With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 8—Further provision about modifications.
Government new clause 9—Notification of major modifications.
New clause 20—Power of Secretary of State to certify warrants—
“(1) The Secretary of State may certify an application for a warrant in those cases where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that an application is necessary pursuant to section 18(2)(a) (national security) and involves—
(a) the defence of the United Kingdom by Armed Forces; or
(b) the foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
(2) A warrant may be certified by the Secretary of State if—
(a) the Secretary of State considers that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within section 18; and
(b) the Secretary of State considers that the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(3) Any warrant certified by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1) is subject to approval by a Judicial Commissioner.
(4) In deciding to approve a warrant pursuant to this section, the Judicial Commissioner must determine whether—
(a) the warrant is capable of certification by the Secretary of State subject to subsection (1);
(b) the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds subject to section 18(2)(a) and subsection (1)(a) or (b); and
(c) the conduct authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.
(5) Where a Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the person’s decision to approve a warrant under this section, the Judicial Commissioner must produce written reasons for the refusal.
(6) Where a Judicial Commissioner, other than the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, approves or refuses to approve a warrant under this Section, the person, or any Special
Advocate appointed, may ask the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to decide whether to approve the decision to issue the warrant.”
Amendment 267, in clause 15, page 12, line 3, leave out “or organisation”.
These amendments would retain the capacity of a single warrant to permit the interception of multiple individuals but would require an identifiable subject matter or premises to be provided. This narrows the current provisions which would effectively permit a limitless number of unidentified individuals to have their communications intercepted.
Amendment 25, page 12, line 7, leave out “or” and insert “and”.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to limit the potentially broad scope of thematic warrants involving people who “share a common purpose” by ensuring that they also must be engaged in a particular activity.
Amendment 131, page 12, line 8, after “activity” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
These amendments seek to make more specific the currently very broadly worded thematic warrants in the Bill, to make it more likely that such thematic warrants will be compatible with the requirements of Article 8 ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.
Amendment 268, page 12, line 9, leave out “or organisation”.
See amendment 267
Amendment 132, page 12, line 11, after “operation” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
See amendment 131.
Amendment 272, page 12, line 12, leave out paragraph (c).
See amendment 267.
Amendment 306, page 12, line 13, leave out subsection (3).
See amendment 267.
Amendment 218, in clause 17, page 13, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 219, page 13, line 10, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 220, page 13, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 221, page 13, line 16, leave out subsection (1)(d).
Amendment 222, page 13, line 20, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 223, page 13, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 224, page 13, line 24, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 225, page 13, line 27, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 226, page 13, line 3, leave out subsection (2)(d).
Amendment 227, page 13, line 35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 228, page 13, line 37, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 229, page 13, line 39, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 230, page 13, line 42, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 231, page 13, line 45, leave out subsection (3)(d).
Amendment 232, page 14, line 5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 233, page 14, line 8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 234, page 14, leave out lines 11 and 12.
Amendment 235, page 14, line 13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 312, in clause 18, page 14, line 22, leave out paragraph (c).
See amendment 313.
Amendment 313, page 14, line 24, at end insert—
‘(2A) A warrant may be considered necessary as mentioned in subsection (2)(b) and (3) only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed.”
These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising interception and delete the separate subsection relating to economic well-being of the UK.
Amendment 236, page 14, line 30, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 237, page 14, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 262, page 14, line 38, at end insert—
‘(6) The fact that the information which would be obtained under a warrant relates to the activities in the British Islands of a trade union is not, of itself, sufficient to establish that the warrant is necessary on grounds falling within this section.”
This amendment restricts the application of warrants in relation to trade union activity.
Amendment 238, page 14, line 39, leave out clause 19.
Amendment 208, in clause 21, page 17, line 4, leave out
“review the person’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 209, page 17, line 10, leave out subsection (2).
Government manuscript amendment 497.
Amendment 265, page 17, line 10, leave out from “must” to end of line 11, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 208 and 209 (which are a package).
Government manuscript amendment 498.
Amendment 314, in clause 24, page 18, line 39, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 316.
Amendment 315, page 18, line 41, leave out subsection (b) and insert—
“(b) the warrant involves a member of a relevant legislature.”
See amendment 316.
Government amendment 53.
Amendment 316, page 19, line 7, leave out subsection (2) and insert—
“(2) Further to the requirements set out elsewhere in this Part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant if—
(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed,
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection to the offence at (a),
(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because it appeared that they were bound to fail,
(d) it is in the public interest having regard to the democratic interest in the confidentiality of correspondence with members of a relevant legislature.”
