My Lords, I share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about the absence of the guidance that the Government are eventually to publish. The whole point of Committee on a Bill is that we can debate in detail the implications of the Government’s proposals. By not publishing the guidance at this stage, the Government are preventing the Committee discussing the essential detail of their proposals. For my part, I do not find it satisfactory, even if the noble Viscount produces answers this afternoon. It should have been done in time for noble Lords to debate the matter today.
In the absence of any guidance, we can proceed only on the basis that Clause 27 does not at all protect the prospective employee from being denied welfare benefits if he or she refuses to take up a job offer which involves the absence of employment rights. Even if there were adequate guidance, I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, that guidance is in principle inadequate. The Bill must state clearly the legal position in order to protect the prospective employee.
Clause 27 is bad enough in its implications for employees, as we explained in a previous debate. It is even worse for the prospective employee. Under Clause 27, the employer can refuse to offer employment to applicants who decline to enter into one of these agreements giving up statutory employment rights. The irony is that the worse the job market, the more willing prospective employees will inevitably be to take the job, even if employment rights are lost. However, the poorer the job market, the greater the employee’s need for the statutory protection against unfair dismissal and redundancy that the employee will be giving up. It is a vicious circle indeed.
Amendment 82 and the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, each address a particular vice of Clause 27 in that respect. The vice is clear. It is that the prospective employee who wishes to maintain his or her statutory employment rights—during the previous debate, the noble Viscount emphasised that this is a matter of choice—and refuses to be bought off, is at risk of losing welfare benefits. That is indefensible for a simple reason. Clause 27 can only be based on a theory of equal bargaining power. It is a wholly unrealistic theory, but that is the theory. That is the fig leaf which shelters the substance of Clause 27. Even the fig leaf—the theory of equal bargaining power—is removed by the fact that the prospective employee’s bargaining power is wholly removed if he or she is going to lose welfare benefits if he or she does not agree to take the job in the absence of the statutory protection of employment rights. Therefore, the absence of protection against losing welfare benefits for the job applicant inevitably means that, in practice, Clause 27 does not simply provide for a choice, it imposes an obligation.