I am very grateful to the Minister and, indeed, to all noble Lords who contributed to this valuable and, as described by the Minister, lively debate. It confirmed, as many noble Lords suggested, that this is an ill thought out, divisive and unnecessary provision that ought to be put to sleep as soon as possible.
The Minister suggested that Clause 27 simply creates a choice, and asked what was wrong with creating choice? The whole point of employment rights is that they are needed because the bargaining power of the employee is so limited that statutory protection is required. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, suggested that these proposals might be appropriate for some types of employee in some types of employment. There are two difficulties with that defence. First, Clause 27 is entirely general in its terms; it is not confined to particular types of employment and particular types of protection. Secondly, the employees and the employers for whom the noble Lord, Lord Flight, suggests Clause 27 might be appropriate—entrepreneurial employees in high-tech companies—are not operating in a context where the rights to protection against unfair dismissal and redundancy are of particular significance. It does not inspire a great deal of confidence in Clause 27 that the best point that can be made in its defence is that it will not be used very often.
This amendment is about legal and financial advice, particularly legal advice. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, said that legal advice is not needed in this context because the legal implications are very clear. I have to say that they may be clear to the noble Lord, but I can assure him that the implications of signing away one’s basic employment law rights, and what one will receive in return, will not be clear to the ordinary working man and woman who may be invited to sign away these essential protections.
The Minister then said that there was nothing in Clause 27 that would prevent the employee seeking advice. As a judge said in the 19th century, it is rather like saying there is nothing to prevent the employee from staying overnight at the Ritz hotel. Statutory protection is required to ensure that in reality, advice is made available for those who will not otherwise obtain it. The Minister did not address this. I cannot understand why legal advice is—rightly—required by Section 288 of the Trade Union Act in the context of a compromise agreement, but is not required under this clause when the employee gives up his or her employment rights generally.
I hope the Government will listen to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton, Lady Turner of Camden and Lady Afshar, and to the noble Lords, Lord Vincent, Lord Martin, Lord Strasburger, Lord Morris of Handsworth and Lord James of Blackheath, all of whom speak from their different perspectives with an enormous range of experience. The Minister and noble Lords will know that there are many other noble Lords who are not here today who are equally concerned by Clause 27. I hope that the Government will listen and do what must be blindingly obvious that they ought to do, which is to withdraw Clause 27 so that we do not need to spend—I will not say “waste”, because it is not a waste of time—any more time on this on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.