My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his thorough reply to these three amendments, although—as he would expect—I cannot say that I am entirely satisfied with his response. In the case of Amendment 113D, he did not go into the consequences of giving limited leave to remain to unaccompanied children and trafficked persons—a matter which I tried to outline in moving this amendment. There is room for further examination, and if he is prepared to let me have sight of the review that was undertaken, that would be the most helpful basis on which we might proceed.
As he will have realised, these amendments were all framed by the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association and it, too, would like to be consulted in any review that will be undertaken in the future on the implications of the present situation for these unaccompanied children and trafficked persons granted limited leave to remain. My noble friend said that the amendment was too broad; we would be perfectly happy if, as a result of further discussions bringing in the legal advice of ILPA, we could agree on a more limited version of Amendment 113D.
With regard to Amendment 113E, removing someone to a supposedly safe third country does not eliminate the right of appeal, but if you have to exercise the appeal from an overseas country with all the disadvantages that that entails in the way of consulting lawyers, obtaining written statements and so on, the right is really not worth very much. The cases we considered mean that the designation of safe third countries is not a satisfactory way of proceeding, particularly when one considers the position of LGBT asylum seekers. I mentioned them in my remarks, but the Minister did not touch on them in his reply. I realise that I was asking for detailed information about what has happened to LGBT asylum seekers who were returned to supposedly safe countries. Maybe we can review the situation once we have that information in front of us.
On Amendment 113F, I mentioned the remarks of Mr Justice Beatson and thought that maybe my noble friend would not have had time to consider that judgment. Perhaps we can pursue the matter in more detail later. He did not respond to the point that, by granting leave to remain in a series of cases that touched on the same matter of principle, the Secretary of State was avoiding any resolution of the matter of principle, which would be helpful in cutting short proceedings of the tribunals in later cases. Therefore, I do not accept what my noble friend said about the saving of time in the courts; I think the reverse is probably true, but again, perhaps we can leave this for further discussion with the benefit of advice from ILPA at a later date. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.