I am afraid that my right hon. Friend is not right in what he thinks the rangers will do. The distinction is that 16 Air Assault, the Parachute Regiment and 3 Commando Brigade, as high-readiness contingent forces who are there to fight at short notice in hostile contested environments such as the ones he describes, still do exactly that from the air or the sea, depending on whether it is 16 Air Assault or 3 Commando. The rangers will be a special operations-capable partnering force designed to train, advise, assist and accompany partner forces in conflicts around the world, not to be a fighting force in and of themselves. That distinction is one that we have observed from the success of the US Green Berets, which have been very successful, and we are looking forward to having that as part of the toolkit for the UK armed forces in the future.
Needless to say, in increasing readiness and being able to operate more quickly, there is still a requirement for war-fighting mass, and that leads to a long overdue revisiting of what we ask of our reservists. I am very much looking forward to the publication of the reserve forces 2030 review, and I am confident that in the discussion that follows we will come out with an exciting proposition of what it means to serve in the reserve and what value that can add as we generate war-fighting mass.
In the air, we have created a joint squadron with Qatar, and we are looking at how this concept can be extended further with other partner air forces, as well as offering world-leading flying training to helicopter and fast jet pilots from our allies around the world. Meanwhile, investment in the P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, in the E-7 airborne command and control, in the Protector uncrewed surveillance and strike platform and in a network of airfields from which we can operate the full
range of RAF capabilities, enhances our capacity to understand our adversaries, find them quickly and strike them wherever they are, all around the globe.
At sea, we have had forward deployed ships in the Caribbean and the Falklands for a number of years, and I can announce to the House that last week HMS Trent arrived in Gibraltar, where she will now be permanently based in order to service the UK’s interests in both the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Guinea. Later in the year, a further offshore patrol vessel will sail for the Indo-Pacific, where she will also be permanently forward based. The maritime forward presence is further enhanced by the restoration of our high-readiness global carrier strike capability and the new littoral response groups providing an at-sea high readiness amphibious response force on NATO’s northern and southern flanks.
However, let there be no misunderstanding: we are clear-eyed on the realities of geography. We are a Euro-Atlantic power and deeply invested in the security of Europe. NATO is the cornerstone of our national security, so our priority is our partnership with other Euro-Atlantic nations and the security of our own backyard, but it is naive in the extreme to think that that means we can ignore insecurity and instability on Europe’s southern flank in sub-Saharan Africa and the middle east.
The UK interest is threatened by violent extremism in the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin and the horn of Africa, and so too is it threatened by Russian proxies massing in Libya and Syria, but those are not problems that would be solved by 10,000 troops on the ground in any one of those places. The lessons of the last two decades show that we must work intelligently to tackle instability upstream and through regional partners. We simply cannot muscle our way to a solution in those places with all-out hard power. Our contribution on those conflicts in the future must be smarter and must develop a capability that will endure even after our mission is inevitably over.
We should also be clear that meeting our global trading ambitions requires both the capacity and the will to protect our sea lines of communication and the wider UK interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Opposition have wrongly characterised that as a switch in emphasis from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it is a recognition that we have the capability, the capacity and the political will to flex hard power into a part of the world where the UK’s strategic interest is growing quickly, so that we can strengthen our alliances, protect our interests and promote adherence to a rules-based international system.
The integrated review and the Defence Command Paper represent the boldest change in foreign, defence and security policy for 30 years, and it is entirely right that we are here debating them today. I know that there is disagreement on both sides of the House about some of the judgments that we have made, but the requirement is to produce a force that is credible: one that can actually fight in the complex and highly digitised battlespace of tomorrow. Some capabilities have run their course, and there can be no room for sentiment in keeping them when they simply are not relevant any more.
Ultimately, this all comes down to two key questions: first, are we offering the men and women of our armed forces exciting opportunities and the equipment they
deserve; and secondly, and most important, does all this make the UK safer? I have already looked servicemen and women in the eye and explained to them our vision for our armed forces and the way they will operate, and so too have my ministerial colleagues and the senior military leaderships of all three services. Our people get this: they understand the need for change, and they want it. The reality is that they can see, and I can see, that because of this transformation, our armed forces will be stronger, more capable and therefore better able to protect our country in the decades ahead.
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