My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Blair, concluded his remarks by advising the Government with the old adage, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. Of course, that is not quite what the Government are talking about here. The Government’s approach on a number of other issues is, “If it ain’t broke, take it to pieces anyway and see what happens”. However, the problem is that this clause, which my noble friend’s amendment will delete, is saying that if the Government decide that they want to change this, it will go through by the super-affirmative procedure without the full, detailed scrutiny of all the issues involved. That is why the Constitutional Committee has highlighted the constitutional issue, and why so many noble Lords are concerned about it. If the Government were to propose this, it would be a very major issue with all sorts of ramifications. It is not something that would lend itself to a one-hour debate at 7.30 pm in your Lordships’ House.
4.45 pm
There are a whole number of issues. The first is about the value or otherwise of the integration of counterterrorism policing with mainstream policing. There are arguments about that in terms of the importance of being totally linked in to intelligence gathering, which may happen at the lowest level when neighbourhood police officers pick up indications that something is happening in an area. However, it is also about the importance of linking it to mainstream policing because of the consequences that some counterterrorist operations have for community relations.
I live quite close to the Finsbury Park Mosque. I recall, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Blair, does, the occasion when the Metropolitan Police felt that it was necessary to raid that mosque. It was highly contentious, in terms of potential local community reaction. However, because the Metropolitan Police knew that they would be policing the area in the months and years that followed, police officers stood outside the police and railway stations and all around the area and leafleted people. They explained the context of the raid, what had been done and what safeguards had been put in place to protect the sensibilities of those who worshipped at that mosque.
I question how easy it would be to maintain all of that—the intelligence gathering and the sensitivity to community reaction—if you separate it out. A debate is to be had as to whether or not that is possible. Then there is a whole series of debates that have to happen about what would be the model if you were to transfer some or all of these functions to the National Crime Agency. There are all sorts of levels; it could simply be the national co-ordination function, or the counter- terrorism units that are spread all around the country, or all sorts of other things that are embedded in local police services. These are major debates, with major implications, both in terms of the structure of police forces and in terms of the effectiveness of the services concerned.
I know that we have just despatched the issue of the governance of the National Crime Agency, but there still remains a significant question. We may need to revisit the questions of the governance of the National Crime Agency in the context where it was engaged in issues that have enormous ramifications for community and security. We might feel that a different governance model would be necessary. That is not possible with the clause as originally proposed in this Bill.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and others, have referred to the question of whether this is the right moment to consider this. The National Crime Agency is yet to be established; as we know, the legislation is not yet through. I suspect that the National Crime Agency will have a considerable task to establish itself and carry out its main functions. Potentially, if you were to move counterterrorism into the National Crime Agency, you would completely distort the agency. The number of police officers engaged in counterterrorism exceeds the numbers that are talked about in terms of the National Crime Agency by a significant factor. You would, therefore, distort the way in which the proposed new agency operates. The question is: will you move something that works comparatively well at the moment to something that has as yet to exist, in a way that may destabilise and distort the functioning and direction of the National Crime Agency?
All of these are major debates, and I suspect that Parliament might wish to spend a considerable time debating and considering each one. However, we are told that this should be agreed, essentially today, so that the Home Secretary has the provision in the future, at some unspecified time when he or she feels that it is necessary, to propose that an affirmative order be laid before Parliament to make this happen.
Why is it necessary to have this clause in the Bill today that allows this to happen at some unspecified time in the future, before the Home Office has even considered these issues or there has been a debate, both within the police service and outside, about whether it is a sensible thing to do? Why is it necessary to have an arrangement for a super-affirmative order in the Bill for us to agree today when no one is clear when this might happen or when the National Crime Agency might be available to receive it? That seems an extraordinary procedure to follow and an extraordinary way to go forward, particularly when you have the Constitution Committee of this House saying that there are grave doubts about the way in which this is being proposed.
As I have said, there are four or five major issues which would need to be considered and debated. Those debates have not taken place. Why have a clause that allows those debates to be pre-empted?