The CPTPP has provisions for its own dispute resolution and they are modelled on what happens in the WTO, but here is the thing: if we do not get the negotiation right with CPTPP it might undermine our ability to practise our own SPS regime and have independence in this area.
If we were to have a significant increase in Australian beef, because we had been forced by a court or a dispute resolution service to allow hormones in beef—and there have been close challenges in the past, through the WTO—that would be intolerable for any British Government. The Government of the day would probably have to trigger article 32.8 of the agreement and give six months’ notice to terminate the FTA. In my view the best clause in our treaty with Australia is that final clause, because it gives any UK Government present or future an unbridled right to terminate and renegotiate the FTA at any time with just six months’ notice. Many Members will remember that we had hours of fun in the last Parliament discussing triggering article 50 of the treaty on European Union; I suspect we would prefer not to have to go back to that, but article 32.8 is the ultimate and final sanction, which, as things have turned out, is a critical safeguard given the size of the concessions made to Australia in the trade deal.
What lessons should we learn? First, and most important, we should not set arbitrary timescales for concluding negotiations. The UK went into this negotiation holding the strongest hand—holding all the best cards—but at some point in early summer 2021 the then Trade Secretary my right hon. Friend the Member for South West Norfolk (Elizabeth Truss) took a decision to set an arbitrary target to conclude heads of terms by the time of the G7 summit, and from that moment the UK was repeatedly on the back foot. In fact, at one point the then Trade Secretary asked her Australian opposite number what he would need in order to be able to conclude an agreement by the time of the G7. Of course, the Australian negotiator kindly set out the Australian terms, which eventually shaped the deal.
We must never repeat that mistake. The Minister and Secretary of State will currently be getting submissions from officials saying that we need to join the CPTPP in a hurry and that if we do not do so now we will not join the club early enough and will not be shaping the rules—they will be saying, “We might miss the boat, this is a crucial part of the Pacific tilt” and so on. But the best thing the Minister can do is go back and tell Crawford Falconer, “I don’t care if it takes a decade to do this agreement; we will get the right agreement—we will never again set the clock against ourselves and shatter our own negotiating position.”
The second lesson is that we must look at making a machinery of government change. I believe all responsibility for agrifood negotiations, including relating to tariff rate quotas, should be transferred from the Department for International Trade to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, because DEFRA has superior technical knowledge in this area. It is important to remember that DEFRA never left the world stage; the DIT is a new creation with people often lacking experience but doing their best to pick things up, whereas even during the EU era DEFRA maintained a presence in trade negotiations, advising and informing the EU’s position and dealing with matters such as market access around the globe. DEFRA is worldly and has deep technical knowledge in this area and it should, therefore, take full responsibility for negotiating TRQs in agrifood.
The third change we must look at making is strengthening the role of Parliament in scrutinising and perhaps even agreeing the negotiating mandate. Countries such as Japan and the United States and the EU all use their parliamentary processes to their advantage. When we were negotiating with Japan and seeking to increase access for British cheese, I remember Japan said, “We would love to, but unfortunately we can’t because there is a parliamentary motion that we cannot breach. Therefore, we cannot retreat on this position.” The UK does not have that. We could use Parliament and a mandate agreed by Parliament to say to trading partners, “We’re not able to agree to what you’re asking for.” However, if they perceive that Crawford Falconer calls the shots and that he will always go through some back channel to get something agreed, we will not be in a strong position and our negotiating position will be undermined.
That brings me to my final point. I have always been a huge fan of the British civil service; I was never a Minister or politician to level criticism at them. I enjoyed nine years of incredibly good relations with civil servants at all levels, but I do want to raise a comment about personnel within the Department for International Trade. Crawford Falconer, currently the interim permanent secretary, is not fit for that position, in my experience. His approach was always to internalise Australian demands, often when they were against UK interests, and his advice was invariably to retreat and make fresh concessions. All the while, he resented people who had a greater understanding of technical issues than he did. It was perhaps something of a surprise when he arrived from New Zealand to find that there were probably several hundred civil servants in the UK civil service who understood trade better than he did, and he has not been good, over the years, at listening to them. He has now done that job for several years, and it would be a good opportunity for him to move on and for us to get a different type of negotiator in place—somebody who understands British interests better than he has been able to.