The current Secretary of State for International Trade had no role in the discussions on these deals, although my right hon. Friend the Minister for Trade Policy did and will recall some of them. The Secretary of State was not in the Cabinet at the time, nor in any of the Cabinet Committees, while the Minister has defended the position that was taken at the time.
My position is obviously slightly different: I was in the Cabinet in 2021 and I was on the Cabinet Sub-Committee that argued over the Australian trade deal—for, yes, there were deep arguments and differences about how we should approach it—but since I now enjoy the freedom of the Back Benches, I no longer have to put such a positive gloss on what was agreed. I hope my right hon. Friend will understand my reason for doing this, which is that unless we recognise the failures the Department for International Trade made during the Australia negotiations, we will not be able to learn the lessons for future negotiations. There are critical negotiations under way right now, notably on the CPTPP and on Canada, and it is essential that the Department does not repeat the mistakes it made.
The first step is to recognise that the Australia trade deal is not actually a very good deal for the UK, which was not for lack of trying on my part. Indeed, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, there were things that we achieved, such as a special agricultural safeguard for years 10 to 15, staged liberalisation across the first decade and the protection of British sovereignty in sanitary and phytosanitary issues. It is no surprise that many of these areas were negotiated either exclusively or predominantly by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on behalf of the UK team, but it has to be said that, overall, the truth of the matter is that the UK gave away far too much for far too little in return.
What would a good agreement have looked like? It would have been one having enduring TRQs on beef in particular, but probably also for sheep. The volumes would probably have started at about 10,000 tonnes per annum, raising after a decade to about 60,000 tonnes or perhaps 80,000 tonnes, which could have been manageable. We did not need to give Australia or New Zealand full liberalisation in beef and sheep—it was not in our economic interest to do so, and neither Australia nor New Zealand had anything to offer in return for such a grand concession. Let us not forget that, while we are about to open our market to unbridled access for Australian beef, Australia remains one of the few countries left in the world that maintains an absolute export ban for British beef. Not a single kilo of British beef can be sold in Australia since it maintains a protectionist ban, using the BSE—bovine spongiform encephalopathy—episode as a sham reason for doing so.
The impact of full liberalisation is hard to predict; the reality is that, provided we maintain a ban on hormones in beef, volumes might remain quite low, but here is the big challenge. The CPTPP negotiation that is under way could mean accession and agreement to new dispute resolution processes that will undermine the UK’s sovereignty in SPS issues and actually undermine our approach when it comes to banning hormones in beef. If some foreign court or foreign mediation process were to say as a matter of treaty that the UK had to
accept beef from Australia treated with hormones, that could change the nature of this agreement considerably; volumes could rise significantly, perhaps to more than 200,000 tonnes over time, and that would have a very severe impact on British beef.