this group and of my further amendment. The Government’s proposals are based on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Whiston case, which the Government interpret as giving a green light in terms of compatibility with human rights obligations—assuming that these are not to be abrogated as the Tory Party attempts to fend off the threat from UKIP. Justice, however, the legal organisation, questioned the robustness of that interpretation.
The Minister organised a briefing meeting at short notice and will, of course, describe the proposal in the course of this debate as he speaks to the amendments in his name. In essence, however, the Government propose to allow the Secretary of State to refer determinate sentence recall cases to a recall adjudicator, which
may, in a somewhat circular fashion, turn out to be the Parole Board. Consultations have apparently been held with the board and the judiciary. The Minister told those of us who attended the meeting that they had apparently approved the change, although, for some reason, there has been no public consultation nor, until now, any parliamentary involvement. Such parliamentary involvement, of course, in terms of this Bill, is at virtually the last gasp.
In his letter of 13 October, the Minister indicated that the department would be working with the Parole Board and other unidentified stakeholders on,
“the drafting of the rule”—
in the singular, strangely—
“the design of adjudicator model and the guidance underpinning this”.
That is all very well, but Parliament is not being consulted, nor will it have any opportunity to exercise any judgment about the proposals. It is simply being expected to sign a blank cheque with the promise that the resources aspect will be the subject of a report to Parliament—eventually—but with no apparent intention to seek parliamentary approval of this or any other aspect of what is, after all, a radical change. This is happening at a time when the Parole Board is in the middle of a triennial review which these proposals will clearly pre-empt.
As the Prison Reform Trust points out, even if it were proposed and acceptable for determinate sentence recall prisoners to be denied an oral hearing, why, at the £60 cost of a paper hearing, is it necessary to create a wholly new and untested structure? How sensible is it, when the whole system is caught up in a maelstrom of change and acute pressures which affect all the statutory players—the Prison Service, NOMS, probation, the police and the courts—to add another ingredient to the mix?
In the event the proposal may prove to be acceptable, but at this stage we have very little information to go on; for example, on the criteria on which the Secretary of State will rely, the qualifications, training and job description of those who will be employed, or, of course, the cost. Given the plethora of as yet unanswered questions, it would clearly be desirable for change of this magnitude to be the subject of a proper parliamentary process before what may, it is to be hoped, be a positive change. It is equally desirable, if not more so, to review the outcome of this untested change and secure parliamentary approval after a period in which its efficacy can be judged—hence the second amendment in my name, which is a sunset clause, as opposed to the original sunrise clause in Amendment 1.
I submit that it is not unreasonable to ask the Government to bring forward a report on the workings of this new arrangement, with details of full costs and the like, and then after a modest period to seek approval for its continuation. This habit of last-minute amendments, one with which we are becoming too familiar, not merely from this department but from others, impedes the proper functioning of parliamentary scrutiny and of your Lordships’ House in particular. The Minister is not personally responsible for that, but his political master is, and it is time that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State bore in mind the role of this House
and of Parliament as a whole in considering matters of great public moment such as those that affect the Prison Service, those who work in the Prison Service and, of course, those in their custody. I beg to move.
4.15 pm