These amendments would ensure that applications for warrants to intercept the communications of elected politicians would be made to the Judicial Commissioner rather than to the Secretary of State via the Prime Minister. They would also set out additional requirements that the Judicial Commissioner must take into account before granting a warrant.
Amendment 1, page 19, line 8, at end insert
“and where the member is a member of the House of Commons he must also consult the Speaker of the House of Commons.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to consult the Speaker before deciding to issue a warrant that applied to an MP’s communications.
Amendment 137, page 19, line 8, after “Minister” insert
“and give sufficient notice to the relevant Presiding Officer of the relevant legislature to enable the relevant Presiding Officer to be heard at the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner.”
Amendment 138, page 19, line 14, at end insert—
“(4) In this section “the relevant Presiding Officer” means—
(a) the Speaker of the House of Commons,
(b) the Lord Speaker of the House of Lords,
(c) the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament,
(d) the Presiding Officer of the National Assembly for Wales,
(e) the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly,
(f) the President of the European Parliament.”
This amendment adds the safeguard of giving the Speaker, or other Presiding Officer, of the relevant legislature, sufficient notice before the Secretary of State decides whether to issue a warrant for targeted interception or examination of members’ communications, to enable the Speaker or Presiding Officer to be heard at the hearing before the Judicial Commissioner.
Amendment 139, in clause 25, page 19, line 16, leave out subsections (1) to (3).
This amendment removes the power to apply for a warrant the purpose of which is to authorise the interception, or selection for examination, of items subject to legal privilege.
Amendment 140, page 19, line 44, leave out subsection (4)(c).
See amendment 141.
Amendment 141, page 20, line 7, after “considers” insert—
“(a) that there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the interception, or (in the case of a targeted examination warrant) the selection for examination, of items subject to legal privilege, and
(b) ”.
These amendments introduce a threshold test for the interception or examination of communications likely to include items subject to legal privilege, reflecting the strong presumption against interference with lawyer-client confidentiality.
Amendment 307, in clause 27, page 21, line 7, leave out “or organisation”.
See amendment 267.
Amendment 308, page 21, line 8, leave out “or organisation”.
See amendment 267.
Amendment 309, page 21, line 13, leave out
“or describe as many of those persons as is reasonably practicable to name or describe”
and insert
“or specifically identify all of those persons using unique identifiers.”
See amendment 267.
Amendment 310, page 21, line 15, leave out “or organisation”.
See amendment 267.
Amendment 311, page 21, line 19, leave out
“or describe as many of those persons or organisations or as many of those sets of premises, as it is reasonably practicable to name or describe”
and insert
“all of those persons or sets of premises.”
See amendment 267.
Amendment 19, in clause 29, page 22, line 25, leave out
“before the end of the relevant”
and insert “during the renewal”.
See amendment 20.
Amendment 20, page 23, line 4, at end insert—
“(4A) ‘The renewal period’ means—
(a) in the case of an urgent warrant which has not been renewed, the relevant period;
(b) in any other case, the period of 30 days ending with the relevant period.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to prohibit the possibility of a warrant being renewed immediately. Clauses 28 and 29 would currently theoretically allow for warrants of 12 months duration rather than the intended six.
Amendment 21, page 23, line 16, at end insert—
“(8A) In this section ‘urgent warrant’ has the same meaning as in section 28.”
See amendment 20.
Amendment 147, page 23, line 19, leave out clause 30.
Government amendments 54 to 57.
Amendment 142, in clause 30, page 24, line 45, at end insert—
“(10A) Section 21 (Approval of warrants by Judicial Commissioners) applies in relation to a decision to make a major modification of a warrant by adding a name or description as mentioned in subsection (2)(a) as it applies in relation to a decision to issue a warrant; and accordingly where section 21 applies a Judicial Commissioner must approve the modification.”
This amendment seeks to ensure that major modifications of warrants require judicial approval.
Government amendment 58.
Amendment 148, page 25, line 22, leave out clause 31.
Government amendments 59 to 73.
Amendment 317, page 34, line 21, leave out clause 44.
This amendment would delete a Clause which permits the creation of additional interception powers immigration detention facilities.
Amendment 15, in clause 45, page 34, line 42, leave out “C” and insert “D”.
Consequential upon amendment 16.
Amendment 16, page 35, line 7, at end insert—
“(3A) Condition C is that the interception is carried out for the purpose of obtaining information about the communications of an individual who, both the interceptor and the person making the request have reasonable grounds for believing, is outside the United Kingdom.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to reinstate the current safeguard in RIPA that the person being intercepted must be outside the UK.
