It is often customary to say that it is a pleasure to follow the previous speaker, but that would not seem appropriate given the contribution by the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson). It was incredibly poignant and powerful, though, and most appropriate given the Bill before us.
I was pleased to hear the contribution from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—I do not say that to cause her any discomfort—because we find common cause on the issue of polygraph testing. If I cast my mind back to my contribution on Second Reading, I recall that I spoke about the fact that there are distinct differences not only between our criminal justice systems throughout this United Kingdom but in the choices that we, as representatives, need to make
about the appropriateness of embarking on an untested and unverifiable system that would ultimately be used to impose further restrictions on somebody’s liberty in a way that we cannot satisfy ourselves is at all appropriate.
I am pleased to find common cause among Members from different parties who have concerns about the creeping integration of the use of an unverified method of assessing offenders. We understand that it is restricted to licences and, now, to three or four discrete areas of offence, but just as the Scottish are being cautious, I believe that we in Northern Ireland will be cautious, too, about the introduction of such measures. To that end, I was pleased to hear chief commissioner Les Allamby from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission give evidence to the Bill Committee and highlight his concerns from a Northern Ireland perspective.
I recognise the thrust behind amendments 3 and 4, tabled in the name of the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry); however, I wonder whether they are necessary. If I reflect on clause 34, I see that it is for the Department of Justice Northern Ireland to decide whether the use of polygraphs is necessary. That provision should give us enough comfort about the operational introduction of polygraph testing in Northern Ireland. We should be slow to water down or remove the fact that counter-terrorism and national security measures are reserved to this Parliament. I say that believing not that the devolved institution in Northern Ireland should not have a role, but that we should be cautious in seeking to attain power on national security and counter-terrorism grounds, recognising the divergent views in our Northern Ireland Executive, some of the competing arguments that would be made and that ultimately we may get less protection should cross-community consensus be required for the introduction of those powers. I am therefore not minded to support amendments 3 and 4.
A recurring theme throughout the passage of the Bill has been its retrospective application. The Minister will recall that I was concerned that Northern Ireland was not included in the retrospective application of the extension of serious terrorist offences, and that I was pleased whenever Northern Ireland was included and that the implications, perceived or otherwise, of article 7 applications on the retrospective nature of the offences were overcome. I say that because when we take such decisions—when we decide as a Parliament that we are going to extend the custodial period of someone’s sentence—we need to do it with our eyes wide open. That is not to ignore the fact that an argument could be made that article 7 is engaged, but we have to reflect thoughtfully on what the policy imperative is for doing so and whether it can be robustly defended if there is a challenge.
Through the consideration on the Floor of the House, in Committee and elsewhere, strong and compelling legal arguments have been made that differentiate between a penalty and the enforcement of the penalty. It is appropriate that we, as parliamentarians, say clearly on the record that we are not changing the penalty for anyone who is currently in prison and subject to a terrorist offence sentence. Their sentence remains the same. How that sentence is operated and enforced is different. Uttley v. United Kingdom, Hogben v. United Kingdom, Kafkaris v. Cyprus and Grava v. Italy all indicate the distinction between the extension of a penalty and the enforcement of it.
While there are particular issues in Northern Ireland that we should be alive to, and we must approach these issues with our eyes wide open and recognise that some will seek to manipulate them for propaganda purposes, we must not fail to be prepared to stand up robustly for the rule of law within our country and say, “No. You may not like it—you may not like the rational choice that we as democrats make within our legal system, but we will not cow to the threat of violence, agitation or propaganda that seek to subvert the norms and principles of democracy that we all enjoy.” On that basis, I cannot support amendments that seek to remove the retrospective application of the Bill.
I will conclude, Mr Deputy Speaker, because there was a suggestion of a notional time limit, and you have been gracious enough to sit calmly as I move towards a conclusion. I think there is some sensible merit in new clause 7, which has been approached and drafted by Her Majesty’s Opposition rationally. It recognises that there are issues in Northern Ireland and that it is important over a period—be it one, two or three years—to carry out an impact assessment of how the Bill has operated in Northern Ireland and whether it has made a significant positive or detrimental impact, and then to lay a report before the House in conjunction with the Northern Ireland Executive. It is a sensible, well-drafted and appropriate new clause. Even if it is not pressed to a vote, I hope that, in taking decisions such as this with eyes wide open, recognising that there could be concerns about the operational impact and the opportunity for people to manipulate the democratic and legitimate choices we make, the Government will review this legislation and consider whether the consequences were warranted and these choices were appropriate.