My Lords, this amendment is grouped with Clause 1 stand part and we are happy to take it on that basis. I am conscious that we had
somewhat of a stand part debate earlier. Nevertheless, I wish to get something on the record as to our overall position.
We wish to see Clause 1 removed from the Bill; it is wrong on so many levels. Fundamentally, it is a denial of localism, representing as it does a shifting of powers from local planning authorities to central government. It is not, of course, the only clause in the Bill to do this. We will debate Clause 24 in due course and there are other consultations in hand relating to permitted development rights and call-in powers which demonstrate the same direction of travel.
Such consultation as there has been is being undertaken now in parallel with consideration of the Bill. It is a truncated eight-week consultation and it is not planned that we will see the Government’s response until we have completed our deliberations. The powers in the Bill, especially around designation, go way beyond the stated intent of the clause, as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee points out.
Of course, the clause is predicated on the proposition that delays in the planning system are holding back growth, but scant evidence has been provided for this. There is obviously clear evidence on the time being taken by local planning authorities to handle applications, but any linking of this to growth—or the lack of it—is, frankly, anecdotal. In any event this seems to ignore the existing powers of the Secretary of State in relation to call-in and the right of applicants to appeal to the Secretary of State against non-determination. We should bear in mind that an appeal against non-determination can be made up to six months after the expiry of the period that the local planning authority had for dealing with the application. This is 13 weeks for major cases and 16 weeks if the application is accompanied by an environmental statement, or whatever extended period has been agreed between the local planning authority and the applicant.
Why are these powers insufficient? As the TCPA points out, planning is not a process. It refers to the complexity of planning decisions, which often hang on fine judgments of local and national policy, and the deliberate anchoring of the system to democratically elected local authorities—the basis of our planning system since 1947. Appeal rights for non-determination, or call-in powers, still retain a role for the local planning authority.
Clause 1 means that the substantive right to have a planning decision taken by a democratically elected local authority is removed, negating one of the founding principles of the 1947 English planning system. There is no doubt that the Government are focusing on the speed of decision-making to the exclusion of quality. Paragraph 47 of the consultation document states:
“We also propose raising the bar for the speed of decisions after the first year”.
Any assertions by the Government that the clause will be used in extremis sound a little hollow. The Government cite the decline from 65% to 57%, in the year ending June 2012, in the number of applications for major developments dealt with within 13 weeks, but there is no substantive analysis of why this might be or, indeed, what might be done to improve the position.
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This has been a period of considerable upheaval in the planning system. There has been extensive debate around the Localism Act and the NPPF, and a period of uncertainty concerning the demise of regional spatial strategies. All local planning authorities have been required to update their local plans. We acknowledge that there has been some progress on this but there are concerns about what remains to be done. Consideration of what has hardly been a period of steady state is creating difficulties for local planning authorities. All this change is being addressed in the context of the biggest cuts in the resources of local authorities for generations.
We agree that planning authorities need to provide to applicants and local communities a service that is efficient, proportionate and effective, but that should surely be the focus of local authorities, the Planning Advisory Service, the DCLG, the Secretary of State and the LGA. If there is a process for improving the performance of struggling authorities through peer support and other sector-led improvement, involving the Planning Advisory Service and perhaps the LGA, why should the authority have to await a designation process?
For a local planning authority that is struggling, how will designation help it to improve? It will lose planning fees and engagement with at least some developers and senior staff—those more likely to be involved on bigger projects. Designation will weaken the link with an authority’s communities; it will undermine LPAs, not support them; and it will be to the long-term detriment of local communities and developers. If the concern is that local councils are not sufficiently focused on growth and want to frustrate development, where does this leave the Government on the business rate retention scheme and the new homes bonus? These, together with general powers of competence, were supposed to be key drivers of growth and the NPPF the route to sustainable development.
The clause must be opposed. Even if used sparingly, it cuts local authorities out of the planning system; it is another power moving from local councils to central government; by breaking the principles of the 1947 settlement, it opens the way for further change; it will pressurise councils to opt for speed rather than quality decisions; it is not a route to helping LPAs improve and will not help them foster good relationships with developers; and, by cutting out local planning authorities, it will undermine the trust of local communities in the planning system. That is why we need to oppose the retention of the clause.
In the group of amendments, we suggest an alternative—a two-year sunset clause. However, that is second best. We would prefer Clause 1 not to be there at all. We recognise that if it is to remain in the Bill, having it on the statute book for as limited a period as possible is the right way to proceed. In the other place, we set a time limit of a year but, on reflection, that is not particularly sensible, which is why we propose a two-year limit for the retention of the clause. That two-year period would provide a chance to evaluate how the provision is working, but it should not provide an opportunity for it to be continued. There would
have to be some process whereby the Government could come back to Parliament if they wished to review something for which, given this debate and the Second Reading debate, there is clearly very little support across the House. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, is probably an exception to that. The debate should send a message to the Government that this is not the right policy. If they will not agree to remove the clause entirely, we should limit its stay. I beg to move.