My Lords, Amendments 63 and 64 address the third and final point of principle I wish to pursue with my noble friend the Minister.
I regret the need to return to the House with concerns over Clause 102. My noble friend the Minister helpfully invited me and my advisers to the meeting he
chaired with CAA and Department for Transport officials. We were able to voice the very deep concerns in the GBA community over the nature and scope of the change that this clause would bring about and our concerns over the way in which this new activity would be administered.
The further information I was expecting by Report stage, with regard to making claims for prosecution costs in respect of civil penalties and what would happen to any such amounts, has not been forthcoming, nor has any further information emerged about the process by which the range of offences to be dealt with under the new powers are to be selected. This does nothing to lessen my concerns and I hope that my noble friend will be able to provide that information in his response.
Clause 102 of the Bill amends Schedules 5 and 7 to the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008. It adds the CAA to the list of 27 “designated regulators” that may be empowered by order to issue fixed-penalty tickets. It adds to the existing list of 45 regulatory provisions contained therein a 46th, which includes Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. The effect of this is to bring Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act within the scope of the powers of the Secretary of State under Section 36 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and allow him to make an order empowering the CAA to issue fixed-penalty notices in the same way that the police do for alleged Road Traffic Act offences.
Section 61 of the Civil Aviation Act is the enabling provision covering the Air Navigation Order. The ANO is a complex document of some 500 pages, detailing thousands of legal requirements for technical and operational matters, such as record-keeping, pilot and aircraft licensing, the rules of the air, aircraft airworthiness and the equipment to be carried on an aircraft.
So we know what Clause 102 will do, but we do not know why. We remain unenlightened as to the justification for this change or the benefits or costs associated with it. We can only infer that the change is proposed because existing sanctions are inadequate and these new sanctions will achieve an improvement in compliance that cannot be secured through existing powers.
In the interests of good government, one would assume that the public good to flow from the exercise of these new powers will bring a benefit to the UK that will exceed the cost of introducing and exercising them. But neither the Department for Transport nor the CAA has made any attempt to quantify the costs or benefits. We are told that they will not do so until after the Bill has passed, the powers have been granted and they have prepared the order implementing the scheme. So perhaps the monetised costs and benefits are outweighed by the public good that will result. The Government’s own published papers say that the main non-monetised benefit,
“is the potential for increased compliance with certain areas of aviation regulation and therefore better protection of passengers and a more level playing field for businesses”.
However, there is no information on the extent of the potential increase in compliance or an identification of the certain areas of regulation.
It is no good for the justification for these powers to be obscured in this way. If there is a reason, it should be made clear so that the House may consider the powers. What compelling reason is there? What improvement in compliance is expected to be achieved? What areas of aviation regulation are failing at present? If we are not persuaded, I may urge noble Lords to support the amendment.
At present, UK aviation, especially GBA, operates in what is described as an open reporting safety culture. The vast majority of pilots, aircraft operators and engineers take their legal responsibilities for flight safety and airworthiness very seriously. There are successful and well supported systems for the voluntary reporting of near misses and general safety occurrences. That takes place in the light of the existing range of prosecution powers, which are used by the CAA where it has evidence to support its case. I understand that in the four years to March 2008 the CAA prosecuted 119 cases of breaches against aviation legislation. This hardly suggests a compliance deficit, given the enormous range of activities. The CAA policy on prosecuting correctly takes account of the fact that the present collaborative approach, where individuals and organisations are free to share information and concerns with the regulator, is more beneficial to safety for the vast majority of people. That valuable safety culture may be undone if the CAA were able automatically to issue fixed penalties. I say that in respect of alleged offences. This may change the relationship between pilots, operators and service providers. If a “no blame” open reporting culture were replaced with prosecution as an administrative commonplace, all the good work built up over decades would be squandered.
The introduction of fixed penalty procedures would also shift the burden of proof. The recipient of a penalty notice would be faced with the alternative of paying up or challenging the ticket in the courts. I am deeply concerned about the financial aspects of this. The penalties imposed under this system will flow to the Treasury. Clause 102 allows the Secretary of State to empower the CAA to recover the costs associated with the fixed penalty ticket system. Therefore, the CAA will be able to launch a new regulatory operation to recover the costs from those it penalises. What incentive does this provide for the CAA to exercise this new function correctly? I was expecting further information on this and it is yet to appear.
We run the risk that our open reporting culture will be fatally damaged, which will work against the interests of increased flight safety. The CAA has adequate penalties and powers of prosecution at its disposal, which it uses wisely and sparingly. No case has been made to the GBA community and no consultation undertaken in which to back this change. The Bill was consulted on, but inadequately so in respect of the detailed implications and impact that this clause would have on the aviation community. At the very least I would expect my noble friend the Minister, when he winds up on this group of amendments, to provide an assurance that the GBA community will be consulted in detail on the proposed scope and operation of any civil penalty scheme.
I say to my noble friend the Minister that the present arrangements in respect of enforcement of the
ANO are working well and with the active consent and participation of the aviation community. We should continue to develop that spirit of co-operation which has achieved so much over the years. My amendment to strike out Section 61 from Clause 102(3) will achieve that. I beg to move.