Amendment 17, page 35, line 8, leave out “C” and insert “D”.
Consequential upon amendment 16.
Government amendments 75 to 77.
Amendment 299, in clause 51, page 41, line 18, at end insert—
“(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”
An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for interception disclosures.
Government amendment 74.
Government new clause 11—Persons who may make modifications under section 104.
Government new clause 12—Further provision about modifications under section 104.
Government new clause 13—Notification of modifications.
New clause 23—Members of Parliament—
“(1) This section applies where—
(a) an application is made to the Judicial Commissioner for a targeted equipment interference warrant, and
(b) the warrant relates to a member of a relevant legislature.
(2) This section also applies where—
(a) an application is made to the Judicial Commissioner for a targeted examination warrant, and
(b) the warrant relates to a member of a relevant legislature.
(3) Where any conduct under this Part is likely to cover material described above, the application must contain—
(a) a statement that the conduct will cover or is likely to cover such material,
(b) An assessment of how likely it is that the material is likely to cover such material.
(4) Further to the requirements set out elsewhere in this part, the Judicial Commissioner may only issue a warrant if—
(a) there are reasonable grounds for believing that an indictable offence has been committed, and
(b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the material is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation in connection to the offence at (a), and
(c) other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and
(d) it is in the public interest having regard to:
(i) the public interest in the protection of privacy and the integrity of personal data,
(ii) the public interest in the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and,
(iii) the democratic interest in the confidentiality of correspondence with members of a relevant legislature.”
This new clause would ensure that applications for a targeted equipment interference warrant or targeted examination warrant in relation to Parliamentarians are granted on application only to a Judicial Commissioner, removing the role of Secretary of State and applies additional safeguards to the correspondence of parliamentarians when a warrant for hacking is sought.
New clause 24—Audit trail of equipment interference—
“Any conduct authorised under a warrant issued under this Part must be conducted in a verifiable manner, so as to produce a chronological record of documentary evidence detailing the sequence of activities (referred to hereafter as ‘the audit trail’).”
See amendment 387.
Amendment 178, in clause 90, page 68, line 24, leave out subsection (1)(b).
See amendment 186.
Amendment 133, page 68, line 26, after “activity” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
See amendment 131.
Amendment 134, page 68, line 29, after “operation” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
See amendment 131.
Amendment 179, page 68, line 31, leave out subsection (1)(e).
See amendment 186.
Amendment 180, page 68, line 33, leave out subsection (1)(f).
See amendment 186.
Amendment 181, page 68, line 35, leave out subsection (1)(g).
See amendment 186.
Amendment 182, page 68, line 38, leave out subsection (1)(h).
See amendment 186.
Amendment 187, page 68, line 40, at end insert—
“(1A) A targeted equipment interference warrant may only be issued in relation to any of the matters that fall under subsection (1) if the persons, equipment, or location to which the warrant relates are named or specifically identified using a unique identifier.”
This amendment would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or otherwise identified.
Amendment 352, page 68, line 44, leave out paragraph (b).
See amendment 357.
Amendment 135, page 68, line 45, after “activity” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
See amendment 131.
Amendment 136, page 68, line 47, after “operation” insert
“where each person is named or otherwise identified”.
See amendment 131.
Amendment 353, page 69, line 1, leave out paragraph (d).
See amendment 357.
Amendment 354, page 69, line 3, leave out paragraph (e).
See amendment 357.
Amendment 188, page 69, line 4, at end insert—
“(2A) A targeted examination warrant may only be issued in relation to any of the matters that fall under subsection (2) if the persons, equipment, or location to which the warrant relates are named or specifically identified using a unique identifier.”
This amendment would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or specifically identified.
Amendment 239, in clause 91, page 69, line 9, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 240, page 69, line 11, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 241, page 69, line 14, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 242, page 69, line 17, leave out subsection (3)(d).
Amendment 358, page 69, line 17, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—
“(d) the Judicial Commissioner has reasonable grounds for believing that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation or operation to which the warrant relates.”
See amendment 361.
Amendment 243, page 69, line 20, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 244, page 69, line 22, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 245, page 69, line 24, leave out “and”.
Amendment 246, page 69, line 25, leave out subsection (2)(b).
Amendment 247, page 69, line 31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 248, page 69, line 33, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 249, page 69, line 35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 250, page 69, line 38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 251, page 69, line 43, leave out subsection (3)(d).
Amendment 252, page 69, line 46, leave out subsection (4).
