I hope that might answer the point the hon. Member was going to ask.
Draft guidance will need to be laid before both Houses for 21 days. During that time, either House will be able to review the guidance and make recommendations or resolutions to which the Government must respond. Select Committees, such as the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee and the Environmental Audit Committee, may also wish to take the opportunity to scrutinise the guidance, and Ministers would be obliged to respond to them in the usual manner.
I turn now to Lords amendment 33B on environmental review, tabled by the noble Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the Government amendments (a) and (b) in lieu that I am tabling today. On environmental review, the key area of debate has been the remedies available in the event a breach of environmental law if that is confirmed by the court. At the heart of the issue has always been the fact that through environmental review the OEP will have the ability to bring cases to court outside standard judicial review time limits, potentially long after the decisions in question have been taken. For that reason, the Government have maintained that bespoke provision is necessary to ensure certainty and fairness for third parties who have acted in line with decisions made by public bodies, and to protect good administration.
The OEP may pursue cases for enforcement action only if it considers that the conduct in question would constitute a “serious” failure to comply with environmental law. Clause 22(7) states that the OEP must have regard, among other things,
“to the particular importance of prioritising cases that it considers have or may have national implications.”
The OEP will have discretion to interpret those criteria, setting out its approach in its enforcement policy, but it follows, in the Government’s view, that cases which have only a local concern, for example most individual planning and environmental permitting decisions, are unlikely to have sufficiently broad or widespread impact to be prioritised. The OEP could pursue such cases if it
considers they are indicative of a broader or more systemic issue or failure, or if especially serious harm has or may result from the potential failure. The OEP, for example, could consider it in relation to the destruction of a nationally important population of a rare and protected species, but it should not be the norm.
However, we have listened to and carefully considered the views and concerns raised in this House and in the other place, and agree it is important that the protections are balanced with the need to prevent or mitigate serious environmental harm. As such, I am pleased to be able to propose an amendment in lieu, which strikes that important balance. In introducing it to the House, I must repeat my earlier acknowledgement that ministerial statements in Hansard could be drawn on by the courts as a legitimate aid to statutory interpretation in future. The amendment will ensure that a high bar is still set for the granting of remedies where third parties may be affected. This is set out in condition A of our amendment. But, critically, it will also provide that, even where condition A is not met, if the court is satisfied that it is necessary in order to prevent or mitigate serious damage to the natural environment or human health, and there is an exceptional public interest reason to do so, the court will be able to grant a remedy. This is set out in condition B. It gives the court discretion to undertake a real and meaningful, albeit weighted, balancing exercise. It means that there would no longer be a blanket prohibition on the granting of remedies where third parties are likely to suffer substantial hardship or prejudice.
In the rare cases where third parties may be affected, however, I would like to illustrate how this provision could operate with an example. Potentially, on an environmental review, the court could rule that an environmental permit had been granted to a factory operator with such inadequate conditions that it was unlawful. If the court concluded that condition A was not met, because substantial hardship to the factory operator would be likely to result from quashing the permit, it would turn to condition B. If, in the absence of a quashing order, it is likely that the factory would continue to release harmful air pollutants with serious impacts for the health of the local population, the court may conclude that it is necessary to grant a remedy in order to prevent or mitigate serious damage to the natural environment or human health. At this point, the court would need to weigh the public interest in preventing serious harm against the public interest in preventing substantial hardship occurring to the third party. In order to grant a remedy, the court would need to be satisfied that the public interest in preventing this serious harm substantially outweighed the interest in preventing hardship, thereby constituting an “exceptional public interest reason” to grant the remedy.
In such cases, where severe damage to the environment or people’s health could occur or continue if no remedy was granted, the court may choose to grant a remedy. Given the types of serious cases that the OEP is likely to bring, we consider that this test strikes the appropriate balance. I have every faith that it will do so and that the amendment will therefore be a valuable addition to the OEP’s enforcement framework as a whole. I hope that the amendment provides reassurance that the Government are thoroughly committed to protecting against environmental harms through the OEP’s enforcement functions, and that the House will support it today.
I turn to what I believe most people are waiting for: the issue of storm overflows. I hope that colleagues will bear with me while I set out our position, because I believe that this is extremely important. So many people have spoken to and contacted me constantly about this whole process and I will take questions at the end, if that is okay, because we are so tight for time.
I have been clear that the frequency with which sewage is discharged from storm overflows into our waters is absolutely unacceptable. It is a credit to my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) and the campaigning of many others that the phrase “storm overflow” is now used 47 times on the face of the Bill. However, I recognise that many hon. Members wanted to see more, and I am pleased to have tabled a further amendment that says that water companies “must” secure a progressive reduction in the adverse impact of discharges from their storm overflows. In this legal drafting, the word “must” means that we are placing a direct legal duty on water companies to do this. That is really crucial. Water companies will have a simple choice: reduce sewage discharges or face the consequences—that is, strong enforcement action.
Turning back to the specific amendment from the Duke of Wellington, we have redrafted it to ensure that it has proper legal effect and there is more effective implementation, and we have gone further in places. I have had much discussion with the Duke of Wellington —I greatly respect and value that—and I would like to clarify a number of points. This amendment places a clear legal duty on water companies to deliver improvements —something that the Duke particularly pressed for. Indeed, ours is a stronger duty than in his wording. Our amendment will ensure that they have to take the necessary steps relative to the size of the problem. We have taken the “progressive” reduction wording from the Lords amendment. “Progressive” means that water companies must continue to take action even after the next price review period and even after they have achieved a significant reduction and tackled high-priority sites, as required in the draft policy statement to the regulator, Ofwat.