It is a privilege to be called to speak in this debate. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) on securing it. He has been a tireless champion of our armed forces, and he has done us all a great service today by giving us an important opportunity to debate this most important of matters. I will seek to do so in the most constructive way possible, because I believe that we all have a responsibility to hold the Government to account. My remarks, and the concerns that I will express, are not about securing short-term political advantage; they are about ensuring that our nation is properly defended.
Throughout my time in the armed forces and in this place, I have come to believe that every Government’s policy on defence should be underpinned by two promises. The first is the Government’s promise to maintain the freedom and integrity of the UK, its overseas territories and its people, and it is rooted in their recognition that this is their primary duty. The second is the armed forces covenant: a promise from the Government, on behalf of the nation, that those who serve or who have served, and their families, will be treated fairly. For reasons of time, I will not talk about the military covenant today. Like all hon. Members present, I am constantly inspired by the incredible skill and commitment that our servicemen and women demonstrate, often in the most difficult circumstances; it is just that today my emphasis will be on the risk to our defensive capability.
When thinking about this speech, I looked at the “UK Defence Doctrine” to see what it says about the role of defence. It states:
“Our national security encompasses the safety of our state and protecting it from external and internal threats. It also requires us to endeavour to preserve the security of UK nationals living overseas.”
The same document goes on to talk about the many varied potential uses of our armed forces, from enhancing soft power influence to the evacuation of non-combatants, the application of force and responding to natural disasters. However, my concern is that it is not a publication
that is read much, at least not by those who seem to be making the decisions on the future of our armed forces. I am thinking, in particular, of some of those in the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. Instead, some of them seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that, in the age of information conflict, the need for our armed forces is decreasing. That could not be further from the truth. Mitigating threats to our security is not a zero-sum game.
In recent years and months, the eyes of Westminster and Whitehall have become increasingly focused on Russia’s activity in the UK’s information domain, our critical national information infrastructure and the broader concepts of soft power and security. That is commendable, but it is worth remembering that in 2015 the national security strategy and the strategic defence and security review identified four primary threats to UK national security: the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; the resurgence of state-based threats; the impact of technological change, especially cyber threats; and the erosion of the rules-based international order. Our armed forces are critical in mitigating those threats.
Since then, some members of the Government have repeatedly told us that
“the threats identified have intensified”
and that
“there is a need to strengthen our defences”.
Yet the growth in threat has not been matched by a growth in resources. Indeed, the previous Secretary of State told the Defence Committee that the mismatch between intensifying threats and the capabilities available was in fact being exacerbated by
“the challenge of inflation, cost growth in some of our more complex programmes and the ambitious efficiency targets.”
Yet the ongoing capability review appears to have no intention of addressing that underfunding, because it cannot. Unlike the full SDSR in 2015, it is not taking place at the same time as a spending review, and the budget for the Ministry of Defence has been fixed up until 2021. My first question to the Minister, who I know thinks very carefully about these matters, is therefore this: what is the purpose of a review that may conclude that there is a need for more capability if there is no chance of the Government providing it? Surely such a move will only highlight to our adversaries both the paucity of our ambition and the degradation of our capabilities.
The past few years have not been good for defence. Too much influence has been ceded to people who do not understand or value our armed forces. That has resulted in the mismanagement of the defence budget, delayed the delivery of crucial equipment and created holes in our strategic and operational capabilities. Now, as the national security capability review runs the risk of channelling funds away from our armed forces in favour of a focus on cyber-security, the Government run the risk of making matters worse.
I could speak at length about the capability areas damaged and in danger, but today I want just to touch on our amphibious capability, Joint Force 2025 and the importance of training to both of them. First, on our amphibious capability, I have had the privilege of serving
alongside Royal Marines and, although I would not necessarily have told them this at the time, I know how important they and their enabling capabilities really are. That is why I hope the continued rumours regarding their future—specifically, the selling off of HMS Ocean, the cutting of HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion, and the reduction of the Royal Marines by up to 1,000—are not true. A cyber capability cannot do what they do, and what they do remains absolutely crucial, be that the application of force, crisis relief or the evacuation of non-combatants. Our amphibious capability is a critical national asset.
In 2005 General Sir Rupert Smith said that the future of warfare was “war amongst the people”. He was right. Considering that over 40% of the world’s population live within 100 km of the coast, it is absurd that we should even be talking about cutting our amphibious capability, or pretending that Bay class and Queen Elizabeth class ships offer similar functionality. Crossing the littoral boundary is not only essential to our ability to deploy troops in many future conflict scenarios, but hugely important to the UK’s humanitarian work around the world, and cutting it would signal that we are stepping back from both our global responsibilities and our responsibilities to UK nationals overseas.
The real-world importance of those capabilities was demonstrated recently by Operation Ruman, the UK’s military response to Hurricane Irma, and continues to be illustrated by the fact that, at the joint force headquarters in Northwood, two of the highest priorities for NEO—non-combatant evacuation operations—planning are South Korea and Lebanon. As such, we must acknowledge that any decision to reduce this capability would come not as part of a wider strategy for the UK’s role in the world, but as a misguided attempt to get the defence budget under control. I would therefore like to ask the Minister whether he can confirm today that neither Albion nor Bulwark will be scrapped as part of the national security capability review. Can he also confirm that there will be no cuts to the regular manpower of our Royal Marines?
I am similarly concerned about the current threats to my old service, the Army. Since 2010 we have seen numerous initiatives affecting the manpower, equipment, training and structure of the Army. The most recent, Joint Force 2025, was initiated by the 2015 SDSR and is rightly focused not on equipment and platforms, but on output and effect. The planned reforms were intended to deliver armed forces that were more agile and reactive, and to prepare the Army to deal with growing threats from state adversaries. That kind of development and evolution is critical to our national defence, but such modernisation is predicated on harnessing emerging technologies and, as such, requires investment in research and development, capital expenditure on new equipment, and the right number of well trained personnel. All of this was to be underpinned by greater cohesion and co-operation between regulars and reserves and paid for by MOD efficiency savings, but I fear neither is happening and Joint Force 2025 is, as a result, under threat.
I therefore ask the Minister three further questions. First, is the MOD still on track to deliver Joint Force 2025 as planned? Secondly, how is the MOD ensuring that the outcomes of the capability review in relation to defence do not similarly rest on false assumptions and
overly optimistic promises? Thirdly—I say this slightly in jest—should regular reserves like my parliamentary assistant and myself, and I suspect the Minister as well, really be included in the “whole force” figures? Although I say that slightly in jest, it highlights the important point that for our armed forces, in the land environment in particular, capability is not just a question of numbers. Personnel have to be correctly equipped, trained and accustomed to operating in deployable structures. Too often, training is seen as an overhead that can be cut back. That ignores the importance of training in ensuring that our armed forces are ready to respond and in demonstrating capability to allies and adversaries alike. As threats diversify and intensify, our training must adapt and deepen.