Amendment 359, page 70, line 8, after “crime” insert
“where there is reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed”.
See amendment 361.
Amendment 360, page 70, line 11, at end insert—
‘(5A) A warrant may be considered necessary only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed in relation to the grounds falling within this section.”
See amendment 361.
Amendment 361, page 70, line 25, at end insert—
“(10) A warrant may only authorise targeted equipment interference or targeted examination as far as the conduct authorised relates—
(a) to the offence as specified under (5)(b), or
(b) to some other indictable offence which is connected with or similar to the offence as specified under (5)(b)”.
These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising equipment interference to be issued. These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information.
This amendment would require that a warrant only authorises conduct in relation to the offence for which the warrant was sought, or other similar offences.
Amendment 258, page 70, line 26, leave out Clause 92.
Amendment 253, in clause 93, page 71, line 21, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 254, page 71, line 23, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 255, page 71, line 25, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 256, page 71, line 28, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioners”.
Amendment 257, page 71, line 31, leave out subsection (1)(d).
Amendment 382, page 71, line 31, leave out subsection (d) and insert—
“(d) the Judicial Commissioner has reasonable grounds for believing that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation or operation to which the warrant relates.”
See amendment 362.
Amendment 362, page 71, line 35, leave out from “include” to the end of line 36 and insert—
“(a) the requirement that other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and
(b) the requirement that a “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment” has been conducted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s technical advisors with regard to the specific equipment interference proposed, accounting for—
(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and
(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and
the risk to public cybersecurity.”
These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered. These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information.
Amendment 363, page 71, line 40, leave out Clause 94.
Government amendments 88 to 91.
Amendment 259, page 72, line 18, leave out Clause 95.
Amendment 364, in clause 96, page 72, line 37, leave out
“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 or 2 of the table in Schedule 6”
and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 365, page 72, line 38, leave out
“person who is an appropriate law enforcement officer in relation to the chief”
and insert
“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 366, page 72, line 41, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 367, page 73, line 1, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 368, page 73, line 4, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 369, page 73, line 7, leave out paragraph (d).
See amendment 383.
Amendment 370, page 73, line 10, leave out
“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”
and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 371, page 73, line 11, leave out
“person who is an appropriate law enforcement officer in relation to the chief”
and insert
“law enforcement chief described in Part 1 of the table in Schedule 6”
See amendment 383.
Amendment 372, page 73, line 13, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 373, page 73, line 17, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 374, page 73, line 20, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 375, page 73, line 23, leave out paragraph (d).
See amendment 383.
Amendment 376, page 73, line 26, leave out subsection (3).
See amendment 383.
Amendment 261, page 73, line 26, leave out “law enforcement chief” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
Amendment 377, page 73, line 32, leave out paragraphs (b) and (c).
Amendment 378, page 73, line 38, after “Where” insert
“an application for an equipment interference warrant is made by a law enforcement chief and”.
See amendment 383.
Amendment 379, page 73, line 42, leave out subsections (6) to (10).
See amendment 383.
Government amendment 92.
Amendment 380, page 74, line 15, leave out
“whether what is sought to be achieved by the warrant could reasonably be achieved by other means”
and insert—
“(a) the requirement that other proportionate methods of obtaining the material have been tried without success or have not been tried because they were assessed to be bound to fail, and
(b) the requirement that a “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment” has been conducted by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s technical advisors with regard to the
specific equipment interference proposed, accounting for—
(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and
(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and
the risk to public cybersecurity.”
See amendment 383.
Amendment 381, in clause 96, page 74, line 18, leave out subsections (12) and (13)
See amendment 383.
Amendment 210, in clause 97, page 74, line 40, leave out
“review the person’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 211, page 75, line 1, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 270, page 75, line 1, leave out from “must” to end of line 2, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 210 and 211 (which are a package).
Amendment 183, in clause 101, page 78, leave out lines 21 to 27.
See amendment 186.
Amendment 184, page 79, leave out lines 3 to 7.
See amendment 186.
Amendment 185, page 79, leave out lines 8 to 12.
See amendment 186.
Amendment 186, page 79, leave out lines 13 to 18.
These amendments refine the matters to which targeted equipment interference warrants may relate by removing vague and overly broad categories including equipment interference for training purposes.
Amendment 386, page 79, line 21, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—
“(b) precisely and explicitly the method and extent of the proposed intrusion and measures taken to minimise access to irrelevant and immaterial information, and
(c) in a separate “Cyber-Security Impact Assessment”,
(i) the risk of collateral interference and intrusion, and
(ii) the risk to the integrity of communications systems and computer networks, and
(iii) the risk to public cybersecurity, and how those risks and damage will be eliminated or corrected.”
