I am sure that the Scottish people will be delighted to hear that the hon. Lady thinks that somehow they do not pay taxes and that they are dependent on the largesse of ladies like her to fund our welfare system.
We have had a very small amount of welfare devolved. If she wants to make such a contribution, she can read out the rest of the Whips’ briefing note when she catches your eye later, Mr Deputy Speaker. [Interruption.] The Tories can groan all they like, but they have called a snap election, and on the same day we are debating the Finance Bill.
In this Bill, the Minister wishes to reduce the dividend nil rate from 2018-19 from £5,000 to £2,000. I will listen carefully in the next 10 days or so to what the Government say about that. Perhaps they can prove that only very wealthy people benefit from that allowance and that it may be a reasonable change. Equally, it may be the case that many small and start-up business owners depend on that money to tide them over and that the measure will be nothing more than a tax on enterprise—a disincentive to start a business, to create jobs and to power local economies.
I did find it slightly jarring when the Minister explained that wealthy people could put lots more money in individual savings accounts. That is fantastic news for people who are already wealthy: they can save tax free. Let us juxtapose that with a change to the dividend nil rate from a modest £5,000 down to £2,000, which might act as a disincentive to people who genuinely want to start a business, while allowing already wealthy people to save tax free. That might be the kind of error we would have seen under the old fiscal charter and its requirement to run a permanent surplus quickly, almost irrespective of the economic conditions. However, the new fiscal charter is more flexible than the last one, which should make such a measure unnecessary. The Government are still targeting a surplus early in the next Parliament. Let us see how early it is in the next, next Parliament.
Again, without digressing too far, the numbers and the timescale for even a modest surplus within four or five years look precarious. The forecasts for a current account surplus are tiny, not even reaching 1.5% of GDP. If there is any external shock or capital flight if sterling suffers further devaluation, which is quite likely if the Brexit negotiations go wrong—again, highly possible—the figures could fall apart very quickly indeed.
At its heart, this is a Finance Bill delivered with the pretence that the hard Tory Brexit is not happening. It sits in splendid isolation from reality. We cannot assess whether it will assist with the challenges that lie ahead. We cannot even assess properly what the consequences of the limited measures in it will be, because the Office for Budget Responsibility told us about Brexit at the Budget:
“There is no meaningful basis for predicting the precise end-point of the negotiations as the basis for our forecast.”
In short, this Finance Bill, like the 2017 Budget, is effectively based on a central assumption that pretends that Brexit does not exist. That is a ridiculous thing to do, given that article 50 has already been triggered.