I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for the reasoning behind his amendment. I also welcome his general support for the principle of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Clement-Jones is absolutely correct in pointing out that the amendment’s application would be wider than double-glazing: spectacles are another really good example of something that is personalised. I am grateful to have the support of the noble Baroness opposite.
The Government disagree with the approach that the amendment takes. The rights to reject in the Bill—both the short-term and final right to reject—represent fundamental protections for consumers where goods do not meet the consumer’s rights under the Bill.
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The removal of these rights to reject for particular types of goods would risk leaving the consumer in the position of either having to live with the faults, albeit with some compensation, or being trapped in a cycle of repairs or replacements. They would have more limited protection than if they had purchased something mass-produced, for example. These are not acceptable as a consumer’s only options.
A key tenet of the Bill is that there should be consistency and simplicity in how the remedies apply. A consumer should not generally face reduced protection simply because of the type of goods or the way in which they were provided. For example, a consumer who buys a washing machine as part of a fitted kitchen should have the same rights as another consumer who bought the same washing machine as a free-standing unit.
Whether the goods were bespoke or have become part of the fabric of a building, the consumer paid for goods meeting the key rights under the Bill, such as being of satisfactory quality and as described. The trader has failed to provide them. The consumer has done nothing wrong and should not be penalised by being trapped in the contract.
It is particularly unclear why the consumer should lose the protection of the right to reject if they have bought bespoke goods. If anything, the consumer is even more reliant on the skill and judgment of the trader for the production of the goods to the consumer’s specification. If the trader failed to produce the desired goods to the required quality, why should the consumer lose out?
I appreciate that, for the types of goods that this amendment covers, rejection could be problematic to the trader. This could be either in practical terms—for example, in removing a window that has become part of the property—or in cost terms. I understand that it may be costly for a trader to remove rejected goods which may have little or no residual value. At the same time, I understand that traders may be concerned that if consumers do not believe that rejected goods will be collected by the trader, the consumer will be able to continue using them without cost.
On the surface, these may seem like legitimate concerns, but I should make two points. First, the short-term right to reject already exists under the current law for sales of goods, but there is little or no evidence of it being abused by consumers and there is no reason to suspect that consumers will start abusing the right under the Bill. Secondly, the Bill explicitly states that the consumer must make the goods available to the trader or return them if they have agreed to do so, so it is clear to both parties that goods are not at the consumer’s disposal once rejected.
In order to reject, the goods must fail to meet the requirements of the Bill; for example, falling below the standards that a reasonable person—“reasonable” is a concept that we will come to throughout the Bill—would consider satisfactory.
I restate that the removal of the right to reject is too broad a measure. There is little or no evidence for the problem that the amendment seeks to address, and the
Bill already includes protections that are more proportionate. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.