See amendment 387.
Amendment 387, page 79, line 23, at end insert—
“(c) the basis for the suspicion that the target is connected to a serious crime or a specific threat to national security, and
(d) in declaration with supporting evidence,
(i) the high probability that evidence of the serious crime or specific threat to national security will be obtained by the operation authorised, and
(ii) how all less intrusive methods of obtaining the information sought have been exhausted or would be futile.”
These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered. They would introduce a requirement that all equipment interference produces a verifiable audit trail.
These amendments would introduce a requirement that warrants are only granted where there are reasonable grounds for believing material to be obtained will be of substantial value to the investigation or operation; the requirement of a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been committed in order for a warrant to be granted; and the requirement that warrant applications contain this information.
Amendment 355, page 79, leave out lines 31 to 36.
See amendment 357.
Amendment 356, page 79, leave out lines 37 to 44.
See amendment 357.
Amendment 357, page 80, leave out lines 8 to 12.
These amendments would ensure that all targets of hacking are properly named or specifically identified. Warrants may still be granted where the equipment in question belongs to or is in the possession of an individual or more than one person where the warrant is for the purpose of a single investigation or operation; or for equipment in a particular location or equipment in more than one location where for the purpose of a single investigation or operation.
Amendment 388, in clause 102, page 80, line 23, leave out “6” and insert “1”.
This specifies that hacking warrants may only last for one month.
Government amendments 93 to 96.
Amendment 149, page 82, line 1, leave out clause 104.
Government amendments 97 to 100.
Amendment 150, page 83, line 36, leave out clause 105.
Government amendments 101 to 113.
Amendment 151, page 84, line 34, leave out clause 106.
Government amendments 114 to 120.
Amendment 152, page 85, line 40, leave out clause 107.
Amendment 173, page 87, line 26, leave out clause 109.
Amendment 174, page 88, line 7, leave out clause 110.
Government amendments 121 and 122.
Amendment 175, page 88, line 35, leave out clause 111.
Amendment 176, in clause 114, page 92, line 6, leave out subsection (3)(e).
Amendment 177, page 92, line 8, leave out subsection (3)(f).
Government amendment 123.
Amendment 302, in clause 116, page 93, line 39, at end insert—
‘(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”
An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for equipment interference disclosures.
Government amendment 124.
Amendment 383, in schedule 6, page 214, line 7, leave out part 2.
These amendments remove the power for law enforcement chiefs to issue equipment interference warrants on application from law enforcement officers and replace it with the power for Judicial Commissioners to issue equipment interference warrants on application from law enforcement chiefs. They also remove the power to issue equipment interference warrants from other officers listed in Part 2, Schedule 6. These amendments require a technical assessment of proportionality accounting for the risks of the conduct proposed. These requirements would apply when applications from the intelligence services, the Chief of Defence Intelligence and law enforcement are considered.
Government amendments 125 and 126.
Government new clause 10.
Amendment 488, page 167, line 9, leave out clause 216.
This amendment would remove the provision for national security notices.
Government amendment 78.
Amendment 196, in clause 216, page 167, line 14, after “State”, insert
“and Investigatory Powers Commissioner consider”.
See amendment 205.
Amendment 197, page 167, line 32, after “State”, insert
“and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Government amendment 79.
Amendment 489, page 167, line 35, leave out clause 217.
This amendment would remove the provision for technical capability notices.
Government amendments 80 and 81.
Amendment 198, page 168, line 9 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner consider”.
See amendment 205.
Government amendment 82.
Amendment 199, page 168, line 27 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Government amendment 83.
Amendment 200, page 168, line 36 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Amendment 201, page 168, line 40 [Clause 217], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Government amendments 84 and 85.
Amendment 490, page 169, line 2, leave out clause 218.
Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.
Amendment 202, page 169, line 6 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Amendment 203, page 169, line 8 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Government amendment 86.
Amendment 204, page 169, line 20 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
See amendment 205.
Amendment 205, page 169, line 34 [Clause 218], after “State”, insert “and Investigatory Powers Commissioner”.
National Security and Technical Capability Notices should be subject to a double lock authorisation by the Secretary of State and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
Government amendment 87.
Amendment 491, page 170, line 10, leave out clause 219.
Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.
Amendment 492, page 170, line 38, leave out clause 220.
Consequential amendment following deletion of national security and technical capability notices.