I endorse what the hon. Lady says. It is important to remember that black, Asian and minority ethnic communities—particularly the Muslim community —need the Prevent strategy as much as the rest of us, but they must not be demonised by it. That is why I referred to what has happened in Scotland. The Scottish Government, working closely with the Muslim community in Scotland, have managed to avoid that degree of resentment. This review is important for all communities in England and Wales, where unfortunately the same thing has not happened.
I turn to TPIMs. The Scottish National party and the Joint Committee on Human Rights are concerned that a case has not been made out for the changes that the Government wish to make. Others have referred to the views of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall QC. In the detailed evidence that he gave to the Bill Committee, he described the combination of clauses 37 and 38 as
“a double whammy…not just reducing the standard of proof but allowing TPIMs to endure forever.”
I asked him about the possibility of safeguards, and he suggested the very safeguards that are set out in amendment 46, which is in my name and that of the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham. Jonathan Hall said that
“if it were right that a TPIM should continue beyond two years, at least at that stage the authorities should be able to say, on the balance of probabilities, that the person really is a terrorist. That is an example of a safeguard.”
He went on to say:
“Turning to the question of enduring TPIMs, another safeguard could be to ensure that a judge would have to give permission—in other words, to treat going beyond the two years without any additional proof of new terrorism-related activity as requiring a higher threshold, or some sort of exceptionality or necessity test, as a further safeguard for the subject.”—[Official Report, Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Public Bill Committee, 25 June 2020; c. 15-16, Q33.]
I urge the Government to consider incorporating into the Bill safeguards similar to those suggested by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation and set out in amendment 46.
As has been said, the problem with the change in the standard of proof is that no operational case has been made for it. I will not anticipate what the Minister will say later, and I may intervene on him if we have time. The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Jonathan Hall, who is appointed by the Government and charged with looking at these matters, has said that
“there is reason to doubt whether there exists an operational case for changing the TPIM regime at this point”.
I suggest that the Bill Committee heard nothing in evidence to challenge that. He said that he had had discussions with the Government but had not been able to identify a cogent business case. That is what is missing here. Although this affects only a small number of people at present—of course, it might affect more if the standard of proof is lowered—these are people who have not actually been convicted of any offence, so if the Government want to make such a significant change, it is really important that they bring forward a clear case for doing so.
5.15 pm
According to the evidence heard by the Bill Committee, the current standard of proof does not seem to have been in any way an impediment to the security services. We have had no clear evidence that the current standard of proof is preventing the security services from seeking or obtaining a TPIM when they consider it necessary and appropriate to do so. My position is that until we have that sort of cogent business case, the Government have not made the case for reducing the standard of proof. I do not think we will get it today, but I suspect that it will be looked for in the other place, and it would be interesting to hear from the Minister later whether he will propose any sort of business case when the Bill goes to the other place.