It is no surprise that my right hon. Friend makes an important point. Whether it is blocking aid, forcing children to act as soldiers or raping and torturing women, the Houthis have no interest in supporting anything but their own power. They have consistently lied to the people of Yemen, and we cannot allow them to act again. I urge anyone in this country who is suggesting in any way that the Houthis are acting in the interests of the Palestinians please to take the time to look at things. If they will not, they should at least look in the mirror.
Moving on, I want to look at why we are absolutely right to take this action. These strikes were a strategic necessity. Article 51 of the UN charter is absolute on
the legal right to self-defence for maritime freedom. In the days leading up to the airstrikes, we saw the UN Security Council come together and agree that action was needed. There was a motion calling for an immediate end to Houthi attacks on shipping. Leading up to the strikes, there were 26 attacks in those waters. That might not have been much reported in the media here, but it was elsewhere. Our Royal Navy has had to defend itself against the worst attack against our ships for decades, and the US is having to deploy Tomahawk missiles to protect itself. That was almost unheard of for a long time. We all heard the arguments from the Defence Secretary. We all know full well that almost 30% of all shipping containers pass through those waters, and 90% of ships are having to avoid the area.
I want briefly to look at the Houthi military capabilities, because there is a view held, particularly among some young people, thanks to a very unhelpful TikTok account. The House knows my views on TikTok, and it is unsurprising that it is helping to spread unhelpful narratives. On this account, a young man seems to be bobbing around on the waters outside Yemen—he could be the star of a movie, I admit—suggesting that the Houthis are working in the interests of Palestinians. The Houthis are incredibly well armed, beyond what many people think. They have Iranian support, and the Iranians have provided rockets and drones, but they also have their own domestic capabilities.
We have to remember that the former dictator of Yemen defected to the Houthi cause, and he brought with him ballistic and cruise missiles. Those are now being used against the Royal Navy, the US and allies. The Houthis have one F-5 jet. Some may say that it is only one jet, but it is attacking the Royal Navy; we have seen them using these weapons against us. They have helicopter pilots. They have so much more domestic capacity beyond what they are being given by the Iranians. Will the Defence Secretary at some point update the House on what assessment we have not just of how we strangle Iranian donations of equipment to the Houthis, but of how much more equipment the Houthis have hidden? We know they have buried it underground, and we also know that they took a great deal when they took control. We need to tackle how we strangle the supply of equipment from Iran.
Moving on to strategic concerns, I have already asked the Defence Secretary how we assess the point to which we need to degrade Houthi capabilities so that they change their intent. This is a deterrence mission; it is a mission to put deterrence back in place. How far down the process of attrition are we? How do we ensure that we do not become the air force of the Yemeni Government? How do we ensure that we have a point to which we are operating, rather than just continuing to try until we see the Houthis change direction?
I am also concerned because Yemen is still in a state of civil war. Although the Houthis control the majority of the population, they control only about 40% of the territory. Meanwhile, we have al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Daesh, both operating in Yemen. My understanding is that there may be some sort of informal relationship between AQAP and the Houthis, because AQAP has been able to move equipment and matériel across the country to where it has its bases. However, as I touched on, terrorists have a pecking order, and they like to be the big man on the street. I am concerned that
we will see these two groups step up their operations and capitalise on what they see as a competing terrorist group being under attack. How do we make sure that we are acting now so that other terrorist groups are not capitalising on those attacks?
My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) rightly raised his concerns about Iraq. That was the first question I asked the Foreign Secretary when he rang me to talk about the airstrikes. I am deeply concerned by our significant footprint in Iraq, not least because over the past few months we have seen increasing attacks on our assets by Shi’a militias beholden to the Iranian regime.
We have also seen the IRGC commit an airstrike in Erbil, and that is concerning but an opportunity. For the IRGC to have taken responsibility for such an airstrike is a step change; we have not seen it do that in the past. That gives more credence to what we will hear from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Sir Liam Fox) about the need to proscribe the IRGC, and it also fundamentally changes how we can talk about the IRGC and its operations. What is the Government’s assessment of how the Red sea situation is likely to escalate, particularly in Iraq? How are we working to protect our assets?
I will touch briefly on Syria. Many colleagues will know that, when the vote came to Parliament, the decision not to intervene militarily in Syria was one of the driving reasons for my joining this place. I still believe that a great mistake was made on that day. Syria has become—forgive me if this sounds flippant—the Amazon warehouse for terrorists. Whether it is narcotics, weapons, people, Shi’a militias or trafficking—you name it—all that is taking place in Syria. What are we doing to reduce the risks emanating from Syria to our assets and interests on the ground?
I turn to Iranian proxies. The Houthis are only one of Iran’s proxies and allies. As I said earlier, different proxies have different relationships. I believe the Houthis to be more of a disobedient ally than a direct proxy, because the command and control is not as significant as it is with Hezbollah. We have Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’a militias and the Assad regime in Syria. What work are we doing to ensure that we have a clear assessment of the differing relationships between different proxies and allies with Iran? Some will be receiving just intelligence. Some will be receiving matériel. With some, there will be direct command and control. Some will feel greater loyalty to others. We need to assess the extent to which Iran will conduct further conflict and chaos to defend each of those proxies. For example, I suspect that Hezbollah is far more happy to wage full-on warfare in defence of the clerics in Iran than the Houthis would be. How do we ensure that we get there?
I have severe concerns about Hezbollah’s future actions. Nasrallah has so far decided to stay out of the action, but the reality is that that could change in a moment. Again, this goes back to who wants to be seen as the best terrorist on the block, and Nasrallah is deeply ideologically tied to the Ayatollahs—more so than any others. While in the past Hezbollah has acted almost as a trip wire to protect Iran’s nuclear capabilities, now, unfortunately, while we may not see significant restraint, it has been showing significant restraint, given its capabilities. I am concerned about what we may see going forward.