UK Parliament / Open data

Investigatory Powers Bill

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael).

The Bill is undoubtedly necessary, in that it was preceded by interception and surveillance based on something like 66 different legal bases, and that was incomprehensible to almost anybody. I had hoped that the Bill would cover all the previous legal bases, but it does not do so. There are still matters that are not covered by the Bill. For example, the Intelligence Services Act 1994 is still avowed in the Bill, and is used as a mechanism for which it was not intended. I know that because I took that Bill through the House. I know what it was intended to do, and it was nothing like what it is now used for.

Since I have a very limited time, I will press on, but let me say this. Listening to most of the speeches on this group of amendments, I agreed with virtually all of them, particularly the points about modification. The right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) made a very good point—whatever the mechanism—about the flaws in the current Wilson doctrine, as now laid down in the Bill. There are therefore many changes yet to come, and I imagine they will come in the Lords, or indeed in the law courts.

In the next few minutes, I will focus on the amendments in my name, principally amendments 208 to 211, which deal with the issue of the so-called double lock. Until the change proposed today, it was more like a double latchkey because it was not really as strong as it was represented to be.

Before I go into that matter, I should tell the House that I take the view that the whole interception strategy used by this country is, in any event, flawed. We are virtually the only serious country in the world that does not use intercept evidence in court. The arguments made by the Government and the agencies are ones that could equally be made anywhere in the world. No other authority follows that. The fact that interception evidence is not used in court is one of the reasons why rather sloppy legal disciplines apply to the use of interception, particularly relying on the Home Secretary to authorise interceptions.

Now, there are practical, principled and political reasons, as well as reasons of accountability, for that being wrong, full stop. The practical reason is that the Home Secretary has admitted to authorising about 2,500 of these things a year. That is 10 a day—not at most, but on average. On Second Reading, I asked her to tell us how long she took over any of them, but she refused and sidestepped the question. When this situation became public, after the Anderson report, I had letters from policemen who were involved in the creation of warrants who said that it was simply impossible and that 10 a day could not be done—a judge could not do 10 a day. That is the first problem.

The second problem is that we take our judgment from the current Home Secretary. She is very unusual. She has been in office for six years. That is incredibly unusual, and a great reflection on her. But a typical Home Secretary is not there for six years. I was shadow Home Secretary for five years and faced four different Home Secretaries—one and a half years apiece, roughly. What are we looking at, then? We will have someone who has typically been in office for a year or so making really serious judgments in a real hurry. That is not the way to make the sort of balanced judgments that we expect when we are balancing the privacy of our citizens on the one hand and their life and security on the other.

The second reason is one of principle. I take the view, as did David Anderson, that it is perfectly proper for Ministers of the Crown to approve anything that would involve a foreign intercept, let us say, that would create a political problem for the country. I see no argument whatever, other than the vestiges of royal prerogative, why Ministers should make judgments about warrants brought against citizens of this country. I can see nothing that justifies that. Our greatest ally, America, views it with horror. It causes us problems with American companies when those warrants are presented. America uses a solely legal process, which would be my preference.

The arguments on accountability are frankly laughable. I know of no Minister who has stood at that Dispatch Box and defended the issue or non-issue of a warrant—not one—and it is arguably not legal. The argument put in Committee, I think by the Minister of State, was that Ministers are accountable to the Intelligence and Security Committee. The current members of that Committee include some of my oldest and dearest political friends, but I have to tell the House that I would not trust a Committee that had to be nominated by the Prime Minister, that met in secret and whose reports were redacted to hold the Executive to account. I could go into the history. It missed the dodgy dossier, the torture and the mass surveillance, and got 7/7 wrong. It is not a Committee we can rely on for accountability until it has proved itself over many more years.

A politician should not sign these warrants off. We are not going to win that argument today, so what is the next best step? It is that a judicial process, based on the evidence—always, not optionally—be the check on the issue of these warrants. My preference is that that should happen before the Home Secretary sees them, not after. That might cut 2,500 down to 2,000, and make things a little more practical. The simple truth is it would be a better way in any well-designed system.

My amendments aim to improve the Bill in that regard. The Government have come up with a manuscript amendment that the former DPP, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), says he thinks is acceptable. Until I have taken advice I cannot make a judgment on that, but for that reason, I will not press my amendments today. But I say to Members on the Front Bench that if their arguments on this issue do not stand up they will either collapse in the Lords or they will collapse in the law courts—one or the other. That is pretty certain.

A number of other issues have been raised today. Those include legal privilege, which as I say I think is the most important corrosion that is going on. We have heard about the Wilson doctrine, and about journalists and trade unions. It is now a wider issue. One thing that has come up in the past few years has been the misbehaviour of police forces and agencies with respect to demonstrators—the legitimate, proper and democratic operations of the Green movement, for example; there is also the blacklisting that the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) referred to. All those things need to be dealt with, and if the privacy guidance and clauses that are effectively built into the Bill do not do that, we must find a way to ensure that we do not just solve the problems of history, but that we solve problems for the future.

10.45 pm

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
611 cc978-980 
Session
2016-17
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
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