I thank your Lordships. I want to make clear that the Office of Rail Regulation in its role as a highways monitor would advise the Secretary of State on these issues. Perhaps it would be helpful if I took your Lordships through the thought process that took us to the current arrangement of enforcement, because we recognise that there are different ways to approach enforcement.
In looking at the system of fines we followed quite a usual practice, which is to keep the setting of performance standards and objectives together with the enforcement of that performance regime. That tends to be the line most experts in this field would recommend, because it means the enforcer, having been involved in setting those standards, has confidence that the regime as a whole is fair and that enforcement is justified. It is quite difficult for a body that is not setting those standards to then enforce them. Given that the company’s funding will come from the Secretary of State, it seemed to us right that he should be the one to set the performance expectations for the company and consequently to enforce them, following the general principle that I just described. That is the role that we have set in place here.
There have been other views. For example, I note that the report of the Transport Select Committee in the other place recommended giving greater powers to the monitor, closer to the functions discharged by a regulator. It is quite clear, as we have discussed before, that the role that the ORR would play with regard to the SHC is, by definition, different from its role in rail. For example, it is clear that there are no passengers who are paying fares, as there are with rail; there is no equivalency with the roads that would be under the responsibility of the SHC. There is no competitive arrangement between the various operators. For example, there is not the relationship that exists between Network
Rail and the operators, which obviously has its tensions. We looked at it as rather a different role, and that is why we came up with the structure that we have here.
I agree with the comments that have been made on fines. Any fines that are paid by the SHC—I hope that it would not get to the point of paying fines, but it happens—will come out of the money that the company can spend on improving the road network. We have always assumed that the fines would be much more reputational in nature, rather than a heavy punishment. They are much more aimed at signalling poor performance, rather than transferring large sums of money out of the company. Obviously we want constant improvements in the road network.
The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, asked again about changing the title to be used from the Office of Rail Regulation to the office of transport regulation. I think that we have said that one of the interesting things about the role that the ORR will have—a role in relationship to rail and a role in relationship to road—is that it may, over time, lead to more thought about how the various modes interrelate. However, at this point we do not think that we are at that stage. It will be interesting to see how this monitoring role evolves. We will need to see how the SHC carries out its work and how that process evolves, so there may be a point in the future when that name change is appropriate.
I also point out that there is nothing to prevent a name change. It is not provided for in the Bill because the body has an advisory role with regard to roads, but it is open to the ORR to use a different trading name if it so chooses. Therefore, if it wanted to call itself a transport regulator, it could choose that as a trading name.