My Lords, if your Lordships can bear a third lawyer in a row, I, too, would like to express my support for the amendment. I regret that I was not able to be present at Report stage, but if I had been I should certainly have spoken in favour of the amendment.
The Government’s fundamental concern, as described on Report by the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, is that there should be “proper lines of accountability”—a quotation already referred to by my noble and learned friend Lord Phillips. My noble and learned friend and my noble friend have already dealt with that argument effectively, so I shall say no more about it.
The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, also said that he would not revisit the arguments that had been raised historically. It is here that I want to add just a few words, because I was more directly concerned with the terms on which the 2005 Act was passed than either my noble friend or my noble and learned friend. The main argument in favour of setting up the Supreme Court was of course the presence of the Law Lords in this place, which was said to be contrary to the principle of the separation of powers. I never accepted that argument. It seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that the Law Lords were as independent of the Executive as the members of the Supreme Court are now—neither more nor less.
Whatever the theory of the separation of powers, the reality was that the separation was complete. The back-up argument in those days was based on perception. Although we in Parliament knew very well that the law Lords were independent of the Executive, that was not—so it was said—the perception of the public, or at least of some members of the public. However, there was never any evidence to suggest that that was the perception of the public except, if I remember correctly, a single piece of anecdotal evidence. This led the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth in a most memorable speech—I wish he was in his position to hear me say this—to describe the whole exercise as having been based on,
“the perception of a perception”.—[Official Report, 4/7/07; col. 1094.]
However, here we are—as the saying goes—and we must go on from here.
Having created the Supreme Court at a cost of £100 million, not to mention the huge increase in the annual cost of running it, we must now take it as it is and complete the job. I cannot imagine any provision more likely to create the impression of interference by the Executive in the affairs of the Supreme Court than that the chief executive should be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. If the Lord Chancellor was here, it would be no answer for him to say that in practice he would accept the nomination of a selection committee. The perception is there and, in this case, the reality is there.
I cannot remember whether we discussed Section 48(2) in the Select Committee that sat for many weeks. Nor can I remember why, in the end, we accepted the section as it stands, unless we perhaps had in mind the old style of Lord Chancellor before the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, rather than the new Lord Chancellor as he has become. Whatever thought processes went through our heads, I am now convinced that the section was a mistake, and therefore I am very glad to support the amendment.