From the point at which I first became aware of its proper formulation, I have been a supporter of the military covenant. It has always seemed to me to be a statement of decent common sense. The covenant has been important for the past two decades because of the way in which it has shaped and, indeed, changed the debate in politics on matters relating to the military. It has given us something around which we can all unite and is a common starting point for us all. The debate in this House and in the community at large has been much the better for that.
It is for that reason that I have particular regret about the way in which the Bill has come to the House today and—I have to say—about the way in which we have debated it. There has been a degree of heat and asperity in this debate that does not serve this House, or those in our armed forces whom we seek to protect, well. I ask the House, and not just those on the Treasury Bench, to reflect on that. I am aware that I may even have been part of it myself, but on reflection I think those who serve in the armed forces deserve better than this.
As I said to the Secretary of State, there is an easy consensus to be built around taking action against vexatious civil dreams. Unfortunately, what we have heard in support of the Bill does not really build that consensus; we have heard a conflation of civil and criminal procedure, with a view to justifying the otherwise unjustifiable changes to criminal procedure. I have very little problem with the part of the Bill that relates to the regulation of claims. What Phil Shiner did was absolutely unconscionable. If we want to stop that sort of thing, the first point ought to have been to call in the regulatory authorities in the legal profession. If we really want to address that problem, that would be the first place I would start to look.
I wish to put on record the concerns that my right hon. and hon. Friends and I have about the Bill. First, there is the question of a presumption against prosecution. The Secretary of State said earlier that I was a right hon. and learned Member; he was not quite right: I was but a humble solicitor. In fact, in the early stages of my legal career, I served as a prosecutor—as a procurator fiscal depute—and it was useful experience. I cannot think of any other example of this presumption in legislation, and I counsel the House that it is a dangerous one.
I want to focus on the use of torture, because this illustrates very well the lack of logic in not having torture in schedule 1 to the Bill. Where there is evidence of torture, no prosecutor sitting in his or her office should say, “Well, there is clearly evidence of torture, but it is presumed that we will not prosecute it.” What sort of signal does that send? But if we read the Bill, we see that its architecture is such that torture is clearly designed to belong in schedule 1, along with sexual offences. That makes perfect sense. As I have said, that is a matter of logic, not of law. The provisions in schedule 1 cover eventualities whose use is never in any circumstances acceptable, so surely that is where torture belongs. Not to
put it there suggests that the use of torture in warfare is in certain circumstances acceptable, and that is a proposition for which there should be no support in this House. In suggesting that, we risk doing ourselves serious damage and, worse than that, we ill serve those whom we seek to support and to help through the passing of this legislation. The people who will be most damaged by the application of that presumption against prosecution in relation to torture are those who serve and have served in our armed services. As I said in my intervention on the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), the purpose of prosecution is to prove beyond reasonable doubt that something has or has not happened. This presumption will work against that, and at the end of the day, the people who will lose as a result are those against whom suspicion exists.