I thank the hon. Gentleman. As he said, in 1979 we get the introduction of the Thatcher Government, and we begin a process of polarisation and of nothing happening in this constitutional debate. Meanwhile, people are preparing, organising and advocating the cause of Scottish self-government. In 1989, we have the establishment and the declaration of the claim of right, which I note from our debate in this Chamber two or three weeks ago that every party in this place now supports. That is encouraging because they did not, of course, at the time.
We then have the situation whereby the Labour party essentially adopts the process of devolution. Whereas it had previously been a controversial matter, now it is what John Smith calls the “settled will” of the Scottish people, and Labour pledges to bring in devolution if elected. Then we have the process of devolution, with the Scotland referendum in 1997, the Scotland Act 1998 and the reconvening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.
Now, there will be some people in this debate who will wonder why that was not enough. They will say, “Well, that was game over” and think that we have done what we came here to do. They will ask, “Why now—20 years later—are people still complaining that this is not enough?” Well, two things happened after the creation of the Scottish Parliament. First, it actually worked quite well, and people in Scotland began to appreciate that their local representatives having control over matters made a difference. New things were put into play. Despite the opposition of the Conservative party to the creation of the institution, it was embraced by the Scottish electorate to a much greater extent than this place ever has been.
The second thing that happened, of course, was the Blair Government and their increasing unpopularity. As in England and most of the rest of Britain, the traditional Labour electorate of Scotland had nowhere to go in response to Tony Blair’s decision to remove the Labour party from supporting them. In Scotland, the electorate had a ready-made alternative, and they began in numbers to join the alternative party on the left—the Scottish National party. We then have a situation where, by 2007, the first SNP Scottish Government are elected. What is the response to that? It is the Calman commission and the promise of further powers.
We go on to 2011, when we see a majority SNP Government having the opportunity to put before the electorate their central promise of giving people the opportunity to decide on their own future. [Interruption.] I will talk about the referendum a little bit, but I do not want to go into detail. The result of the referendum, of course, was the Smith commission and the promise of further powers. So all the way along the past 50 years, we have seen additional powers given to Scotland—more control given to the Scottish people over their own lives—because of the state’s reaction to the rise of the sentiment for self-government and for national self-determination. That is the fact of the matter; that is anybody’s analysis of history.
Much as Scottish Conservative Members may dislike this fact, the Scottish referendum in 2014 did not, I am afraid, settle anything at all. Many people, when they look at this from afar, misunderstand some of the things that were happening during that referendum. In particular, many commentators on the liberal left in England completely get it wrong when they say that what was
going on was some sort of assertion of identity. That was not the case at all. If ever a country had a surfeit of symbols of identity, it would be Scotland. Scotland has all the identity in the world; what it does not have is empowerment of the people who live there to control their own lives. That was the spirit of the 2012-14 referendum campaign.