My Lords, I hope that I can start by referring to the amendments to Part 2 before us in the most enthusiastic terms of which I am capable. I congratulate the Minister because I know that he played a significant role in ensuring that these amendments include the valuable provisions with regard to restorative justice. The provisions are substantially overdue; the evidence has been available for us to see; and in the debates in this House there has been a unanimity of view as to the positive role that it could play. All that I would caution, if I may, is the importance of ensuring that the proper groundwork is done in regard to its introduction and execution. It is first of all critical that victims see it as it is indeed intended to be—something that is meant to serve them as well as the community generally. Victims are at the centre of restorative justice and the evidence suggests that if conducted properly it provides them with real reassurance that those in authority recognise the importance of putting them at the centre of the policy to be adopted.
Turning to Part 1, I listened with great care to what was said by noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Ramsbotham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Bearing in mind the admonition of the Minister that we are treating this as a Second Reading in our approach, I should say that I strongly support what they have said. I do not know whether it is right to refer to expressions of concern or expressions of alarm, but whichever term is used it is certainly endorsed by me.
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I, of course, have well in mind the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, which seeks to take out of the Bill the parts of the proposed amendments to Part 1 which deal with the question of punishment. Unless steps are taken by the Government to deal with the problems which this part of the amendment creates, I can assure the House that when the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is reintroduced it will have my strong support. The language used in this part of the proposed amendment will create huge difficulties for sentencers. I cannot conceive that the language would be in the terms that it is now if those who have responsibility for sentencing had been listened to.
Comments have been made suggesting that this will create problems for the judiciary. In this regard, I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will forgive me if I say that judges—and I include magistrates when I refer to judges—have no problem about training because they all receive it. They would like to receive more training but the resources available make that very difficult to achieve. I anticipate that for the purposes of community sentencing the judges will receive proper training. If they do—as they will—I cannot see any need for the proposal contained in the amendments to Part 1. Although I am sure it is certainly not intended, they are offensive to the judiciary, who strive to ensure that each person dealt with by them is sentenced to the appropriate sentence.
I have looked carefully at the list of community orders contained in Section 177 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and each order, in the case of certain offenders, is perfectly capable of being a form of punitive action. This perhaps emphasises that the amendment to include
a mandatory requirement is not required. I urge the Government to rethink whether they want to pursue this. If they do, how do they think it will work in practice? Where a judge—whether a magistrate or a senior judge—is involved in deciding on the disposal of an offender, he or she has to consider which of the alternatives available is the appropriate one to apply. If the judge comes to the conclusion that any of the community orders listed in subsection (1)(a) to (l) is the appropriate way of dealing with an offence, then it would equally be the case—unless it is an unusual situation—that he would have decided that that is the appropriate way to achieve justice in the disposal of the offender. But having come to that conclusion and decided that there is no need to do more than what he already intends to do, what should he do about the provisions in Part 1? Can he say that there would have to be exceptional circumstances to impose another punishment just because of the language of Part 1, and if so, would it be unjust to do so?
As to the second half of that contention, I would suggest that it must be unjust to impose something which a judge does not think is the appropriate form of punishment. Given that the way to treat an offender is the most difficult of judgments, we will get into situations where the judge conducting the task of disposal will not be given the liberty, having come to a conclusion on the appropriate manner of disposal, not to impose another form of disposal. That does not seem to me to be good sense.